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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the metaethical theory known as ‘Robust Realism.’ 
According to defenders of this view, there exist irreducible, non-natural, 
mind-independent, and categorically authoritative moral properties. The 
central aim of this thesis is to identify the best way of understanding and 
motivating these claims. In other words, I intend to develop a compelling 
metaphysics for Robust Realism. I don’t plan to show that Robust Realism 
is true, but I do plan to identify the best formulation of it. I will thereby 
put us in a better place to assess its viability against rival views of moral 
reality.  
The robustly realistic theory that I will develop is built around the 
idea that there are necessary moral norms. In other words, norms that 
have authority in every possible world. I show how positing such norms 
enables the Robust Realist to defuse two influential ways of objecting to 
their claim that moral properties are irreducible. I provide an account of 
necessary moral norms as fundamental entities with a modal jurisdiction 
that, unlike the many non-fundamental moral norms, is not limited by any 
contingent presupposition. I show that the mind-independence of moral 
properties and norms takes us some way toward the elimination of those 
contingent limiting factors.  I use this account to clarify the categoricity of 
moral direction, and in turn show how the categoricity of moral direction 
can be used in defence of an interestingly non-naturalist view of moral 
reality.  
I thereby give a compelling metaphysics for Robust Realism, but I 
do not thereby show that this theory is true. I thus consider prominent 
ways of arguing about moral reality, to assess whether we can decide the 
matter one way or another. Unfortunately, however, I show that debate 
about moral reality often results in a persistent stalemate. I diagnose this 
by appealing to deep differences in ‘temperament’ and ‘existential need.’ 
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1 Starting Points 
 
You have to start somewhere, and there are a number of places at which 
one might begin an investigation into the nature of morality. Some begin 
by asking about the content of our moral terms, like ‘right’ and ‘good’ and 
‘ought.’ Others try to make sense of the motivational role played by moral 
judgement, or they seek to improve our knowledge of human nature and 
moral psychology. These are respectable starting points for ‘metaethical’ 
inquiry, that is, inquiry into the nature and status of ethics. Semantic and 
psychological issues are interesting and important. But they are not my 
starting point. I begin with metaphysics. I want to make sense of moral 
reality. 
 More specifically, I want to answer the following question: what 
is the best way to understand the metaphysical commitments incurred by 
robustly realistic metaethical theories? In answering this question I will 
develop a set of metaphysical positions that should be accepted by those 
sympathetic to a view known as ‘Robust Realism.’ Developing this set of 
positions is the aim that guides subsequent chapters. But what is Robust 
Realism? I will answer this question thoroughly in §1.1, but here is a first 
approximation: Robust Realism is the claim that there is an irreducible, 
non-natural, mind-independent, categorically authoritative moral reality. 
Although it was long considered dead and buried, Robust Realism has in 
recent years been exhumed and revivified by a number of philosophers.1 
It is now alive and kicking, and I intend to advance our understanding of 
it. 
I don’t intend to show that Robust Realism is true. For reasons 
that will eventually become clear, I’m simply not that ambitious. My aim 
is quite modest, for I just want to show how a robust moral metaphysics 
should be developed. However, despite its relative modesty, this aim is 
important. There are many ways to view the metaphysical commitments 
of Robust Realism, and we won’t be in a position to properly compare this 
theory with its rivals until we have found the most convincing version of 
it. 
                                                             
1 Contemporary defenders include Shafer-Landau (2003), Huemer (2005), Oddie (2005), 
Wedgwood (2007), Cuneo (2007a), FitzPatrick (2008; 2011; 2014), Tännsjö (2010), 
Enoch (2007; 2011), and Wielenberg (2014). Not all of these philosophers use the term 
‘robust,’ though some do, and all are Robust Realists in the sense given in §1.1. Also, some 
discuss normativity in general rather than morality in particular. I will concentrate mainly 
on morality, as that’s what I’m interested in and you have to start somewhere. 
2 
 
So, in investigating the nature of morality, my starting points are 
metaphysics and, more specifically, the metaphysics of Robust Realism. 
One might doubt that this is the best way to begin a metaethical inquiry. 
Many are suspicious of metaphysics in general, and even those who aren’t 
might nevertheless regard it as a strange or misguided way to investigate 
and understand something as practical as morality. It will thus be worth 
explaining and justifying my chosen starting points, and I will do this in 
§1.2 and §1.3. First, however, I will clarify what Robust Realism actually 
is. 
 
1.1 Robust Realism 
It’s often said that ‘realism’ is a term of art, and this is certainly true in 
metaethics.2 Some philosophers have attempted to provide a principled 
distinction between realism and anti-realism in the metaethical domain, 
but given the technical nature of these terms of art I am mostly content to 
be permissive about who gets to call themselves a realist about morality.3 
The ‘realism’ label is apt for a variety of metaethical positions, and at the 
moment I feel no particular push to offer even a stipulative definition. As 
long as we are able to distinguish between different metaethical theories 
by identifying the specific cluster of commitments that each such theory 
accepts, I’ll be happy enough. My goal in this section is thus to (briefly) 
outline the exact combination of commitments that characterises Robust 
Realism, and that marks it out as distinct from various rival metaethical 
views. 
 An initial commitment that all Robust Realists will accept is as 
follows: 
Truth. There are substantive moral truths. 
Candidates for such truths include claims like ‘it is wrong to kill for fun’ 
and ‘helping others is generally admirable.’ Note that the commitment is 
to substantive moral truths. Everyone can endorse a claim like ‘killing is 
wrong or nineteen is a prime number,’ or ‘if killing is wrong, then killing 
is wrong.’ Even if such propositions are moral truths, they are too trivial 
to be of interest. However, whilst Truth is a claim that all Robust Realists 
will accept, it is not nearly enough to carve out distinctive territory for 
them. 
                                                             
2 Cf. Wright (1992: 1). 
3 For attempts to provide a principled distinction, see Dreier (2004) and Miller (2009).  
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This is because Truth can be interpreted in different ways, and 
many of those who style themselves as moral anti-realists will also claim 
to capture Truth. For instance, self-styled moral anti-realists might seek 
to accommodate substantive moral truth by appealing to deflationary, or 
relativist, or constructivist accounts of such truths.4 As we’ll see, there are 
a number of additional commitments that distinguish a robustly realistic 
interpretation of Truth from both realist and anti-realist alternatives. The 
overall combination of commitments that Robust Realists defend marks 
them out as offering an unusually uncompromising conception of moral 
reality.  
In particular, Robust Realists think that we need a metaphysically 
committed understanding of the claim that there are substantive moral 
truths. They will therefore accept the following: 
Properties. At least some substantive moral truths pertain to 
the moral properties of certain acts, or types of act. 
This puts us on the right track, but to get to a metaphysically robust form 
of moral realism we’ll need to say more about the nature of these moral 
properties. As it stands, the commitment to Properties is compatible with 
several theories that are not as uncompromising as Robust Realism. It is 
compatible with theories according to which moral properties reduce to 
descriptive properties, theories according to which moral properties are 
within the purview of the sciences, and theories according to which moral 
properties are in some way subjective. Robust Realists see each of these 
views as unsatisfactory, for reasons discussed in later chapters. So, to get 
to Robust Realism, we must clarify just what is involved in rejecting these 
views. 
 Robust Realists reject reductive construals of moral properties, 
and instead accept the following: 
Non-Reductivism. Moral properties are not reducible to 
purely descriptive properties. 
But what are these ‘purely descriptive’ properties, and what is it for moral 
properties to be (or fail to be) reducible to such properties? I return to 
these questions in Chapter 3, but it is worth saying just a little about them 
now. 
                                                             
4 For a deflationary understanding of substantive moral truths, see Blackburn (1998). For 
a relativist understanding, see Harman (1977). For a constructivist understanding, see 
Street (2008; 2010). 
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 Descriptive properties are those properties that can be picked out 
by the descriptive predicates, which include predicates like ‘… is human’ 
and ‘… is a garden gnome.’ Now, this gloss raises an obvious question: 
what is a descriptive predicate? And this question has an obvious answer: 
a descriptive predicate is one that describes something as it is or can be. 
Typically, then, to use a descriptive predicate is to say something true or 
false. This might make Non-Reductivism seem odd. After all, there is an 
everyday sense in which to say that an act is right or good is to describe 
it as right or good. And moral claims can be true or false.5 So is it not clear 
that moral properties are descriptive? It is not. At least, it’s not clear that 
they are purely descriptive, for moral predicates like ‘… is right’ involve 
or entail normative direction. This means that they’re not just capable of 
truth or falsity, for directions can also being satisfied or unsatisfied. This 
directive element is hard to see in descriptive predicates like ‘… is human’ 
and ‘… is a garden gnome,’ or even ‘… is desired’ and ‘… is pleasurable.’ 
These appear to be entirely on the ‘is’ side of the ‘is/ought’ divide. They 
seem to lack the element of direction found in morality. This appearance 
might turn out to be illusory, but Non-Reductivism amounts to a denial of 
the claim that the directive bit of morality can be had in purely descriptive 
terms.6  
What about reduction itself? In this context, we can see reduction 
as a relation that holds between properties or classes of property. There 
are various ways of understanding what it is for one class of properties to 
reduce to another. For instance, one might view the reduction relation as 
the identity relation, or as the constitution relation, or as the grounding 
relation. Alternatively, one might avoid a specific approach altogether by 
using a generic placeholder. For instance, one might ask whether moral 
properties exist ‘over-and-above’ purely descriptive properties, or one 
might ask whether they can be said to constitute an ‘addition of being.’7 
The approach to reduction that will be relevant in Chapter 3 involves the 
identity relation. I understand Robust Realism as primarily concerned to 
deny that the moral properties can be identified with purely descriptive 
properties. 
                                                             
5 Moreover, thick moral predicates – ‘… is brave’ and ‘… is cruel’ – have descriptive content. 
6 The opposing view – ‘Descriptivism’ – is defended by Jackson (1998) and Brown (2011). 
I discuss this position in depth in Chapter 3. 
7 Enoch (2011: 101) speaks of an ‘over-and-above’ relation. The phrase ‘addition of being’ 
is from Armstrong (1997: 117), though I don’t know if he is using it as a placeholder. 
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Robust Realists don’t just deny that moral properties reduce to 
any purely descriptive properties. They also deny that moral reality can 
be naturalised.8 It is hard to say exactly what this means, for the character 
of the natural/non-natural distinction is controversial in metaethics, and 
indeed philosophy generally. However, as I explain in Chapter 5, I operate 
with a ‘methodological’ approach to the natural/non-natural distinction. 
More specifically, I will work with a ‘disciplinary’ view of this distinction, 
on which the natural properties are those that fall within the purview of 
the natural or social sciences. So, a property counts as natural if it can be 
discovered by the methods of disciplines like physics, chemistry, biology, 
neuroscience, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, and so 
on.9  
This sort of methodological approach is common in metaethics, 
but it does raise questions. For instance, if we view natural properties via 
the natural and social sciences, we might want a more detailed account of 
what it is for some discipline to count as a natural or social science. And 
this complicates matters, for even if most of us know a science when we 
see one, demarcating science from non-science won’t be straightforward. 
Still, even if we’re unsure of precisely which conditions are necessary and 
sufficient for something’s counting as a science, we can plausibly suppose 
that there are such conditions. For instance, it is likely that science, unlike 
non-science, tests its hypotheses using repeatable empirical experiments. 
There is more to science than this, as we’ll see in Chapter 5, but there are 
things that we can say to usefully distinguish scientific and non-scientific 
inquiry. 
One might also wonder if it is too artificial to divide scientific from 
non-scientific inquiry. Universities often put their science and philosophy 
departments in separate faculties, but this hardly entails that they lack 
methodological similarities. I’ve no doubt that there is a certain overlap 
(see below). But there are also key differences, as I explain in Chapter 5. 
Thus, if we treat the disciplinary approach with care, and don’t take too 
much from it, it is a neat way to approach the natural and the non-natural. 
I know of no better way of approaching it, so I’ll put this one to cautious 
use. 
                                                             
8 For reasons that will become clear in later chapters, we should distinguish the rejection 
of reductive theories from the rejection of naturalistic theories. This is basically because 
not all naturalistic theories are reductive, and not all reductive theories are naturalistic. 
9 For detailed discussion, see Copp (2003), Shafer-Landau (2006), and Cuneo (2007b). 
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In short, Robust Realists reject naturalistic metaethical theories 
and instead accept the following: 
Non-Naturalism. Moral properties are beyond the purview of 
the natural and social sciences. 
I will consider how Robust Realists can best interpret and motivate the 
commitment to Non-Naturalism in Chapter 5, but for now the point is just 
that this commitment is sufficient to distinguish their theory from those 
that seek to accommodate morality within a strictly scientific picture of 
reality.10 
In addition to defending the irreducibility and the non-natural 
status of moral properties, Robust Realists also say that these properties 
exist objectively. There are different ways in which something might be 
considered objective. For instance, one might say that an entity counts as 
objective if one can be mistaken about its existence or nature. However, 
the Robust Realist has a much stronger style of objectivity in mind. This 
is because one can be mistaken about the existence and nature of socially 
constructed entities like money and nation states, and the Robust Realist 
certainly does not think that moral properties or truths are entities of this 
sort.11 
Robust Realists instead accept the following very strong view of 
moral objectivity: 
Mind-Independence. Moral properties are constitutively 
independent of any agent’s or set of agents’ actual or 
hypothetical attitudes, beliefs, and conventions. 
This does not entail that our attitudes (and so on) are entirely irrelevant 
to what is morally right or wrong in particular cases. For instance, it is 
compatible with Mind-Independence that substantive moral obligations 
lie solely in doing as one desires. I’d be surprised if this is where all such 
value lies, but this claim is perfectly compatible with Mind-Independence. 
If one’s obligation does indeed lie solely in doing as one desires, defenders 
of Mind-Independence will just say that this is the case even if you judge 
that one should never do as one desires and that just having desires is 
evil. This is the strong form of moral objectivity to which Robust Realists 
commit, and I discuss this commitment in detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6. 
                                                             
10 For some naturalistic theories, see Boyd (1988), Brink (1989) and Thomson (2008). 
11 This distinguishes them from constructivists like Korsgaard (1996) and Street (2008). 
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So far I have said that Robust Realists regard moral properties as 
irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent. Now, these are claims 
about the existential status of such properties, but the Robust Realist also 
makes a claim about the authority of morality: 
Categorical Authority. The authority of moral direction is 
paradigmatically categorical. 
First off, what is it for moral direction to be categorical? I will answer this 
question carefully in Chapter 5, but for now we can just say that direction 
is categorical if it is unconditional, or inescapably binding.12 Categorical 
direction is independent of any contingencies of a social or psychological 
nature.13 
We can contrast categorical direction with hypothetical direction. 
Consider the following: if you want you impress your boss, you should offer 
to work late this evening. There is certainly direction here, for the claim 
that you should offer to work late requires or demands something of you. 
But there is no categorical direction in this claim, for it is conditional on a 
particular psychological contingency – wanting to impress your boss. And 
the fact that this piece of direction comes with conditions ensures that it 
is escapable. If you were to change your end (impressing your boss), then 
(assuming no other relevant conditions are in play) the direction to take 
the means to that end (offering to work late) doesn’t apply. Hypothetical 
direction is thus binding, but only for those with the relevant desires or 
ends. 
This means that hypothetical direction is distinct from categorical 
direction like the following: you ought to keep your promise to meet your 
friend. It might get trumped by another moral obligation, but you cannot 
escape this piece of moral direction just because you don’t want to meet 
your friend. The obligation to keep your promise is unconditional, and is 
thus in some sense inescapable. The same goes for most other pieces of 
moral direction, at least according to Robust Realists. I will expand on this 
commitment in Chapter 5, offering a more detailed approach to morality’s 
inescapability and the role that this can play in attempts to motivate the 
rejection of naturalistic theories. Before moving on, it is worth drawing 
out two points about the Robust Realist’s commitment to Categorical 
Authority. 
                                                             
12 Cf. Kant (Groundwork). 
13 This way of putting it echoes Hampton (1998: 96). 
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First, the commitment does not require that all moral direction is 
categorical. Just that it is paradigmatically so. This means that, if we were 
to discover that some moral direction is non-categorical, this would not 
be sufficient to falsify Categorical Authority. And this is perfectly fine, for 
Robust Realism should be understood as a particular thesis rather than 
as a universal thesis. In other words, it is a theory on which some moral 
properties are robustly real, not on which all such properties are robustly 
real.  
Second, note that the commitments to Categorical Authority and 
Mind-Independence are distinct. I want to make this explicit, for they look 
similar. After all, both are independence claims. Mind-Independence says 
that moral properties are constitutively independent of attitudes, beliefs, 
and conventions. Categorical Authority says that the authority of moral 
direction is independent of social and psychological contingencies. There 
is a difference between these independence claims. Mind-Independence 
is a claim about the objective existential status of moral properties, whilst 
Categorical Authority is a claim about the inescapable authority of the 
direction provided by the ascription of such properties. If the difference 
remains unclear, consider that it is entirely uncontroversial to hold that 
natural properties can be mind-independent, but it is highly controversial 
to hold that the ascription of natural properties can direct categorically. 
Maybe categoricity can be naturalised, but this is something that must be 
shown. 
Before defining Robust Realism, there is another point to address. 
Some have argued that the commitments discussed so far can be secured 
without any robust metaphysical commitments. This claim is associated 
with two theories – ‘Quasi-Realism’ and ‘Relaxed Realism.’14 I’ll discuss 
these theories in the next chapter, but the idea that they have in common 
is as follows: when the commitments that we have considered so far are 
correctly construed, they are moral and not metaphysical commitments. 
They are ‘internal’ to ethics, occurring within the moral domain. They are 
not ‘external’ claims about ethics, requiring a metaphysically committed 
theory. Indeed, the Quasi-Realists and the Relaxed Realists have typically 
suggested that these commitments can only be understood as internal to 
ethics. 
                                                             
14 Quasi-Realists include Blackburn (1984; 1993a; 1998; 2010a) and Gibbard (2003). 
Relaxed Realists, also known as ‘Quietists,’ include Dworkin (1996; 2011), Nagel (1997), 
Kramer (2009), Parfit (2011 v.2), and Scanlon (2014). 
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If this is correct, then there is no space for a metaphysically robust 
view of moral reality. Of course, Robust Realists think that there is space 
for such a view. They therefore accept the following: 
External Metaphysics. We can assess the nature of moral 
properties from an external metaphysical standpoint, and 
the existence of such properties is to be defended or rejected 
primarily from that standpoint by appeal to external 
metaphysical considerations. 
I will explain and defend this commitment more thoroughly in the next 
chapter, showing how Quasi-Realism and Relaxed Realism fail to threaten 
it. For now we can just note that a commitment to External Metaphysics 
is required to demarcate Robust Realism from any theory that claims to 
secure claims like Truth, Properties, Non-Reductivism, Non-Naturalism, 
Mind-Independence and Categorical Authority in some non-metaphysical 
sense. 
 Now we can define Robust Realism. The following is sufficient to 
characterise the heart of the theory, and to distinguish it from rivals: 
Robust Realism. There are substantive moral truths that 
commit us to irreducible, non-natural, mind-independent 
moral properties. The authority of direction provided by the 
successful ascription of such properties is paradigmatically 
categorical. Their existence is to be defended primarily from 
an external metaphysical standpoint, by appeal to external 
metaphysical considerations. 
This has been a whistle-stop tour through the terrain that Robust Realism 
occupies in the metaethical landscape. I won’t go into further detail about 
the commitments that characterise my conception of Robust Realism, for 
I return to them all in subsequent chapters. What matters now is that this 




You might have noticed that Robust Realism, as I’ve defined it, is a strictly 
metaphysical theory. It incorporates a number of claims about the nature 
of moral reality, but it incorporates no claims about moral semantics or 
psychology. I will explain why I define Robust Realism in this way in §1.3, 




 After all, you might see it as a mistake to do so. Perhaps you are 
suspicious of metaphysics in general, or perhaps you think that abstract 
metaphysical theorising is a peculiar way to start an investigation into as 
blatantly practical a domain as morality. I agree that morality is primarily 
a practical discipline. For the most part, moral life does not take place in 
a seminar room. Without wishing to offer any sort of definition, moral 
inquiry is centrally concerned with how we should act and how we should 
live. In contrast, metaphysics seems extremely abstract and theoretical. 
Without wishing to offer any sort of definition, metaphysics is centrally 
concerned with understanding the nature and structure of reality as a 
whole. 
 More specifically, as I understand it, metaphysics is an inherently 
speculative enterprise. A metaphysician considers the various ways that 
reality might be, and then gives tentative arguments for thinking that it is 
one way and not another. These needn’t be knockdown arguments. That 
would be an unfairly high expectation, and metaphysical inquiry can be 
fruitfully conducted with much more humble intellectual ambitions. And 
this means that metaphysicians need not retreat to studying the structure 
of our concepts, or whatever. Given the caveat that their suggestions are 
speculative, they can view themselves as studying the nature of reality 
itself.15 
Still, you may ask why one should start a metaethical inquiry with 
metaphysics. Given that morality is primarily practical, and given that 
metaphysics seems primarily theoretical, what bearing can metaphysical 
inquiry have on our view of morality? The first thing to note here is that 
it is simply a mistake to operate with a strict division between theory and 
practice. The distinction may sometimes be useful, but it is also artificial. 
Theory can matter for practice, and practice is at least to some degree 
theory-laden. Our engagement with practical issues takes place against a 
background of internalised concepts, norms, motives, rationales, and so 
on. These are often related more or less systematically and more or less 
coherently, and are thus more or less theoretical. They may not rise to the 
level of explicit and unified philosophical theories, but they can still be 
understood as theories that guide practice. One job for philosophers is to 
make these theories explicit, to assess their quality, and to improve upon 
them.16 
                                                             
15 For this conception of metaphysics, see Lowe (1998; 2000). 
16 For a more detailed discussion in a similar vein, see Nussbaum (2000). 
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This point applies even with highly practical domains. Answers to 
substantive ethical questions about the permissibility of euthanasia, for 
example, will turn partly on metaphysical assumptions about the nature 
of personal identity. And those metaphysical assumptions may turn upon 
on further and perhaps much more abstract metaphysical assumptions 
about, for example, agency and the identity relation. This is certainly not 
to say that the metaphysical issues must be settled before one can discuss 
the ethical issues. It’s simply to say that metaphysical assumptions often 
bear on our answers to moral questions. One role for theory is to shape 
these background assumptions into something coherent and plausible, so 
metaphysical theorising has a contribution to make to substantive moral 
inquiry. 
The insights provided by moral metaphysics will also have some 
practical significance. Metaphysical argument may ultimately convince us 
that there are no moral properties, for example, and this is very likely to 
have an effect on our ability to take seriously those claims that involve 
such properties. We may feel compelled to abandon morality, or to revisit 
and perhaps rethink our understanding of what morality is. Alternatively, 
metaphysical inquiry might convince that there are moral properties, and 
it might help us to understand them. The discovery that there are moral 
properties would vindicate morality against certain sceptical attacks, and 
could help to reinforce our efforts to work together on moral questions. 
So, once again, metaphysical theorising is not without practical import. It 
is thus a mistake to reject metaphysical inquiry as a metaethical starting 
point on the grounds that, unlike moral life, it is primarily theoretical and 
abstract. 
Moreover, the basic concern of metaphysics ensures that it will 
come up eventually in any prolonged intellectual inquiry. Metaphysics is 
concerned with scrutinising the nature and structure of reality as a whole. 
Its province is thus all-encompassing. It is worth noting that this inclusive 
conception of metaphysical inquiry entails that even scientists do a little 
bit of metaphysical (or at least quasi-metaphysical) inquiry at a particular 
point in their investigations. When they offer their hypotheses, scientists 
are speculating as to how a certain portion of reality might be. Of course, 
scientists seek empirical evidence (rather than philosophical arguments) 
for their hypotheses – this is one crucial way in which scientific inquiry 
diverges from that of philosophical metaphysics, as I’ll explain in Chapter 




On this approach, a little bit of metaphysical inquiry is therefore 
unavoidable even if science is the only path to knowledge. But one should 
not assume without argument that science is the only path to knowledge. 
Indeed, as I noted in §1.1, the Robust Realist accepts Non-Naturalism, the 
view that the moral properties are beyond the purview of the natural and 
social sciences. Either way, to inquire into the way in which morality fits 
into the universe is to consider various ways that moral reality might be, 
and to then defend one particular conception of it. For the Robust Realist, 
then, inquiry into the nature of moral reality is an inherently speculative 
enterprise. And that’s fine. Not all speculation is idle, even if it is backed 
up by philosophical arguments rather than empirical experiments. But, 
again, what reasons are there to start with this speculative metaphysical 
inquiry. 
Well, as should now be obvious, it’s going to come up eventually 
given the all-encompassing nature of metaphysical inquiry. Metaphysics 
is centrally concerned with the nature and structure of reality as a whole, 
and moral life is a part of the nature and structure of reality as a whole. 
Anyone interested in giving a systematic understanding of morality will 
thus have to do a bit of metaphysical inquiry at some point. Bluntly, then, 
one might as well get it over with. Less bluntly, in asking about the nature 
of ethics and ethical life, it seems to me sensible to start with the broadest 
form of inquiry. Understanding and comparing the various ways that 
moral reality might be will give frameworks within which other questions 
– for instance, questions about moral semantics and psychology – can be 
located.  
I lack the space (and the energy) to develop and compare every 
account of moral reality, so I centre my discussion on one theory – Robust 
Realism. I don’t aim to show that this theory is true, but I will develop a 
compelling metaphysics for it. Having now offered some general remarks 
about metaphysics and its legitimacy as a metaethical starting point, I will 
next explain the particular significance of metaphysical inquiry to Robust 
Realism. 
  
1.3 Metaphysics and Robust Realism 
I have been explicit about the fact that I define Robust Realism in strictly 
metaphysical terms. This is not because I regard the various semantic and 
psychological claims that are commonly associated with Robust Realism 




 First, what semantic and psychological claims are associated with 
Robust Realism? We can start with the following: 
Cognitivist Semantics. Moral sentences are truth-apt. 
Cognitivist Psychology. Moral judgements express beliefs. 
Of course, a great many non-robust metaethicists will also accept these 
rather thin commitments, but Robust Realists can distinguish themselves 
by accepting the following: 
Robust Referent. If moral sentences and moral judgements 
successfully refer, they refer to robust moral properties. 
This is an interesting and controversial set of commitments, but it is not 
essential to Robust Realism. We can see this by considering the possibility 
of combining a robust account of moral properties with a substantive 
view known as ‘Abolitionism.’ As will become clear, this is an unorthodox 
pairing of views, but its mere availability within the conceptual landscape 
shows that Robust Realism is best seen as a fundamentally metaphysical 
theory. 
 In this context, Abolitionism is the view that it is in our interests 
to eliminate moral thought and discourse. Its defenders recommend that 
we stop uttering moral sentences and making moral judgements. They 
allow that we can engage in non-moral direction and evaluation, but think 
that we are better off getting rid of our moral framework. Abolitionism is 
associated with ‘Error Theory,’ but it is also possible to combine it with 
other metaethical views. Before we consider how it can be combined with 
Robust Realism, it will help to see how it relates to Error Theory. First off, 
note that Error Theorists are with Robust Realists when it comes to moral 
semantics and psychology. They part, however, in their willingness to 
accept the metaphysical views outlined in §1.1 – whereas Robust Realists 
say that robust moral properties exist, Error Theorists deny this. In short, 
Error Theorists argue that moral thought and discourse are essentially 
committed to the existence of robust moral properties, that no such moral 
properties exist, and that moral thought and discourse are thus infected 
with an error.17 If this is correct, an obvious question arises: what are we 
to do? Abolitionism offers one possible answer. It tells us that we are to 
get rid of our moral framework, and direct or evaluate only in non-moral 
terms. 
                                                             
17 Cf. Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001; 2006), Streumer (2008; 2011), and Olson (2014). 
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 This is not, of course, the only available option. According to some 
Error Theorists, it is in our interests to reform our moral framework so 
that it becomes a sort of make-believe. This is ‘Fictionalism.’ On this view, 
rather than making moral judgements we would instead just pretend to 
make moral judgement, for there is no error in pretending. Alternatively, 
we might accept ‘Conservationism.’ On this view, we should just continue 
with our faulty moral discourse.18 However, the Abolitionist recommends 
that we eliminate our moral framework altogether.19 Those who defend 
this view do so because they think that, prudentially speaking, it is our 
best option. They maintain that moral thought and discourse do badly in 
a cost-benefit analysis, and that it is in our interests to replace them with 
something else – probably something like purely prudential thought and 
discourse. This will make life go better, whilst avoiding any metaphysical 
issues. 
 Various arguments for Abolitionism have been offered, but the 
most effective centres on the categoricity of moral direction. Roughly, the 
suggestion is that categorical moral judgements undermine our ability to 
successfully resolve practical conflicts. More specifically, if you judge that 
Φ-ing is unconditionally and inescapably demanded of you, this will make 
you less inclined to compromise with those who are opposed to Φ-ing. 
The risk is that this will lead to entrenchment and deadlock among the 
conflicting parties in difficult disputes, making it less likely that they will 
productively resolve their practical conflicts at both an interpersonal and 
an intercultural level. Whether or not you find this plausible, it is clear 
that Abolitionism is a view that can be coherently combined with Error 
Theory. What is of interest here, however, is that Abolitionism can also 
be coherently combined with Robust Realism.20 If it is in our interests to 
abolish our moral framework, a Robust Realist can recommend that we 
do so. Indeed, unlike the Error Theorist, the Robust Realist can even claim 
that our moral framework should be abolished for moral reasons; maybe 
the most effective way of realising moral ends is to stop thinking in moral 
terms.  
                                                             
18 Fictionalism has been defended by Joyce (2001; 2005) and Nolan et al. (2005), whilst 
Conservationism has been defended by Olson (2014). 
19 Abolitionism is defended by Hinckfuss (1987), Garner (2007), and Marks (2013). I have 
argued that this theory has a surprising amount going for it in Ingram (2015a). 
20 I think that Robust Realism and Abolitionism make an interesting theoretical package. 
Although I do not in fact endorse this package, I have explored it in Ingram (2015a).  
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If we were to stop thinking in moral terms, this wouldn’t mean 
that robust moral properties don’t exist. They’re mind-independent, so 
they’ll still exist even if you aren’t paying attention to them. We might not 
even have to eliminate the second-order belief that such properties exist. 
We just have to stop appealing to them in ordinary life, and replace our 
moral framework with something else. In practice, this would of course 
be difficult. But it is at least possible in principle, and the mere possibility 
of combining a robust view of moral properties with Abolitionism shows 
that we should understand Robust Realism as an essentially metaphysical 
view.  
Let’s name the combination of Robust Realism and Abolitionism 
‘Realist Abolitionism.’ It would be odd to say that Realist Abolitionists fail 
to be robust in their metaethical outlook even though they maintain that 
there exist irreducible, non-natural, mind-independent, and categorically 
authoritative moral properties whose existence can be established from 
an external metaphysical standpoint. The fact that Realist Abolitionists 
also take there to be compelling moral or prudential reasons to abolish 
moral thought and discourse should not prevent us from seeing them as 
metaethically robust. The central insight of the Realist Abolitionist is that, 
if there are robust moral truths, they’re not going to go away just because 
the final moral judgement has been made, and the final moral sentence 
uttered.  
This is why metaphysical inquiry should be our starting point in 
an investigation into Robust Realism.21 Semantics and psychology are 
both interesting, and they may help when we think about the more basic 
metaphysical issues. Still, it is the metaphysical commitments outlined in 
§1.1 that constitute the essential core of Robust Realism. It is with these 
commitments that Robust Realism must stand or fall, and metaphysical 
considerations will thus be vital to our evaluation of this theory. Even if 
we set aside the general reasons to begin metaethics with metaphysical 
inquiry, there are reasons for inquiry into Robust Realism to start in this 
way. 
 
                                                             
21 Kahane (2013) arrives at a similar conclusion in a different way. He argues that we can 
see that Robust Realism is fundamentally metaphysical by inverting Error Theory. After 
all, Error Theory accepts a robust moral semantics and psychology, but rejects a robust 
metaphysics. Kahane discusses so-called ‘Reverse Theory,’ on which a robust metaphysics 
is accepted but a robust semantics and psychology are rejected. He plausibly argues that 




Having explained the importance of metaphysics for investigating the 
nature of morality in general and Robust Realism in particular, I am now 
in a position to lay bare something that will be important in subsequent 
chapters but that has hitherto gone unmentioned. Specifically, a key idea 
that guides the discussion in subsequent chapters is that considerations 
pertaining to the necessity of (at least some) moral truths are crucial for 
understanding and motivating the metaphysical commitments of Robust 
Realism.  
For example, some influential objections to Non-Reductivism can 
be answered by appeal to the idea that there are necessary moral truths. 
Moreover, a plausible account of these necessary moral truths is, I will 
argue, partly bound up with the commitment to Mind-Independence. In 
addition, the commitment to Categorical Authority can be interpreted via 
a certain sort of necessity claim, and this in turn helps the Robust Realist 
to motivate their commitment to Non-Naturalism. All of this will become 
clearer as the discussion unfolds, and I will not pre-empt that discussion 
at this point. However, given that considerations pertaining to necessity 
will have an important role to play in subsequent chapters, it is worth 
taking a moment to provide some general comments about necessity and 
modality. 
First of all, what is necessity? The short answer, which will do for 
my purposes, is that something is necessary if it must be. In other words, 
the necessary is that which cannot be otherwise. For instance, it is clearly 
necessary that 2+2=4. This cannot be otherwise. In contrast, something 
is contingent (or merely possible) if it only might be. This is to say that 
the contingent is that which can be otherwise. It is merely contingent, for 
example, that I have curly hair. I could have had straight hair, or I could 
have had no hair at all. Now, claims about necessity and contingency are 
often articulated using the language of ‘possible worlds,’ and I follow this 
practice. Roughly speaking, possible worlds are complete ways the actual 
world might have been.22 Setting aside a caveat mentioned below, we can 
say that a proposition is a necessary truth if it is true at all worlds, and we 
can say that it is a contingent truth if it is true at some worlds and not at 
others. 
                                                             
22 As far as I can tell, nothing that I say will depend on any particular conception of the 
nature and status of possible worlds. For some prominent views, see Plantinga (1974), 
Kripke (1980), Lewis (1986), and Armstrong (1989). 
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To clarify, in saying that it is necessary that 2+2=4, one is saying 
that this is true at all possible worlds. In saying that it is contingent that I 
have curly hair, I am saying that there are worlds in which I do not have 
curly hair. In some of these worlds, I do not exist. In others, I exist with 
straight hair. In others, I exist but have no hair at all.23 And so on. As will 
become clear in later chapters, the Robust Realist can achieve a great deal 
just by elaborating on the claim that some moral truths hold at all possible 
worlds. 
Now, it may be that there is more than one type of necessity. We 
can speak of analytic necessity, nomic necessity, metaphysical necessity, 
epistemic necessity, conventional necessity, and so on. Whether there is 
a deep distinction between these forms of necessity is up for debate, but 
we can differentiate them in a somewhat loose manner.24 For instance, a 
proposition is analytically necessary if it must be true given its meaning.25 
It is nomically necessary if it must be true given the laws that govern the 
relevant phenomena. And it is metaphysically necessary if it must be true, 
even under different laws of nature. Controversies abound when it comes 
to giving a detailed account of these necessities, and the relations among 
them all, but my only concern in what follows is the necessity in Robust 
Realism. 
Note as well that necessity claims can be more or less restricted 
in scope. Not all uses of modal terms like ‘must’ and ‘cannot’ pertain to all 
worlds. Some are implicitly or explicitly localised to a world or a set of 
worlds. Consider tennis. To win a tie-break game a player must reach at 
least seven points, with a margin of two points over the opposing player. 
However, the scope of this ‘must’ is (implicitly) restricted to the worlds 
at which certain conventions – the rules of tennis – obtain. And there are 
worlds in these conventions are different. For instance, there are worlds 
in which a player must reach at least nine points to win a tie-break. The 
nature of the conventions limits the range of worlds in which the claim is 
true.26  
                                                             
23 I’d rather not think about such worlds, but I am willing to acknowledge their possibility. 
24 For discussion of how the varieties of necessity may be related, see Fine (2002). 
25 Of course, there are complications arising from Quine (1951).  
26 Most games have some rules analytically built into them. To change such rules would 
be to make a new and different game. I don’t think that the tie-break rule in tennis is such 
a rule. But it is likely true of other rules in tennis, like the rule requiring a player to hit the 
ball so that it lands within the court. Thanks to Jimmy Lenman for this observation. 
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Although many necessity claims are restricted in their scope, for 
the Robust Realist it is mainly those that extend to all possible worlds that 
will be at issue. Again, this is because the Robust Realist can go a long way 
simply with the suggestion that certain moral truths obtain at all possible 
worlds. But how should we understand the necessity in Robust Realism 
itself? This is an important and interesting question that is only beginning 
to receive the attention it deserves.27 I discuss it in Chapter 4, in which I 




In this chapter I have explained and justified my starting points. I begin 
with moral metaphysics, which I take to be the speculative enterprise of 
outlining and assessing the various ways that moral reality might be. My 
specific focus is on Robust Realism, the claim that there are irreducible, 
non-natural, mind-independent, and categorically authoritative moral 
properties that exist from an external metaphysical point of view. In the 
chapters that follow, my overarching aim is to develop this theory in more 
depth. I mean to outline a unified and compelling metaphysics for Robust 
Realism. Moreover, in developing this metaphysics I will at various points 
draw on claims relating to necessity. However, before launching into this 
project, I will first explain how exactly it is going to unfold. I don’t like to 
give the game away, but it may help to have a sense of what each chapter 
will do. 
 Chapter 2 addresses some challenges to External Metaphysics. It 
is important to begin with this commitment, as there will be no space for 
a robust view of moral properties if it turns out to be untenable, and that 
would obviously undermine my core aim, which is to outline a compelling 
metaphysical position for Robust Realism. I explain the precise nature of 
the challenge facing defenders of External Metaphysics, distinguishing a 
modest and an ambitious version of this challenge. The modest version is 
associated with Quasi-Realism, and the ambitious version is associated 
with Relaxed Realism. My discussion of these theories will show that we 
can uphold a commitment to External Metaphysics, properly interpreted, 
and thereby vindicates my project of providing a metaphysics for Robust 
Realism. 
                                                             
27 A recent discussion comes from Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). I consider and reject 
their view in Chapter 4. For other discussions, see Scanlon (2014) and Skarsaune (2015). 
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 Chapter 3 examines the commitment to Non-Reductivism. After 
outlining some evidence for Non-Reductivism, I consider two influential 
objections to it. I show that these objections can be answered by appeal 
to necessary moral truths. The objections in question seek to challenge 
Non-Reductivism by appealing to the supervenience of moral properties 
on descriptive properties. The first says that this supervenience relation, 
combined with some other plausible claims, entails that moral properties 
reduce to descriptive properties. The second says that Non-Reductivism 
makes a mystery out moral supervenience. I explain how both objections 
can be answered by appeal to necessary moral truths. I do not argue that 
there definitely are such truths, but I do argue that this claim is at least 
tenable. 
 Chapter 4 examines the necessity in Robust Realism in greater 
detail. I consider and reject a recently suggested view according to which 
some moral truths hold as a matter of conceptual necessity. I then outline 
a different account of the necessity in Robust Realism. I basically suggest 
that the necessity in Robust Realism can be understood in terms of the 
elimination of what I call ‘limiting factors.’ These are, broadly, contingent 
factors that are built into or presupposed by many moral norms, and that 
limit the range of worlds in which those norms have authority. If a moral 
norm can survive its limiting factors having been stripped away, and if all 
of these limiting factors are in fact stripped away, we will have found a 
moral norm that holds as a matter of necessity. I illustrate this process of 
stripping away limiting factors with Mind-Independence, a metaphysical 
commitment which in itself eliminates a significant limitation on moral 
norms. 
 Chapter 5 looks at the commitment to Categorical Authority, and 
explores how it can help to motivate the commitment to Non-Naturalism. 
Interpretations of categoricity often rely on evocative but vague images, 
so I provide a way of getting a clear grip on it. Roughly, we can get a grip 
on the notion of categorical authority by focusing on the fact that anyone 
who culpably violates a categorical moral norm will necessarily acquire 
the property of being morally blameworthy. This necessity claim can then 
be construed in a modally ‘fragile’ or a modally ‘robust’ sense. If there are 
necessary moral norms then the modally robust sense is the way to go, 
and I argue that it leads us to Non-Naturalism. More precisely, I argue that 
the modally robust necessitation of moral blameworthiness is something 




 Having developed this set of metaphysical positions, and having 
explained why Robust Realists should find it compelling, I then move on 
to a different topic. Chapter 6 examines the dialectical situation that we 
face in contemporary metaethics. I consider this in order to assess how 
much we can expect to achieve when we argue about moral reality. Given 
that my aim here is just to develop Robust Realism, rather than to show 
that it is true, I want to know whether and how we can make progress in 
metaethical debate. Building my discussion around Mind-Independence, 
I suggest that some common ways of arguing about moral reality lead to 
an intractable stalemate, and that this stalemate is likely to generalise and 
persist as a result of entrenched differences in our temperaments and 
existential needs. I explain how these temperamental divisions have a lot 
to do with our feelings about the link between necessity, contingency and 
arbitrariness. I then consider how one might respond to this dialectical 
situation, arguing that we may need to limit the ambitions of metaethical 
inquiry. In spite of our best efforts, determining whether Robust Realism 
(or some other metaethical theory) is actually true might well be beyond 
us. 
 Chapter 7 concludes my inquiry by bringing together its various 
elements, and by sketching a number of avenues that I hope to explore in 
future research. However, before thinking about research that I hope to 


















2 The Possibility of Robust Realism 
 
Robust Realism is distinguished from most other metaethical theories by 
its acceptance of the following combination of commitments: 
Truth. There are substantive moral truths. 
Properties. At least some substantive moral truths pertain to 
the moral properties of certain acts, or types of act. 
Non-Reductivism. Moral properties are not reducible to 
purely descriptive properties. 
Non-Naturalism. Moral properties are beyond the purview of 
the natural and social sciences. 
Mind-Independence. Moral properties are constitutively 
independent of any agent’s or set of agents’ actual or 
hypothetical attitudes, beliefs, and conventions. 
Categorical Authority. The authority of moral direction is 
paradigmatically categorical. 
It will be useful to give this combination of commitments a name, so I will 
call them the ‘Realist Commitments.’ Given that ‘realism’ is a term of art, 
you can legitimately describe yourself as a moral realist even if you don’t 
accept each and every one of the Realist Commitments. However, they are 
all in fact accepted by each of the three theories that are at issue in this 
chapter.  
In addition to Robust Realism, the theories at issue in this chapter 
are Quasi-Realism and Relaxed Realism. There are important differences 
between those two theories, but there are important similarities too, for 
they are roughly alike in how they see the Realist Commitments. Both see 
them as moral rather than metaphysical commitments, and both maintain 
that they can be secured without any robust metaphysical claims. On top 
of this, Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists commonly suggest that the 
Realist Commitments can only be interpreted in this non-robust light. Put 
another way, for many Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists, there is just 
no space for a metaphysically robust reading of the Realist Commitments. 
This should clearly worry anyone with plans to develop a metaphysically 
robust interpretation of the Realist Commitments. Given that I have plans 




After all, if the Realist Commitments cannot be interpreted as 
metaphysical, it won’t even be possible to articulate (let alone defend) a 
robust view of morality. This is the sense in which many Quasi-Realists 
and Relaxed Realists have denied that there is space for Robust Realism. 
So, these two theories present an apparent threat to the very possibility 
of Robust Realism. In this chapter I deal with this threat, explaining what 
it is and how it fails. I begin in §2.1 and §2.2 by outlining the challenge in 
detail, exposing a modest and an ambitious version of it. Quasi-Realism 
presents the modest version, and Relaxed Realism presents the ambitious 
version. I discuss Quasi-Realism in §2.3 and §2.4, showing that it fails to 
threaten the possibility of Robust Realism. I then move on to the chapter’s 
main focus, which is the more ambitious challenge defended by Relaxed 
Realists. I explain the Relaxed Realist position in §2.5 and §2.6, and I then 
respond to the threat that it poses in §2.7 and §2.8. I conclude in §2.9 that 
there is space to articulate and defend a metaphysically robust account of 
morality. 
 
2.1 Two Points of View 
What goes into a robustly metaphysical view of the Realist Commitments, 
and how could one view them in any other way? We can begin to answer 
these questions by appealing to a distinction between the two points of 
view from which one can think about morality. On the one hand, we have 
the ‘internal’ point of view. On the other, we have the ‘external’ point of 
view. 
 First, the internal point of view. This is the first-order standpoint 
from which we ask and answer substantive ethical questions. It is called 
‘internal’ because it is the point of view occupied within ethics. In other 
words, it is the perspective from which one judges that killing is wrong, 
that helping other people is admirable, and that courage is a virtue. These 
claims are all quite widely accepted, of course, but we can also ask more 
controversial questions at the internal moral level. For instance, we might 
assess whether it is morally permissible to eat meat by considering moral 
arguments for and against meat eating. More abstractly, we might ask 
what it takes for an act to be right, for a person to be good, and for a social 
institution to count as just. We can work on these first-order moral issues 
together, for the internal perspective is one that all moral agents occupy. 
Of course, we often disagree about the best way to answer substantive 




 Second, we have the external point of view. This is a second-order 
standpoint at which we abstract away from all straightforwardly ethical 
questions and ask metaethical questions instead – that is, questions about 
moral reality, moral semantics, moral psychology, moral knowledge, and 
so on. This external perspective is often seen as being ‘detached’ from the 
internal moral perspective.1 On this understanding, when we occupy the 
external point of view can be strictly neutral on the substantive moral 
questions that we ask within the internal perspective. The external point 
of view is therefore distinctively non-substantive. Put another way, every 
external metaethical position is compatible with every first-order moral 
position. 
I’ll say more about this later, but for now the point is that it is from 
an apparently neutral perspective that one asks metaethical questions. 
To illustrate, from the external point of view one might ask about the 
content and function of moral concepts. One might ask whether and how 
moral properties are sewn into the fabric of reality. And one might ask 
whether and how we can have knowledge of moral properties, if indeed 
there are such properties. As with the internal moral perspective, these 
are questions that we can discuss together, for the external perspective is 
one that any moral agent can occupy in a reflective moment. They are also 
questions about which we can disagree. But such disagreements are not 
straightforwardly moral, for they are disagreements about morality, and 
they occur outside of moral discourse. At least, this is where they seem to 
occur. 
 The distinction between internal and external perspectives helps 
to shed light on a commitment mentioned in the previous chapter. Robust 
Realism, as I understand it, accepts the following: 
External Metaphysics. We can assess the nature of moral 
properties from an external metaphysical standpoint, and 
the existence of such properties is to be defended or rejected 
primarily from that standpoint by appeal to external 
metaphysical considerations. 
Robust Realists understand the Realist Commitments in light of External 
Metaphysics. They hold that these claims about moral truths and moral 
properties can be developed, and then either defended or rejected, from 
the external standpoint. This is basically what puts the ‘Robust’ in Robust 
Realism. 
                                                             




2.2 Anti-Archimedean Challenges 
Ronald Dworkin, a Relaxed Realist, describes the external metaphysical 
perspective as ‘Archimedean.’2 According to Dworkin, theories that claim 
to occupy this external standpoint are Archimedean in that they “purport 
to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole from 
premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it” (1996: 88). But philosophers 
like Dworkin deny that one can engage in such Archimedean metaethical 
theorising. This puts us in a position to understand the challenge posed 
by Quasi-Realism and Relaxed Realism. Both theories are, in a certain 
sense, anti-Archimedean. In one way or another, they deny that we can 
make sense of the Realist Commitments from an Archimedean point of 
view.  
If the Quasi-Realist and the Relaxed Realist are right to reject 
Archimedean metaethics, and if they are also right to interpret External 
Metaphysics as an Archimedean commitment, then the very possibility of 
defending Robust Realism is undercut, for there is simply no way to even 
articulate its external metaphysical commitments. This is the sense in 
which Quasi-Realism and Relaxed Realism entail that there is no space for 
Robust Realism. And if there is no space for Robust Realism, the only way 
to retain the Realist Commitments is by treating them as moral. In other 
words, Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists think that we can only keep 
these commitments as internal moral claims. We cannot keep them if they 
are external metaphysical claims that require an Archimedean point of 
view.  
This makes it clear that we should not think of anti-Archimedeans 
as moral sceptics. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists can and do accept 
the Realist Commitments. They just deny that these commitments involve 
any robust metaphysics. Indeed, they typically deny that they even could 
come with any robust metaphysics – given their anti-Archimedean views, 
Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists see an internal moral interpretation 
as the only available way of capturing the Realist Commitments. In short, 
the claim that there exists an irreducible, non-natural, mind-independent, 
and categorical moral reality simply must be seen as a claim made within 
ethics. 
                                                             
2 Dworkin is not the first to use this term in relation to ethics, as Bloomfield (2009: 285) 




So far, I have lumped the Quasi-Realist and the Relaxed Realist 
together. There is a rationale for such a lumping, for the two theories are 
closely connected – they are both forms of anti-Archimedeanism. But the 
picture is a little more complex than this suggests, for Quasi-Realists and 
Relaxed Realists are anti-Archimedean in importantly different ways, and 
these different styles of anti-Archimedeanism correspond to two distinct 
challenges facing the Robust Realist. So, before I argue that it is at least 
possible to provide external metaphysical interpretations of the Realist 
Commitments, I’ll first distinguish and clarify the two anti-Archimedean 
threats. 
 Of the two anti-Archimedean challenges, one is more modest and 
one is more ambitious: 
Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism. It is impossible to articulate 
an external metaphysical interpretation of the Realist 
Commitments. This is because the Archimedean standpoint 
from which such an interpretation would have to be 
articulated either does not exist, or else cannot be occupied 
by creatures like us. 
Modest Anti-Archimedeanism. It is impossible to articulate an 
external metaphysical interpretation of the Realist 
Commitments. This is because, although the Archimedean 
standpoint from which such an interpretation would have to 
be articulated does exist and can be occupied by creatures 
like us, there is no way to construe the Realist Commitments 
at this standpoint. 
Quasi-Realism is a version of Modest Anti-Archimedeanism, and Relaxed 
Realism is a version of Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism. I’ll explore and 
respond to both of these challenges, but my focus will be on the ambitious 
one. This is because, as I’ll explain, it presents the deeper threat to Robust 
Realism. 
 To clarify, Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism proposes a wholesale 
rejection of metaethics. It claims that there is no space at all for external 
theorising about morality. On this view, there is simply no such thing as a 
genuinely external metaethical theory. That sounds dramatic, and indeed 
it is. Modest Anti-Archimedeanism allows that there is an Archimedean 
standpoint, and is to that extent less dramatic than its more ambitious 
counterpart. Even so, Modest Anti-Archimedeanism can seem a threat to 






Quasi-Realism is a form of Modest Anti-Archimedeanism. To get a grip on 
the Quasi-Realist picture we can turn to its originator – Simon Blackburn. 
According to Blackburn, the Quasi-Realist project is the attempt “to earn, 
on the slender basis, the features of moral language … which tempt people 
to realism” (1984: 171). This makes it appealing to see Quasi-Realism as 
a sort of ‘diet realism,’ for it purports to offer all of the tasty realist treats 
without any of the fattening metaphysics. However, it has often been said 
that Quasi-Realists want to have their cake and eat it too, so it may be that 
‘diet realism’ is not such an apt label after all. I will shortly explain the 
Quasi-Realist position in detail by outlining how it interprets the Realist 
Commitments, but first it is worth commenting more broadly on its main 
goals.  
Quasi-Realism has been understood in a variety of ways – there is 
more than one way to interpret its goals. For instance, on one influential 
conception, Quasi-Realism is characterised by a concern to imitate what 
Robust Realism says about moral reality.3 Another conception is that it is 
characterised by a concern to imitate some of what Robust Realism says, 
but only some of it.4 Yet another does not involve any imitation claim, and 
is simply characterised by a concern to capture certain parts of everyday 
moral thought and discourse without a robust metaphysics.5 Interpreting 
the Quasi-Realist project can therefore be a tricky business, and different 
versions of it may be more or less threatening to the possibility of Robust 
Realism. Whatever the best interpretation of Quasi-Realism, many things 
that influential Quasi-Realists have said do read as denying space for a 
robustly realistic metaethical theory. However, we can easily defuse the 
threat that Quasi-Realism appears to pose for the Robust Realist. To see 
this, we need only look at the extent to which its anti-Archimedeanism is 
modest. 
                                                             
3 This reading, which is (fairly or unfairly) associated with Blackburn, seems particularly 
vulnerable to what Dreier (2004) calls ‘the problem of creeping minimalism.’ It’s a very 
common interpretation, but it’s probably not the most charitable. 
4 This is one way of interpreting Gibbard (2002; 2003; 2011). It is better placed to avoid 
creeping minimalism, and perhaps arguments like that of Street (2011). 
5 This interpretation is clearest in Ridge (2014; 2015) and Dreier (2015), though it may 
be what others have had in mind too. It seems well-placed to avoid creeping minimalism, 
and is likely the most charitable reading of Quasi-Realism.  
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 I’ll come to that in the next section, but let’s start by considering 
how Quasi-Realists see the Realist Commitments. First, to deliver moral 
truths the Quasi-Realist commits to a deflationary theory about truth in 
general.6 According to deflationary theories, predicates like ‘… is true’ and 
‘it is true that…’ can be eliminated from a sentence without any loss of 
meaning. The truth predicate does play important pragmatic roles – we 
use it to emphasise our convictions, and it enables speakers to endorse 
multiple propositions without having to explicitly assert each and every 
one of them in turn – but on a deflationary theory there is no semantic 
difference between ‘p’ and ‘it is true that p.’ Once a deflationary theory of 
truth is accepted, the claim that there are moral truths can be had on the 
cheap. 
 To illustrate, deflationists will read ‘it is true that killing is wrong’ 
as semantically equivalent to ‘killing is wrong.’ And ‘killing is wrong’ is an 
internal moral claim, the meaning of which has yet to be elaborated. Now, 
the Quasi-Realist standardly defends ‘Expressivism’ about the meaning of 
moral sentences.7 According to Expressivists, the meaning of a sentence 
comes from the state(s) of mind that the sentence serves to express. 
Expressivists deny that there are robust moral properties, but they also 
deny that moral sentences aim to refer to such properties. They see moral 
sentences as serving to express non-representational states like approval 
or disapproval, and not representational states like belief. Expressivists 
thus see ‘killing is wrong’ as expressing (something like) disapproval of 
killing. Now, if we say that ‘it is true that killing is wrong’ is semantically 
equivalent to ‘killing is wrong,’ and if ‘killing is wrong’ is simply a moral 
claim that expresses disapproval of killing, then we can get moral truth 
without accepting anything metaphysically robust along the way. For the 
sentence ‘it is true that killing is wrong’ simply expresses disapproval of 
killing. So, adding the truth predicate to a moral sentence doesn’t push us 
outside of moral discourse, and in that sense Truth is an internal moral 
claim. 
                                                             
6 Blackburn (1996: 86; 1998: 78-79). For a different view, see Ridge (2014: Ch. 7). 
7 I say ‘standardly’ because I interpret Quasi-Realism and Expressivism as distinct and 
separable aspects of one theoretical package. This has the potential to confuse, for some 
treat ‘Expressivism’ and ‘Quasi-Realism’ as synonymous. I imagine that these people are 
a minority, for this use of terms unhelpfully masks important possibilities. Specifically, we 
should allow that one can see moral judgement as fundamentally non-representational 
without committing to Quasi-Realism, and we should also acknowledge that Expressivism 
is not the only view of moral discourse with which Quasi-Realism could be combined.  
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 How about Properties? Well, according to Blackburn, there isn’t 
any harm “in saying that ethical predicates refer to properties, when such 
properties are merely the semantic shadows of the fact that they function 
as predicates” (1993a: 181).8 And, if Quasi-Realists take moral properties 
to be ‘semantic shadows,’ as Blackburn puts it, they can also understand 
such properties as irreducible and non-natural. That our moral concepts 
are irreducible and non-natural is something that a lot of metaethicists 
now accept. This is because the ‘Open Question Argument’ defended by 
G.E. Moore (1903) can appear to have important semantic implications, 
even if its metaphysical implications have been overstated.9 By treating 
moral properties as ‘semantic shadows,’ the Quasi-Realist can then read 
Non-Reductivism and Non-Naturalism at the semantic level – that is, as 
located within moral discourse – rather than at the external metaphysical 
level. 
 One might think that it will be harder for Quasi-Realists to deliver 
Mind-Independence. Given that their theoretical package also includes 
Expressivism, they may appear to be committed to treating morality as 
dependent on the attitudes of agents (their approvals or disapprovals, or 
whatever). However, the Quasi-Realist also sees Mind-Independence as 
an internal moral claim. This might sound odd, and I will discuss it further 
in a moment, but here is the basic idea as Blackburn presents it:  
‘[M]oral truths are mind-independent’ can only summarise a 
list like ‘If there were no people (or people with different 
attitudes) then X …’ where the dots are filled in by some 
moral claim about X (1998: 311).  
On this view, to say that a moral claim is mind-independently true is to 
make a counterfactual moral claim. It is to apply one’s moral judgement 
to a range of counterfactual scenarios, including scenarios in which one’s 
attitudes differ.10 Quasi-Realists thus see Mind-Independence as a moral 
claim. 
                                                             
8 I take it that Blackburn is gesturing here at the ‘abundant’ conception of properties. For 
more on ‘abundant’ and ‘sparse’ properties, see Lewis (1983; 1986) and Schaffer (2004). 
9 From the openness of ‘this is pleasurable, but is it good,’ we can plausibly infer that ‘good’ 
doesn’t mean the same as ‘pleasurable.’ But, contra Moore, it doesn’t follow that goodness 
and pleasurableness are distinct properties, for this would require a synonymy constraint 
on property identity. And such a constraint is subject to well-known counterexamples 
(consider ‘water’ and ‘H2O’). Cf. Gibbard (2002). For a different view, see Cullison (2009). 
10 Cf. Gibbard (2003: 186). 
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 They are likely to make a similar move in attempting to capture 
the commitment to Categorical Authority. Remember that the authority 
of categorical direction is supposed to be independent of all social and 
psychological contingencies. Although this independence claim concerns 
the authority of moral direction, rather than the existential status of 
moral properties, the Quasi-Realist can again understand it simply as the 
application of an ordinary first-order moral judgement to a wider range 
of counterfactual scenarios. So, for the Quasi-Realist, to think that A has a 
categorical reason to Φ is just to think that A would have a reason to Φ 
even in worlds in which the social or psychological situation is different. 
To make a claim about the categorical authority of moral direction is just 
to have a certain sort of moral thought, requiring nothing metaphysically 
robust.11 
 In sum, Quasi-Realists deny that we can have a metaphysical view 
of the Realist Commitments, but offer a moral reading instead. Of course, 
this has been a brief overview of Quasi-Realism. A great deal more could 
be said. However, I can now show that Quasi-Realism does not constitute 
a serious challenge to the possibility of developing a robust metaethical 
theory. 
 
2.4 Foundations of Quasi-Realism 
The modesty of the challenge posed by Quasi-Realism is the result of its 
reliance on certain Archimedean foundations. To see this, consider the 
Quasi-Realist’s interpretation of Mind-Independence. Blackburn stresses 
that the only available interpretation of this commitment is a substantive 
moral interpretation: 
The wrongness of wanton cruelty does indeed depend on 
things – features of it that remind us of how awful it is. But 
locating these is giving moral verdicts. Talk of dependency is 
moral talk or nothing (1993a: 173, my emphasis). 
Claims about whether or not morality is mind-independent are made 
within ethics, on this view, and can only be made within ethics. There is 
therefore no way to make sense of an external metaphysical construal of 
Mind-Independence. In that sense, there is simply no space for a robustly 
realistic interpretation of this commitment. Or, indeed, Robust Realism in 
general. 
                                                             
11 For detailed discussion, see Gibbard (1990: 162-165), Blackburn (1998: 266; 2010b), 
and Lenman (2013: 401-402). 
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 However, shortly after suggesting that talk of morality’s being or 
failing to be mind-independent is moral talk or nothing, Blackburn says 
the following: 
[T]here would be an external reading if realism were true. 
For in that case there would be a fact, a state of affairs (the 
wrongness of cruelty) whose rise and fall and dependency 
on other things could be charted. But anti-realism 
acknowledges no such state of affairs and no such issue of 
dependency (1993a: 173). 
This is Blackburn’s account of what it would take for there to be a robust 
reading of Mind-Independence, and it clarifies that Quasi-Realists are 
only able to deny that there can be such a reading because they accept a 
metaphysically anti-realist theory – Expressivism – at the meta-level. In 
other words, Quasi-Realism is built on certain Archimedean foundations. 
This is not news. After all, Blackburn is explicit about it. However, it is 
important for seeing the modesty of the Quasi-Realist’s anti-Archimedean 
threat. 
 Recall that the Modest Anti-Archimedean doesn’t think that the 
impossibility of giving a robust construal of the Realist Commitments is 
due to the lack of an Archimedean metaethical standpoint. They therefore 
have to offer some alternative support for the claim that there can be no 
external metaphysical reading of, say, Mind-Independence. And what the 
Quasi-Realist offers is the following: Expressivism is the true meta-level 
theory. That is, the possibility of offering a robust view of moral reality is 
locked out by the truth of Expressivism. Put another way, Expressivism is 
the foundation on which a Quasi-Realist’s anti-Archimedean challenge is 
built. 
 Again, this is not a new observation – it’s built into the theoretical 
package itself. The significance of making it explicit is that it exposes an 
important dialectical point, which will in turn clarify how Quasi-Realism 
fails to constitute a serious challenge to the possibility of articulating and 
defending a robust metaethical theory. The dialectical point is as follows: 
in defending themselves against the Quasi-Realist’s anti-Archimedean 
challenge, the Robust Realist can simply give their reasons for rejecting 
Expressivism. They can work on the basis that there is space for Robust 
Realism because they take that Archimedean theory to be false. And, if 
Expressivism is false, then there is no foundation for the Quasi-Realist’s 




Put another way, the real challenge to Robust Realism comes from 
the Expressivist part of the package rather than the Quasi-Realist part. 
The real challenge is Archimedean rather than anti-Archimedean, for it is 
this Archimedean theory that does the heavy lifting against an external 
metaphysical reading of Mind-Independence. Indeed, the Quasi-Realist’s 
modest anti-Archimedean challenge would collapse if it were to lose its 
Expressivist foundation. In short, the important moment of disagreement 
between Robust Realists and Quasi-Realists occurs at the external level, 
and Robust Realists should engage the Quasi-Realist at this foundational 
stage. 
And this is just to say that Robust Realists can defend themselves 
against Quasi-Realism by doing something that they’ve always done, that 
is, by rejecting Expressivism. Quasi-Realists won’t be able to convince you 
that there is no space for Robust Realism unless you’ve already been sold 
on Expressivism at the meta-level. And this is something on which Robust 
Realists remain unsold. So – and here’s the crucial point – Robust Realists 
do not need any new strategic manoeuvres to answer the Quasi-Realist 
challenge. They can just continue making their arguments against the 
Expressivist part of the package.12 More broadly, if an anti-Archimedean 
challenge can only get off the ground by appealing to a certain external 
metaethical theory, it is not a serious threat to the possibility of Robust 
Realism. 
I imagine that some Quasi-Realists will say that they are fine with 
this conclusion. The extent to which Quasi-Realists view themselves as 
challenging the possibility of Robust Realism will depend significantly on 
how they interpret the goals of their project. And, as I’ve noted, different 
interpretations are available. So it may be that, despite the rhetoric of 
certain prominent Quasi-Realists, their project does not have to be seen 
as an attempt to paint Robust Realism out of the picture. Fine by me. My 
current concern is just to show that it is possible to articulate a robust 
moral metaphysics. If there are Quasi-Realists who never deny that this 
is a possibility, then I have no beef with them. My topic has been a more 
intolerant-sounding Quasi-Realism, and I have shown how this view fails 
to present a threat to the possibility of developing a robust metaethical 
theory. 
                                                             
12 There are many things that the Robust Realist might say in rejecting the Expressivist 
view. Some interesting critiques in the recent literature are developed by Unwin (1999), 
Cuneo (2006), Schroeder (2008), and Woods (2014). 
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 I should make clear that I have not shown, and have not attempted 
to show, that the Expressivistic Quasi-Realist package is false. For all I’ve 
said so far, it may be that we should in the end accept it. I have only been 
arguing that it fails to constitute a genuine challenge to the possibility of 
Robust Realism. By accepting a point of view from which one can argue 
about external metaphysical interpretations of the Realist Commitments, 
even the most intolerant forms of Quasi-Realism make space for Robust 
Realists to articulate and defend their external metaphysical position. 
Robust Realism may still turn out to be false, but there is room for such a 
theory. 
 Here is the lesson. An anti-Archimedean threat that builds on an 
Archimedean foundation does not constitute a genuine challenge to the 
possibility of our articulating a robust moral metaphysics, for one can 
respond to such a threat simply by engaging it at its foundational level. 
The deeper anti-Archimedean threat will come from theories that reject 
any such level at all, and thus refuse to be engaged at it. In short, the more 
serious challenge comes from the Ambitious Anti-Archimedean theories. 
Modest Anti-Archimedeanism doesn’t require new strategic manoeuvres 
from the Robust Realist, but Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism does. I will 
soon provide the Robust Realist some new manoeuvres to deal with the 
ambitious challenge. First, however, I will explain the challenge in greater 
detail. 
 
2.5 Relaxed Realism 
Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism is brought to life by Relaxed Realism. 
The position I have in mind is often called ‘Quietism,’ but its defenders 
tend to distance themselves from that term. They understand themselves 
as defending the only feasible sort of realism, and claim that efforts to be 
more robust are confused. My preferred label – ‘Relaxed Realism’ – is apt, 
for philosophers who defend this view combine the Realist Commitments 
with what Sarah McGrath describes as “a certain lack of anxiety about the 
status and standing of morality, despite understanding morality in ways 
that might naturally encourage such anxiety” (2014: 187). As will become 
clear, this lack of anxiety is due to their Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism. 
Unlike the Quasi-Realist, the Relaxed Realist doesn’t rely on any external 
metaethical foundation with which the Robust Realist can engage, and 




For the Relaxed Realist, the Realist Commitments are just internal 
moral claims. And that’s it.13 There’s no more to say. Attempts to give an 
account of the metaphysical status of those commitments are misguided, 
as are attempts to explain what we are doing when we talk about such 
commitments. They are moral rather than metaphysical claims, and there 
is nothing else to it. This might sound puzzling, but there are advantages 
to a Relaxed Realist approach that make it attractive.14 After all, if Relaxed 
Realists are correct, any external metaphysical doubts that you may have 
about fitting morality into a scientific worldview are misplaced. After all, 
if there is no external standpoint from which wholesale moral scepticism 
can make sense, then one can only doubt the Realist Commitments at the 
internal perspective, and these doubts must come from moral rather than 
metaphysical factors. Relaxed Realism thereby seems to undercut certain 
sceptical views about moral reality, for it says that one can only question 
a Realist Commitment by making a moral case against it. Its ability to deal 
with a major form of scepticism about morality is an important attraction 
of Relaxed Realism. So, to clarify how this position is supposed to work, 
let’s see how Relaxed Realists interpret the Realist Commitments in more 
detail. 
Relaxed Realists typically suggest that there is an independent or 
strictly ‘autonomous’ domain of normative discourse. Just as there are 
autonomous domains of mathematical and scientific discourse, there is a 
group of normative concepts and claims that constitutes the autonomous 
normative domain. And, for Relaxed Realists, the correct view of Truth 
sticks within this normative domain. As Dworkin puts it, it is a mistake to 
“expect answers that step outside morality to find a nonmoral account of 
moral truth … that expectation is confused: it rests on a failure to grasp 
the independence of morality” (2011: 38). More specifically, T.M. Scanlon 
says that “truth values of statements about one domain, insofar as they 
do not conflict with the statements of some other domain, are properly 
settled by the standards of the domain they are about” (2014: 19). As long 
as normative statements don’t conflict with (say) scientific statements, 
their truth is to be decided by standards internal to normative domain. 
And these are just normative standards. That is, substantive principles or 
norms.  
                                                             
13 More strictly, some Relaxed Realists – like Scanlon – are constructivists about the moral 
but relaxed about the normative. This is a wrinkle that we can set aside for now. 
14 Cf. McPherson (2011: 238). 
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Relaxed Realists also claim that there are moral properties in a 
sense that require no second-order metaphysics. Derek Parfit has called 
himself a ‘non-metaphysical cognitivist,’ for example, but he allows that 
there can be normative properties in a minimal sense:  
I use the word ‘property’ in the wide non-metaphysical 
sense with which we can restate any claim that is, or might 
be, true. Whenever someone ought to act in some way, for 
example, we could say either that this act has the property 
of being what this person ought to do, or that this person has 
the property of being someone who ought to act in this way 
(2011 v.2: 756).  
I don’t know if I understand Parfit’s overall view, but he is clearly relaxed 
about normative properties.15 He doesn’t view them as metaphysically 
robust. 
Given their appeal to an autonomous normative domain, it’s easy 
to see how Relaxed Realists view Non-Reductivism and Non-Naturalism. 
Normative predicates belong to an autonomous domain of discourse, so 
they won’t reduce to predicates from other (descriptive) domains. Given 
the irreducibility of normative predicates, the properties picked out by 
such predicates will be irreducible too. In sum, given the autonomy claim, 
the Relaxed Realist can suggest that moral and descriptive properties are 
distinct. 
Relatedly, the Relaxed Realist needn’t think that normative truths 
are discoverable by methods appropriate for, say, the scientific domain. 
Truths about normative properties will be beyond the purview of the 
sciences, for they are part of a distinct domain and are thus known by 
methods appropriate for that domain. Perhaps a form of foundationalism 
is correct, where the fundamental normative truths are detected through 
direct intuition. Or perhaps we should adopt a coherentist method, where 
we seek a reflective equilibrium among considered judgements.16 Either 
way, Relaxed Realists understand Non-Reductivism and Non-Naturalism 
such that they stay at the moral level, avoiding anything metaphysically 
robust. 
                                                             
15 Cowie (2014a) helpfully seeks to interpret Parfit and other Relaxed Realists. Note that 
Parfit, in the forthcoming third volume of On What Matters, changes his preferred label to 
‘non-realist cognitivism.’ I take it that his view still counts as Relaxed Realist in my sense. 
16 For the former approach, see Parfit (2011 v.2: Ch. 32). For the latter, see Dworkin 
(2011: 82-86) and Scanlon (2014: Ch. 4). 
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When it comes to Mind-Independence, the Relaxed Realist once 
again understands this as a commitment that can only be articulated and 
defended or rejected at the internal moral level. As Thomas Nagel puts it, 
it is only by “thinking about what to do and how to live … [that] we can 
find methods, reasons, and principles whose validity does not have to be 
subjectively or relativistically qualified” (1997: 102). This is how Relaxed 
Realists offer a non-metaphysical construal of Mind-Independence. They 
say that it only makes sense as a first-order moral commitment, one that 
must be defended by first-order moral argument. Because thinking about 
what to do and how to live is simply internal moral thinking, not external 
metaphysical thinking, it doesn’t commit us to anything metaphysically 
robust. 
Moreover, if the normative domain is autonomous, the authority 
of normativity will not depend on social and psychological contingencies 
lying outside of that domain. We can see this by considering the notion of 
a reason. A reason to Φ is a consideration that counts in favour of Φ-ing. 
According to many Relaxed Realists, the concept of a reason is basic. That 
is, despite what some say, no further explanation of it can be given: 
[A] further explanation might be an explanation of what 
“counting in favour of” amounts to. This might take the form 
of an explanation of the “grip” or “authority” of reasons, of 
the kind offered by Kantians and others … however, it seems 
to me that no such further explanation of reasons need or 
can be given: the “grip” that a consideration that is a reason 
has on a person for whom it is a reason is just being a reason 
for him or her (Scanlon 2014: 44). 
It is misguided, in other words, to seek some deeper explanation for the 
authority of reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental. An agent’s 
having an authoritative reason to Φ thus requires no further explanation 
in terms of its being conditional on a desire, convention, commitment, or 
agentive status. It is primitive, and does not take us beyond the normative 
domain. 
 In sum, Relaxed Realists reject a metaphysical view of the Realist 
Commitments, claiming that they can be located within the autonomous 
normative domain. Moreover, they do not rest this internal reading of the 
Realist Commitments on any Archimedean foundation. Their challenge is 






The threat posed by Relaxed Realism cannot be defused by engaging it at 
its external metaethical foundation, for Relaxed Realists claim that there 
is no space for external metaethics. This is the nature of their Ambitious 
Anti-Archimedeanism. But how can it actually be shown that there is no 
space for external metaethics? We’ve seen internal moral readings of the 
Realist Commitments, but why should we accept that these are the only 
available readings? This question is crucial, for if an external metaethical 
reading is also available, the more relaxed option might appear hollow by 
comparison. In considering this matter I will use Dworkin’s work as my 
jumping off point. McGrath rightly says that Dworkin’s defence of Relaxed 
Realism is “undiluted and uncompromising” and thus “provides a useful 
case study” for critics to examine (2014: 187). Dworkin’s suggestions 
reveal a lot about the Ambitious Anti-Archimedean challenge to Robust 
Realism. 
 In attempting to show that an internal moral view of the Realist 
Commitments is the only one available, Dworkin (1996: 96-97) proposes 
a test to help us assess the viability of Archimedean metaethics. The test 
starts with a moral judgement. Consider, for example, my judgement that 
killing is wrong. This is clearly a moral judgement. We can locate it within 
the internal point of view. But imagine that I decide to elaborate on it by 
saying that it is true that killing is wrong, and that wrongness is a property 
of killing. I may also say that this property is irreducible, non-natural, and 
mind-independent. I may add that it involves some categorical direction. 
To stress my conviction, I may even say that killing is really and actually 
wrong.  
Dworkin brands these the ‘Further Claims,’ and he suggests two 
questions that one must ask about them in order to test the viability of 
Archimedean metaethics. First, is there a way of interpreting the Further 
Claims as moral statements? That is, can the Further Claims be viewed as 
restatements or clarifications of the original moral judgement? Second, is 
there a plausible way of interpreting any of the Further Claims as morally 
neutral? Dworkin tells us that, if the answer to the first question is yes and 
if the answer to the second question is no, we cannot do Archimedean 
metaethics. And, given that the Robust Realist’s commitment to External 
Metaphysics is apparently a commitment to Archimedeanism, this would 
mean that there is no external metaphysical perspective from which one 




According to Dworkin, the answer to the first question is indeed 
yes and the answer to the second question is indeed no. That is, there is a 
way to read the Further Claims as internal to ethics, and there is no way 
to read them as morally neutral. Archimedeanism is thus undermined. So, 
if we are assuming that External Metaphysics is itself an Archimedean 
commitment, there is no space for a robust interpretation of the Realist 
Commitments. This is clearly a threat to my project, for my aim is to show 
how the Realist Commitments can and should be developed by the Robust 
Realist.  
Why should one think that the answer to the first question is yes? 
Dworkin (1996: 97) suggests that the most natural reading of the Further 
Claims is an internal moral reading. When someone says that a certain 
moral claim is true independently of anyone’s responses or attitudes, for 
example, the most natural interpretation (according to Dworkin) is that 
the individual in question is just clarifying the content of their substantive 
moral opinion. As it happens, I don’t find that the most natural reading of 
this claim. Dworkin does, however, and the popularity of Relaxed Realism 
suggests that he is not alone. Anyway, whether or not it is the natural 
reading, I accept that the further claims can be read as moral claims. That 
is, I accept that the answer to the first question is yes. There is a way of 
reading the Further Claims such that they fall within the internal point of 
view. 
But why is the answer to the second question no? Well, according 
to Dworkin, claims that are seen by philosophers as metaethical actually 
end up being or entailing substantive moral claims:  
The philosophical-sounding proposition that there are 
moral properties in the universe, for example, is or entails … 
that some acts really are unjust, or some people really are 
good, or something of the sort. So read … a skeptic who 
denied it would hardly be neutral toward substantive 
morality (1996: 100).  
In short, if you accept that moral properties exist, you must accept that 
they are instantiated in certain acts and people (and such). But this means 
that even abstract claims like ‘there are moral properties in the universe’ 
are not morally neutral, for they entail substantive moral propositions. 
Now, if such claims are not morally neutral, they can’t be Archimedean. 
And, for Dworkin, if these claims aren’t Archimedean they aren’t external 




 This leaves Relaxed Realism as the only available interpretation 
of the Realist Commitments. And without a more robust reading of those 
commitments, a relaxed reading may seem less hollow. Should my project 
in subsequent chapters thus be seen as an account of the internal moral 
commitments of Relaxed Realism, rather than the external metaphysical 
commitments of Robust Realism? I think not. Against what the Ambitious 
Anti-Archimedean suggests, external and metaphysical commitments are 
entirely possible. I will show that Dworkin overstates the case for being 
relaxed instead of robust, arguing that his mistake is to think that external 
metaphysical commitments require an Archimedean point of view. In this 
way, the Robust Realist can deal with the Ambitious Anti-Archimedean 
threat. 
In showing exactly how Robust Realists can handle this threat, it 
will be productive to consider the following thesis: 
Compatibility. External metaethical theories and claims must 
be compatible with every internal moral theory and claim.  
Compatibility is to be understood as a constraint on which theories can 
count as metaethical.17 It explicitly ties the external to the Archimedean. 
According to Compatibility, a theory that fails to be compatible with every 
first-order moral view thereby fails to count as external and metaethical. 
Dworkin’s test aims to show that no theory conforms to Compatibility. 
Even very abstract claims end up entailing substantive ethical positions, 
and supposedly external metaethical theories thus fail to be compatible 
with every internal ethical claim. In other words, they fail to conform to 
the constraint provided by Compatibility. So, if Compatibility genuinely 
constrains what can count as an external metaethical theory, there are no 
external metaethical theories. There is, in that case, no way to be a Robust 
Realist. 
 Compatibility, as I will explain, is not something that we have to 
accept as a constraint on metaethical discourse. It is open to the Robust 
Realist (and others) to reject Compatibility, and in doing so undercut the 
Ambitious Anti-Archimedean threat. Having said that, it is worth noting 
that Compatibility has lurked in the background of many metaethical 
views. 
                                                             
17 McPherson (2008: 3) discusses a similar sort of constraint, which he names ‘Neutrality.’ 
It is better to put the point in terms of compatibility, however, for there are different ways 
of understanding moral neutrality that can figure in this debate. I discuss different forms 
of neutrality in §2.7. 
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 For instance, the early ‘Emotivists’ – who were ancestors of the 
contemporary Expressivists – were certainly sympathetic to the idea that 
to do metaethics is to abstract away from first-order moral questions. A.J. 
Ayer suggests that strictly philosophical work on ethics should “make no 
ethical pronouncements” (1936: 105). Charles Stevenson aims to “retain 
that difficult detachment which studies ethical judgements without 
making them” (1944: 110). P.H. Nowell-Smith neatly captures this view 
of substantive moral theorising when he says that “[a] philosopher is not 
a parish priest or Universal Aunt or Citizens’ Advice Bureau” (1954: 12). 
I am not entirely unsympathetic to this line of thought, for I can attest that 
philosophy PhD programmes are not production lines for moral saints.18 
Anyway, these thinkers were sympathetic to Compatibility, or something 
like it.  
And they are not alone. J.L. Mackie – an Error Theorist, rather than 
an Emotivist or an Expressivist – also bought into something like the 
Compatibility constraint. Mackie saw first-order ethics as distinct from 
second-order metaethics, such that “one could be a second-order sceptic 
without being a first-order one, or again the other way round” (1977: 16). 
In short, it is clear that Compatibility has had an important influence over 
some philosophers. Dworkin, however, thinks that no theory conforms to 
Compatibility, and he takes this to undermine Archimedean metaethics. 
This, in turn, is meant to undermine the very possibility of engaging in 
external metaphysical theorising. Robust Realism therefore appears to be 
in some trouble. After all, if there is no point of view from which one can 
articulate (let alone defend) the external metaphysical commitments of a 
theory, that’s more than a little inconvenient for those who understand 
themselves as subscribing to a robustly realistic account of moral reality. 
This is the essential core of the Ambitious Anti-Archimedean challenge as 
Dworkin develops it. This relaxed approach to morality seems to pull the 
Archimedean rug from under the Robust Realist’s external metaphysical 
feet.  
 
                                                             
18 Less flippantly, whilst a view of philosophy that treats moral theory as unphilosophical 
is obviously too narrow, there is something to be said for the idea that one should not 
expect to derive specific moral verdicts from highly abstract claims made in metaethics. 
Not everyone would agree with this – Hare (1981) is the obvious counterexample – but it 
seems plausible to me. One might worry that rejecting Compatibility, as I do below, fails 
to respect this plausible idea. I respond to this worry in §2.7 by arguing that there is a 
more modest version of this constraint that does not have this implausible result.  
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2.7 Against Compatibility 
How can Robust Realists answer this challenge? Some interesting replies 
to Dworkin (and to Relaxed Realist positions more generally) try to show 
that it is in fact possible to make external metaethical claims that conform 
to Compatibility.19 In other words, some responses seek to vindicate the 
Archimedean standpoint. However, this is not the sort of response that I 
am going to offer. Instead, as I have already indicated, I will suggest that 
Robust Realists can reject Compatibility without thereby losing the ability 
to articulate and defend a robust construal of the Realist Commitments. 
After all, it’s not clear why we are meant to suppose that Robust Realists 
are committed to Compatibility. If they were to reject this constraint on 
what can be counted as an external metaethical theory, will the heavens 
(I want to say Plato’s heavens) fall? I doubt it. In particular, we can take 
issue with the suggestion that an apparently metaethical claim’s merely 
entailing a substantive moral claim somehow shows that it was moral all 
along. 
I explained in §2.6 that, according to Dworkin, a supposedly 
metaethical claim’s having substantive moral bearings ensures that it is 
itself a substantive moral claim. For instance, the abstract claim that there 
are moral properties in the universe might sound as though it’s entirely 
non-committal on first-order matters, but it entails that “some acts really 
are unjust, or some people really are good, or something of the sort” 
(Dworkin 1996: 100). It is therefore not an external metaphysical claim, 
according to Dworkin, for it fails to conform to Compatibility. It fails the 
Compatibility test, and thus fails to be Archimedean, and thus fails to be 
robust. But it is not easy to make sense of this move. How does some 
theory’s having a substantive moral bearing make it a substantive moral 
theory? What would the general principle be? Perhaps that a claim that 
seems to belong to claim-kind1 actually turns out to belong to claim-kind2 
if it entails a claim that belongs to claim-kind2. But this would be a rather 
peculiar principle, as one can see by looking at some examples from other 
contexts. 
                                                             
19 The availability of Archimedean theories is defended by Dreier (2002) and Ehrenberg 
(2008). Note that, whilst my reply to the Ambitious Anti-Archimedean shows that Robust 
Realists need not rely on Compatibility, this does not necessarily mean that no metaethical 
theory is compatible with everything at the moral level. Just that it doesn’t have to be to 
count as metaethical. So, even though we should not tie the external to the Archimedean, 
it may be that some theories do count as Archimedean. 
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Consider a theological claim – God created the universe in seven 
days – that implies a certain metaphysical claim – naturalism is false. Does 
the theological claim thereby fail to count as theological? It seems not. Is 
theology just part of metaphysical discourse? I don’t see it. Or consider a 
neurological claim – c-fibres are firing – that implies a phenomenological 
claim – pain is felt. Does the neurological claim thereby fail to count as 
neurological? Does it just become phenomenological? Again, it seems not. 
And it would be peculiar to think that it did. In short, it is not appealing to 
suppose that claims belonging to claim-kind1 actually turn out to belong 
to claim-kind2 given entailments between the former and the latter. If this 
is what Dworkin has in mind, there is no reason to think that his claims 
succeed in undermining the possibility of providing a robust metaethical 
theory. 
However, there is a better way to understand the point about 
entailments. The examples just given – the theological and neurological 
entailments – are (I presume) not instances of strictly logical entailment. 
And this is the sort of entailment that Dworkin and other Relaxed Realists 
are interested in.20 This is not always clear from their writings, but maybe 
the suggestion is that logical entailments from the putatively metaethical 
to the substantively ethical show that there isn’t any external metaethical 
level. 
But the example that Dworkin himself provides is only a case of 
logical entailment when interpreted charitably. Recall that he offered the 
following: 
The philosophical-sounding proposition that there are 
moral properties in the universe, for example, is or entails … 
that some acts really are unjust, or some people really are 
good, or something of the sort (1996: 100). 
The phrase “or something of the sort” is obviously crucial here. Strictly 
speaking, the putatively metaethical claim – there are moral properties in 
the universe – only logically entails something like – certain aspects of the 
universe that can bear moral properties do in fact bear moral properties. 
And why should Robust Realists be unsettled by that logical entailment? 
After all, it sounds very much like a metaphysically committed position. 
It thus seems as though there is no clear reason to suppose that the logical 
entailment undermines one’s commitment to something metaphysically 
robust.  
                                                             
20 Thanks to Matthew Kramer for suggesting this reading of Dworkin. 
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Put another way, Dworkin’s example provides us with reason to 
reject Compatibility as a constraint on external metaethics. It does not 
provide us with a reason to reject external metaethics itself. It is therefore 
very tempting to allow that an external metaethical claim can fail to be 
compatible with every substantive moral theory and claim, even though 
it is a metaphysically committed claim about ethics. Robust Realists can 
thus turn the tables on Dworkin, pulling the anti-Archimedean rug from 
under his anti-metaphysical feet by saying that a Compatibility constraint 
is not something to which they were ever in fact committed. In sum, they 
should agree that Robust Realism fails to conform to Compatibility whilst 
denying that this has anything like the significance that Dworkin has to 
assume. 
To illustrate, look at how Moore’s answers to certain metaethical 
questions seem to bear on his acceptance of a certain first-order moral 
position. Specifically, his commitment to some form of utilitarianism is 
implied by his definition of ‘right’ in terms of ‘good.’ Moore thought that 
the term ‘good’ was itself indefinable (and thus contrasts himself with 
‘analytic utilitarians’ like Jeremy Bentham), but he held that to say that an 
act is right is to say that it promotes the good: whatever things are good, 
the right thing to do is to promote them.21 Moore’s question about the 
meaning of ‘right’ is naturally seen as metaethical, the answer to which 
entails a (fairly abstract) claim within first-order ethics. My view is that 
such examples cast doubt on Compatibility as a constraint on metaethics, 
rather than on metaethics itself. A view can count as metaethical, and can 
involve metaphysical commitments, whilst also having implications for 
ethics. 
Of course, in rejecting the Compatibility constraint we do not lose 
neutrality altogether. Even the Relaxed Realist agrees that a metaethical 
claim’s entailing some ethical claim does not thereby mean that it cannot 
be compatible with other ethical claims. For instance, even if the claim 
that moral properties are sewn into the fabric of reality implies that some 
acts are unjust or that some people are good or something like that, it 
does not entail anything about which acts are unjust or which people are 
good. Nor does it tell us anything about what makes some acts unjust or 
some people good. So even if a metaethical theory fails to be compatible 
with all first-order moral claims, it can be compatible with very many of 
them. 
                                                             
21 For details, see Moore (1903: §14). 
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In particular, it can be compatible with the verdicts that we arrive 
at for highly specific moral questions. So, to reject Compatibility is not to 
reject first-order neutrality altogether. We can reject Compatibility and 
instead accept something like the following:  
Modest Compatibility. Most external metaethical claims are 
compatible with a wide range of internal moral claims, 
including most claims about which verdicts are correct in 
particular cases.  
I mention this because it preserves what is correct about Nowell-Smith’s 
observation that philosophers (or metaethicists, at least) are not parish 
priests. Modest Compatibility accommodates the fact that specific moral 
guidance is unlikely to fall out of philosophical metaethics of an abstract 
sort. 
Not everyone who rejects Compatibility will also endorse Modest 
Compatibility. For instance, some philosophers have thought that quite 
specific moral views can be derived just from the logical features of moral 
words.22 I believe that we should endorse it, however. After all, you’d be 
unlikely to consult a specialist in metaethics to find out whether eating 
meat is wrong. (At least, if you were to do so, it is unlikely that you would 
be appealing to them in their capacity as a metaethicist.) Moreover, one 
can be morally well-informed whilst knowing nothing of metaethics, just 
as one can be morally ill-informed whilst knowing a lot of metaethics, and 
it is hard to see how metaethical considerations fix a verdict on specific 
moral debates about euthanasia, meat eating, abortion, the environment, 
charity, war, and so on. Modest Compatibility manages to capture the fact 
that, whilst metaethics has some practical relevance, this will only go so 
far. 
Before moving on, it is also worth noting that there are different 
ways of understanding neutrality.23 Compatibility – which seems to be 
the most common interpretation of metaethical neutrality among those 
who actually articulate their view of it – fleshes out a metaethical theory’s 
neutrality as consisting in its being compatible with every first-order 
theory and claim. But there is at least one form of neutrality that has 
nothing to do with Compatibility at all. Neutrality can be an epistemic 
matter. 
                                                             
22 Cf. Hare (1981). 
23 Cf. Gewirth (1968). 
44 
 
Even if an answer to a metaethical question entails an answer to 
a substantive question, it may sometimes be possible to ask and answer 
that metaethical question from an epistemically neutral standpoint. Doing 
so will involve suspending judgement on the answer to the substantive 
question. To illustrate, consider the following case. Question: how can I 
have moral knowledge? Answer: I am justified in believing that all of my 
moral judgements are true because I have a perfectly reliable faculty of 
moral intuition. Ignore the fact that this answer is both silly and hubristic. 
What matters is that both the question and the answer are metaethical. 
But the answer has substantive implications, for it entails that all of my 
first-order moral judgements are correct. For instance, it will entail that 
eating meat is wrong, assuming that I judge that eating meat is wrong. 
Still, whilst asking the question about moral knowledge, I can suspend 
judgement on the wrongness of eating meat. I can withhold assent on that 
moral question, and I can avoid even thinking about any substantive 
claims whilst comparing the merits of my hubristic intuitionism with its 
rivals.  
My answer to the metaethical question about moral knowledge 
may not be logically compatible with every first-order theory and claim, 
then, but in arriving at that answer I am in some sense neutral. So, this is 
a way of being neutral about substantive moral matters. Of course, I am 
not suggesting that this sort of neutrality is Archimedean, or even that it 
will be possible in every case of external metaethical reasoning. However, 
it does indicate another way in which one can sometimes be neutral about 
moral claims even when those claims are entailed by one’s metaethical 
views.  
I don’t know how often this can be done, and I’m not sure how 
easy it will be to achieve, but it may help to satisfy someone who remains 
disturbed by the idea that metaethics has even some practical import. I 
have encountered philosophers who are uncomfortable with the idea that 
metaethicists cannot abstract away from substantive ethical questions 
altogether. I find it hard to feel the full force of this concern, given that the 
substantive implications of most metaethical views will be fairly modest. 
But for those who do feel the concern, the epistemic neutrality to which I 
have pointed might provide some relief. If one feels unqualified to engage 
with substantive matters, or if one thinks that lack of neutrality on them 
gets in the way of good metaethics, it may be that (at least sometimes) we 




So, by rejecting Compatibility, the Robust Realist can deal with the 
threat posed by Ambitious Anti-Archimedeanism. There is no reason to 
think that Robust Realists are committed to this constraint on metaethics, 
and rejecting it will not put them in danger of becoming parish priests if 
they accept Modest Compatibility instead. In short, the commitment to 
External Metaphysics can survive the Relaxed Realist challenge. We don’t 
need to view it as an Archimedean commitment, not after we reject the 
Compatibility constraint. So, despite what Dworkin and others have said, 
there is space to articulate an external and metaphysical interpretation 
of the Realist Commitments. In other words, there is space to be a Robust 
Realist. 
 
2.8 Moral and Metaphysical Argument 
I have focused so far on Dworkin’s uncompromising attack on metaethics. 
However, not all Relaxed Realists see themselves as attacking metaethics 
itself. For instance, Matthew Kramer is a Relaxed Realist who thinks that 
metaethical theorising is a thing, but who also thinks that the class of 
metaethical claims is located within the class of substantive moral claims. 
In other words, whereas I see the rejection of the Compatibility constraint 
as showing that robust external metaphysical commitments are possible 
despite logical entailments between metaethical and ethical propositions, 
Kramer sees this as revealing that metaethics is located within ethics 
itself. In short, whilst Kramer does not see metaethics as being external 
to ethics, he does see it as a second-order discipline about ethics. In his 
view, the entailments from the metaethical to the ethical reveal that this 
is a second-order discipline that is located within the first-order ethical 
domain.  
Again, I am not sure that I understand this move. To show that a 
metaphysical claim about moral reality has logical implications for what 
we say in ethics is not to thereby show that the metaphysical claim is part 
of substantive ethical discourse. It seems to me a mistake to conflate these 
ideas. Perhaps this is terminological.24 Perhaps some are willing to use 
terms like ‘first-order’ and ‘moral’ more expansively than others. If so, the 
dispute between Robust Realism and Kramer’s form of Relaxed Realism 
is smaller than it looks. This would be a nice result. However, even if this 
is so, there is still a major difference between Kramer’s view and Robust 
Realism. 
                                                             
24 Cf. Enoch (2011: 130). 
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 This difference lies in how Robust Realists expect arguments for 
the Realist Commitments to unfold. Owing to his view that metaethical 
discourse is just a part of moral discourse, Kramer thinks that the Realist 
Commitments are to be defended or rejected primarily by an appeal to 
substantive moral considerations. For instance, he maintains that certain 
theories – what he calls ‘Subjectivism’ and ‘Relativism,’ in particular – are 
forced to take substantive moral stands that expose them as untenable. 
For instance, Kramer tells us that, by making the correct moral principles 
constitutively dependent on our attitudes, the Subjectivist must accept 
that claims like ‘it is not the case that torturing babies for pleasure is 
morally wrong’ would be true in (for example) a world that contained no 
people.25 
Kramer thinks that this claim is obviously false. And, because he 
sees Subjectivist metaethical theories as being committed to such claims, 
Kramer maintains that they can be seen to be false as well. Put another 
way, Subjectivist metaethical theories are rendered unacceptable by their 
repugnant entailments at the substantive moral level. This point applies 
more generally. Kramer holds that metaethical positions are to be tested 
primarily by consideration of their substantive moral implications, and 
he judges that the Realist Commitments come out well from this sort of 
test. 
In accepting External Metaphysics, a Robust Realist should deny 
this key role to moral argument. They should instead say that the Realist 
Commitments are to be defended or rejected primarily by an appeal to 
external considerations. We abstract away from substantive entailments 
and assess the metaphysical merits of various views of moral reality. This 
echoes the approach to metaphysical inquiry discussed in §1.2. On that 
approach, we develop various theoretical accounts of how reality might 
be. We then compare these theories by the standard criteria for theory 
choice, and provide arguments for thinking that reality is one way or 
another. In metaethics, we are of course concerned mainly with the moral 
aspects of reality. Robust Realists should thus say that a defender of the 
Realist Commitments needs to examine the competing theories of moral 
reality in order to assess their theoretical merits. As a way of arguing 
about moral reality, this is more attractive than the appeal to first-order 
positions.  
                                                             
25 Kramer (2009: 30-35). I take it that a sophisticated subjectivist will in fact attempt to 
rigidify the subjective moral norms, but we can set this aside for the present. 
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To see how Kramer’s way of arguing about moral reality leads to 
problems, consider that he frequently relies on the emphatic assertion of 
his personal moral convictions when attempting to establish the Realist 
Commitments, condemning certain Relativist theories, for example, by 
saying that they give us no way to morally criticise “fanatical Nazis and 
Maoists and other arrant villains” (2009: 45). Other metaethical views are 
likewise rejected because Kramer considers them “repellent” (2009: 32), 
or to have a certain “perniciousness” (2009: 33), or to be “appalling and 
crazy” (2009: 133). I generally find myself agreeing with Kramer’s ethical 
judgements. I am no fan of fanatical Nazis and Maoists, and I probably 
wouldn’t get on with most other arrant villains. However, it is unwise to 
give this sort of moral consideration primary significance in metaethical 
debate.  
Note first that, from the claim that metaethics is part of ethics, it 
does not follow that ethically assessing metaethical positions has to be 
the only or even the primary way of arguing about moral reality. More 
crucially, focusing our attention on substantive convictions is unlikely to 
lead to progress in metaethics, however firmly they are held.26 It is open 
to anti-realists to reply to Kramer by saying that what their arguments 
show is that, perhaps surprisingly, many substantive moral claims that 
look highly evident to us are in fact false (unless relativised, or whatever). 
Such a move seems to be dialectically acceptable, for if there is no strict 
division between ethics and metaethics then arguing from metaethical to 
ethical positions is just as feasible as arguing from ethical to metaethical 
views.  
Assuming that the moral views to which Kramer appeals are not 
maximally evident, as one no doubt should, it is hard to see how Relaxed 
Realists can respond to the anti-realist without simply reasserting their 
personal convictions even more emphatically. But if that’s the only move 
available to us, or even if it’s meant to be our primary move, then progress 
seems unlikely. After all, this way of arguing just won’t be convincing to 
those who are already prepared to reject certain Realist Commitments in 
light of metaphysical problems that they take to be associated with them. 
And that’s significant, at least if we were hoping that our arguments might 
be dialectically effective. We are better off at the external metaphysical 
level, which turns on modest speculation about ways moral reality might 
be. 
                                                             
26 I return to this sort of point in Chapter 6. 
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So, there are important differences between Robust Realism and 
Kramer’s brand of Relaxed Realism. Specifically, they take different views 
about how metaethical arguments should unfold. And the Robust Realist 
has the less problematic approach here. I return to these dialectical issues 
in Chapter 6, for whilst I am confident that the Robust Realist’s approach 
is less problematic than the Relaxed Realist’s, there are (I will argue) far 
more general problems with how we argue about moral reality, problems 
that should be troubling to anyone with the optimistic goal of preaching 
beyond the choir. Anyway, what matters here is that Robust Realism is 
clearly not the same as Kramer’s version of Relaxed Realism, and that on 




There is space for Robust Realism. Despite what a number of both Modest 
and Ambitious Anti-Archimedeans have claimed, it is entirely possible to 
develop and defend a metaethical theory that has external metaphysical 
commitments. Of course, none of this is to show that Robust Realism is 
actually the true metaethical theory. For all I have said, it may be that the 
Realist Commitments are all false. Maybe there are no moral truths, or no 
moral properties. Or maybe there are such truths and properties, but they 
are all reducible, natural, mind-dependent, and conditional on contingent 
desires or social conventions. However, we can at least say that there is 
room to articulate a robustly metaphysical view of these commitments. 
This may sound like a modest conclusion, but it matters a great deal given 
the apparent significance of the threat posed by anti-Archimedean views 
like Quasi-Realism and Relaxed Realism. Having defended the possibility 
of developing a robustly realistic metaethical theory, the next task will be 






                                                             
27 A shorter version of this chapter is published as Ingram (forthcoming).  
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3 The Supervenience of Moral Properties 
 
Robust Realists think that there are substantive moral truths, and that at 
least some of these pertain to the moral properties of acts, or types of act. 
I will not elaborate on these claims, however, for in themselves they do 
little to distinguish Robust Realism from rival theories. Instead, it will be 
more productive to investigate the four Realist Commitments that make 
Robust Realism a uniquely uncompromising position: Non-Reductivism, 
Non-Naturalism, Mind-Independence, and Categorical Authority. My aim 
in this chapter is to examine the first of these, showing how an appeal to 
necessary moral truths can help us answer two important objections to 
it.  
More precisely, in this chapter I am concerned with the following 
claim about moral properties:  
Non-Reductivism. Moral properties are not reducible to 
purely descriptive properties. 
I clarify and motivate this claim in §3.1. The rest of the chapter is devoted 
to answering the two most influential ways of objecting to it. Both of these 
objections rely on the fact that the moral ‘supervenes’ on the descriptive. 
I explain what this supervenience claim involves in §3.2, before outlining 
the first supervenience objection against Non-Reductivism in §3.3. I call 
this the ‘Reductive Supervenience Objection,’ and I respond to it in §3.4. I 
outline the second supervenience objection against Non-Reductivism in 
§3.5. I call this the ‘Explanatory Supervenience Objection,’ and I respond 
to it in §3.6 and §3.7. My response to both supervenience objections will 
appeal to necessary moral truths, so I briefly discuss the existence of such 
truths in §3.8. I conclude, in §3.9, that an appeal to necessary moral truths 
enables Robust Realists to retain the commitment to an irreducible moral 
reality. 
 
3.1 Non-Reductivism and Descriptivism 
What does commitment to Non-Reductivism involve, and with what claim 
does it most directly contrast? In this section I answer these questions, 
and in doing so I provide evidence for Non-Reductivism. The evidence is 
defeasible, for it relies on how things appear. It is for Non-Reductivism’s 
critics to object that things are not as they appear. If the objections can be 




First, how are we to distinguish moral and descriptive properties? 
I said in §1.1 that descriptive properties are picked out by the descriptive 
predicates, like ‘… is human’ and ‘… is desired,’ whilst moral properties 
are picked out by moral predicates, like ‘… is right’ and ‘… is good.’ This 
approach is not uncontroversial, but it has the attraction of ensuring that 
the debate begins on an even footing.1 After all, to draw the distinction in 
metaphysical terms would beg the question against the Non-Reductivist’s 
critics, who deny that the moral and the descriptive are metaphysically 
distinct. Maybe there are other ways of drawing the distinction that are 
equally dialectically friendly but, by approaching the properties via the 
predicates that pick them out, we allow that these predicates may or may 
not refer to just one type of property. The debate can then be had on even 
terms. 
If moral and descriptive predicates refer to one type of property, 
then it will most likely be due to the truth of the following:  
Descriptivism. Moral properties are reducible to purely 
descriptive properties.  
Descriptivism is the most direct contrast with Non-Reductivism. You may 
ask why I treat descriptive properties as the potential reductive base for 
moral properties, rather than the (perhaps) more traditional natural or 
non-moral properties. With the natural, there are two reasons. One is that 
I suspect that there is room for a non-reductive form of moral naturalism. 
I won’t explore this view now – I discuss it in Chapter 5 – but we shouldn’t 
view moral naturalists as necessarily being hostile to the irreducibility of 
moral properties.2 A second reason is that, in accepting Non-Reductivism, 
the Robust Realist is partly seeking to exclude theistic views that reduce, 
say, being good, to a supernatural property like being loved by the gods. 
Non-Reductivism is thus not exclusively against naturalistic reductions, 
for it is also against supernaturalistic reductions. The term ‘descriptive’ 
is therefore useful, for it broad enough to incorporate the supernatural as 
well as the natural. So, in short, the Non-Reductivist should deny both that 
moral properties are descriptively natural and that they are descriptively 
supernatural. 
                                                             
1 It is used by critics of Non-Reductivism, like Jackson (1998) and Streumer (2008), so by 
operating with it we’re clearly not stacking the deck in favour of Non-Reductivism.   
2 The view I have in mind is mostly associated with Boyd (1988), Sturgeon (1988; 2006), 
and Brink (1984; 1989; 2001). I consider this type of view in Chapter 5, in which I also 
discuss the relation between the natural and the descriptive in more depth. 
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 With the non-moral, it is just wrong to say that moral properties 
might reduce to non-moral properties. In this setting, attempts to reduce 
moral properties are meant to be ‘conservative,’ not ‘eliminative.’ That is, 
reductive metaethical claims do not aim to usher moral properties from 
the scene. They instead aim to capture moral properties via more basic 
properties in which they putatively consist. And something that counts as 
moral cannot consist in anything non-moral. This point is made by Mark 
Schroeder, who says that a “property cannot be both moral and nonmoral. 
If it is non-moral, then it is not moral after all” (2005: 9). By talking of the 
relation between the moral and the descriptive, rather than the moral and 
the non-moral, ensures that we avoid this unhelpful view of the reductive 
claim. 
 So, it’s best to talk of the descriptive instead of the natural or the 
non-moral. But you might worry that moral properties are just obviously 
descriptive. After all, ‘killing is wrong’ seems to describe killing as having 
the property of wrongness, just as ‘the table is brown’ describes the table 
as having the property of brownness. This is no longer an issue, however, 
if we clarify the precise sense in which Non-Reductivists deny that moral 
properties are descriptive. For the descriptive, as it is understood here, is 
firmly on the ‘is’ side of the ‘is/ought’ gulf. Whilst no one could deny that 
morality includes ought-y stuff, the most important question is whether 
this ought-y or directive part of morality can be had in purely descriptive 
terms.  
Non-Reductivists say that it cannot, for it is far from clear that to 
direct is simply to describe in a certain way. Maybe there is a way to have 
direction in purely descriptive terms, but this is where the disagreement 
between Non-Reductivists and Descriptivists is located. Put another way, 
there is a similarity between ‘killing is wrong’ and ‘the table is brown’ in 
that both claims are truth-apt.3 But ‘killing is wrong’ is not just truth-apt. 
It is also ‘satisfaction-apt,’ as I will put it. It involves or entails a directive 
claim about how one ought to behave, and a moral agent can thus satisfy 
or fail to satisfy it. A reductive claim must capture the satisfaction-aptness 
of moral property ascriptions. Descriptivists and Non-Reductivists divide 
over the prospects of capturing satisfaction-aptness in purely descriptive 
terms. 
                                                             
3 I thus use ‘descriptive’ differently to Hare (1952), who denies that moral sentences are 
truth-apt. I set aside Hare’s prescriptivist view. The relevant debate is between those, like 
Jackson (1998) and Brown (2011), who think that the whole of morality can be captured 
on the ‘is’ side of the ‘is/ought’ divide, and those who think that it cannot. 
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 This satisfaction-aptness certainly doesn’t seem to be present in 
some potential reductions. If one attempted to reduce being a wrong act 
to being an act that fails to maximise happiness, then one would appear to 
lose satisfaction-aptness. After all, ‘killing is wrong’ appears to involve or 
imply direction that agents can satisfy or fail to satisfy. But this isn’t clear 
of ‘killing fails to maximise happiness.’ This claim is truth-apt, but it does 
not appear to be satisfaction-apt. Other cases are more delicate, however. 
For instance, suppose that being a wrong act is reducible to something 
like being an act that is against the commands of the gods. Then the claim 
‘killing is wrong’ equates to ‘killing is against the commands of the gods.’ 
This may look satisfaction-apt, for agents can satisfy or fail to satisfy a 
command. But careful reading suggests that it not, in fact, satisfaction-apt. 
For it does not issue a command, it only describes an act as having been 
commanded. To see the difference, compare a command like ‘do not kill’ 
with the description that ‘killing is against the commands of the gods.’4 
Clearly, the former is satisfaction-apt. But it is not clear that the latter is 
satisfaction-apt. I know how to obey a command that has been issued. I 
don’t know how to obey a description of the fact that a command has been 
issued.5 
 So, there seems to be a key difference between the moral and the 
descriptive. Directive moral claims are satisfaction-apt, and it appears as 
though satisfaction-aptness cannot be had in purely descriptive terms. To 
clarify how this helps Non-Reductivism, I should make explicit the notion 
of reduction that I have in mind. In claiming that moral properties reduce 
to purely descriptive properties, I take it that most Descriptivists mean 
that moral properties are identical to some purely descriptive properties. 
They think that the set of moral properties is included in the set of purely 
descriptive properties.6 In contrast, Non-Reductivism (as I understand it) 
claims that moral properties are not identical to any purely descriptive 
properties.  
                                                             
4 If we see ‘killing as wrong’ as meaning ‘do not kill,’ we are dealing with an Expressivist 
rather than a Descriptivist view. That’s a different kettle of fish, discussed in Chapter 2. 
5 The point about commands applies to desires too. There’s a difference between having 
a desire and a description of the fact that a desire is had. I know how to satisfy the former, 
but I don’t know how to satisfy the latter.  
6 This is the approach taken by Jackson (1998) and, if I read him correctly, Brown (2011). 
Schroeder (2005; 2007) has a different approach, but I set this aside as I think that the 
identity claim is what most Robust Realists are chiefly concerned to deny.  
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 Having understood reduction as identity, we can be clearer about 
the way in which morality’s satisfaction-aptness helps to make a case for 
Non-Reductivism. Consider the following part of Leibniz’s Law: 
Indiscernibility of Identicals. For any a and b, if a is identical 
to b then, for all properties F, a has F if and only if b has F.  
From this highly plausible principle we can draw a test that enables us to 
assess whether two entities are metaphysically distinct. The test is just to 
see whether they have any different properties. If they do, the entities are 
indeed non-identical and therefore distinct. In the metaethical case, our 
question is thus as follows: is there any difference in the (second-order) 
properties of (first-order) moral and descriptive properties? According 
to Non-Reductivists, moral properties appear to have the (second-order) 
property of being directive, or being satisfaction-apt. Purely descriptive 
properties seem to lack this (second-order) property.7 If the appearances 
reflect reality, moral and descriptive properties will indeed have different 
properties. Given the test provided by Indiscernibility of Identicals, moral 
properties and descriptive properties will therefore be non-identical and 
distinct. 
There is thus evidence for Non-Reductivism. But this evidence is 
defeasible, for it comes from apparent differences between the moral and 
the descriptive.8 It appears that morality involves satisfaction-aptness, 
and it also appears that we can’t get satisfaction-aptness from the purely 
descriptive. But there may be arguments that make us think twice about 
the appearances. Argument may show that satisfaction-aptness is purely 
descriptive. Or it may make us revise our view of morality, so that we see 
the appearance of satisfaction-aptness as an illusion. In what follows, I 
look at the best ways of objecting to Non-Reductivism. If, as I’ll argue, they 
fail to bite, then the evidence for Non-Reductivism will stand, and we will 
be (provisionally) entitled to maintain our belief in an irreducible moral 
reality. 
                                                             
7 I argue in Chapter 5 that the specifically categorical nature of moral direction is evidence 
for Non-Naturalism, but this is a different point to the one made here. 
8 Enoch (2011: 82) judges that normative properties are irreducible by appealing to what 
he calls the ‘just-too-different’ intuition. This may be similar to the point made here, but 
Enoch does not specify a view of reduction. Seeing reduction as identity clarifies that the 
support for Non-Reductivism is not bare intuition. Instead the idea is that, in concord with 
Indiscernibility of Identicals, apparent differences between the moral and the descriptive 




3.2 Moral Supervenience 
The most influential objections to Non-Reductivism draw on the widely 
accepted fact that moral properties supervene on descriptive properties. 
The notion of supervenience is sometimes less than clear in discussions 
of these issues, so before I consider how ‘supervenience objections’ are 
meant to be a threat to Non-Reductivism, I’ll discuss moral supervenience 
itself. 
The supervenience relation has been understood in various ways 
over the years. In its early uses, it was treated by some as a certain sort of 
metaphysical relation. Specifically, it was often seen as an asymmetrical 
dependence relation.9 But this is not how it is understood now. Instead, 
supervenience is standardly understood as a modal relation that holds 
between classes of properties. In other words, to say that a certain set of 
properties supervenes on some other set of properties is to say that those 
classes of property co-vary across worlds. Understood in these terms, the 
supervenience relation is neither symmetric nor asymmetric. Instead it is 
non-symmetric. That is, supervenience claims in themselves presuppose 
nothing about the character of any metaphysical link between the sets of 
properties with which it is concerned. Two sets of properties related by 
supervenience might be related symmetrically (for instance, by identity) 
or asymmetrically (for instance, by dependence), but this isn’t decided by 
the fact that one of them supervenes on the other. In sum, supervenience 
is a non-symmetric modal relationship that can hold between property 
classes. 
Philosophers also draw a distinction between different types of 
supervenience, and this is partly because the worlds across which two or 
more sets of properties co-vary can be more or less wide-ranging. It might 
be that the relevant sets of properties are correlated within a limited set 
of worlds, for example, or it might be that the relevant sets of properties 
are correlated across all worlds. Fortunately, in the present context there 
is no need to flesh out every type of supervenience.10 Given that our only 
concern at the moment is the connection between moral properties and 
descriptive properties, just one type of supervenience relation is relevant 
to us. 
                                                             
9 McPherson (2012: 216) makes the same point.   
10 Kim (1993) has a seminal discussion, and McLaughlin and Bennett (2014) give a broad 
survey of both classic and more recent literature.   
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Specifically, debate between Non-Reductivists and Descriptivists 
involves the following ‘global’ type of supervenience:  
Global Supervenience. The A-properties globally supervene 
on the B-properties if and only if any two worlds that are 
exactly alike in their A-properties are also exactly alike in 
their B-properties.  
Among metaethicists, it is widely (though not universally) accepted that 
moral and descriptive properties are related in this way.11 I will thus take 
the following as common ground:  
Moral Supervenience. Any two worlds that are exactly alike 
in their descriptive properties are exactly alike in their 
moral properties.  
Moral Supervenience states that the moral properties and the descriptive 
properties co-vary across all worlds. Although it is not often given explicit 
argumentative support, its plausibility can be illustrated by an appeal to 
cases. 
 For instance, if worlds w and w* are exactly alike descriptively, 
then the claim that Arthur acted wrongly in slapping Barry in w but that 
Arthur* acted rightly in slapping Barry* in w* will seem highly peculiar. 
Such a claim appears to lack any motivation. It seems to be arbitrary and 
inconsistent, maybe ad hoc. Cases violating Moral Supervenience are thus 
rejected as impossible. Basically, then, it is counterintuitive to claim that 
there could be a moral difference between two worlds without there also 
being some relevant descriptive difference to explain it. Of course, if there 
were some relevant descriptive difference between w and w*, then the 
existence of corresponding moral differences between these two worlds 
would be fine. Suppose that Arthur* performed his slapping in order to 
prevent Barry* from fainting, and that this was not the case with Arthur. 
There can of course be a moral difference between w and w* in this sort 
of situation. But this doesn’t entail a violation of the Moral Supervenience 
principle, for the two worlds are no longer descriptively alike. Without a 
relevant descriptive difference, there cannot be any corresponding moral 
difference. 
                                                             
11 Sturgeon (2009) raises interesting doubts, but I think that there are strong responses 
to them – see Ridge (2007) and McPherson (2012). It might be that Moral Supervenience, 
as I’ve stated it, should be slightly reformulated in light of Sturgeon’s discussion, but the 
relevant reformulations will make no difference to the arguments of this chapter. To keep 
things simple and clear, I therefore set them aside. 
56 
 
 Moral Supervenience is not optional. Non-Reductivists are thus in 
trouble if, as some suggest, it makes problems for them. One can’t escape 
any problem it creates by denying it.12 One must make instead some other 
move. 
 
3.3 Reductive Supervenience Objections 
One way of challenging Non-Reductivism says that Moral Supervenience, 
when combined with certain other claims, entails Descriptivism. That is, 
some say that the modal link between the moral and the descriptive helps 
to establish the reducibility of moral properties to descriptive properties. 
Call this the ‘Reductive Supervenience Objection.’ In this section I outline 
the best way of framing this objection to Non-Reductivism. I respond to it 
in §3.4. 
The most influential Reductive Supervenience Objection is due to 
Frank Jackson, but I will suggest that it isn’t the most worrying. Jackson’s 
version of the objection relies on a contentious metaphysical claim, and 
as a result has little or no dialectical bite against Non-Reductivism. Before 
coming to a more troubling version of the objection, however, we should 
consider Jackson’s influential argument. He begins as follows: 
Let E be a sentence about ethical nature … Now each world 
at which E is true will have some descriptive nature: ethical 
nature without descriptive nature is impossible … And, for 
each such world, there will be a sentence containing only 
descriptive terms that gives that nature in full. Now let w1, 
w2, etc. be the worlds where E is true, and let D1, D2, etc. be 
purely descriptive sentences true at w1, w2, etc., respectively, 
which give the full descriptive nature of w1, w2, etc. Then the 
disjunction of D1, D2, etc., will also be a purely descriptive 
sentence, call it D. But then E entails and is entailed by D. For 
every world where E is true is a world where one or other of 
the Di is true, so E entails D. Moreover, every world where 
one or other of the Di are true is a world where E is true, as 
otherwise we would have a violation of [Moral 
Supervenience]. Therefore, D entails E (1998: 122-123)  
The upshot of these comments is that moral predicates and descriptive 
predicates are necessarily coextensive. But we need more to get us to 
Descriptivism, which is a claim about moral properties rather than moral 
predicates. 
                                                             
12 Though see Harrison (2013). 
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Jackson offers the following principle in order to get us all the way 
to Descriptivism:  
Necessary Coextension. If two predicates are necessarily 
coextensive, then they refer to one and the same property.13 
Given that moral and descriptive predicates are necessarily co-extensive, 
and assuming that necessarily coextensive predicates refer to one and the 
same property, it follows that moral and descriptive predicates refer to 
one and the same property. Moral and descriptive properties are one and 
the same. Given that there is no serious way for descriptive properties to 
reduce to moral properties, the reduction obviously goes the other way. 
That is, the moral reduces to the descriptive. And this is Descriptivism. In 
sum, Jackson seeks to move from Moral Supervenience to Descriptivism, 
via Necessary Coextension. If he succeeds, then the claim that there exist 
irreducible moral properties must be rejected in favour of one or another 
reduction of the moral to the descriptive.14 So, how can Non-Reductivists 
reply? 
A standard reply is to reject Necessary Coextension. Critics offer 
cases like the following:  
Triangle. The predicates ‘… is a closed figure with three 
sides’ and ‘… is a closed figure with three angles’ are 
necessarily coextensive, but these predicates refer to 
different properties.15 
Nine. The predicates ‘… is the cube root of 729’ and ‘… is the 
square of 3’ are necessarily coextensive, but these predicates 
refer to different properties.16 
The properties picked out by these necessarily coextensive predicates are 
said to be non-identical, and thus distinct. If this is correct, it undermines 
Jackson’s argument by showing that moral and descriptive properties can 
differ despite the necessary coextension of those predicates that refer to 
them.  
                                                             
13 Jackson (1998: 125-128).   
14 This assumes that we aim to retain moral truths and properties. We could abandon that 
and be Error Theorists or Expressivists, but I set this aside. Cf. Streumer (2008; 2011). 
15 Shafer-Landau (2003: 91), Majors (2005: 488), FitzPatrick (2008: 199), and Kramer 
(2009: 209-210).   
16 Oddie (2005: 149) and Parfit (2011 v.2: 297). Note that, whilst Oddie is committed to 
Non-Reductivism, he discusses this case in order to argue that it is unhelpful.   
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 But how do defenders of Non-Reductivism argue that, in Triangle 
and Nine, the relevant predicates refer to distinct properties? The answer 
starts with the Indiscernibility of Identicals test mentioned in §3.1. Recall 
that, on this test, we can see whether two entities are identical by asking 
if they have the same properties. If they don’t, they are non-identical and 
therefore distinct. The idea in the Triangle and Nine cases is just that the 
(second-order) properties of the (first-order) properties in question are 
not entirely alike, and that as a result those (first-order) properties are 
distinct.  
In the case of Nine, for example, the property of being the cube 
root of 729 and the property of being the square of 3 each have different 
(second-order) properties. To illustrate, consider that one can investigate 
the cube root of 729 without investigating the square of 3. This means 
that the property of being the cube root of 729 has the (second-order) 
property of being investigable in isolation from investigation into the 
square of 3. This is not true of the property of being the square of 3. Given 
the Indiscernibility of Identicals principle, it therefore seems as though 
being the cube root of 729 and being the square of 3 are distinct, for these 
(first-order) properties have distinct (second-order) properties. Equally 
fine-grained differences can be found for the Triangle case. This is why 
most Non-Reductivists reject Necessary Coextension. With this principle 
rejected, the door to understanding moral and descriptive properties as 
distinct – despite the necessary coextension of their predicates – remains 
open.  
 If this is right, then Non-Reductivism still stands. However, there 
is a worry about this response. Some deny that Triangle and Nine count 
as counterexamples to Coextension, for they don’t share the intuition that 
the predicates in these cases refer to distinct properties. Instead, they are 
inclined to judge that ‘… is a closed figure with three sides’ and ‘… is a 
closed figure with three angles’ refer to one property – being a triangle. 
Similarly, they judge that ‘… is the cube root of 729’ and ‘… is the square 
of 3’ refer to one property – being the number 9. The core charge is that 
Triangle and Nine conflate properties with the contents of predicates, and 
that they thus fail to support Non-Reductivism.17 Of course, not everyone 
shares the intuitions required to underpin that charge. Non-Reductivists 
typically don’t, which is why they appeal to Triangle and Nine in the first 
place. 
                                                             
17 Jackson (1998: 125-128) and Streumer (2008; 2011). 
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This is the cause of my concern about Jackson’s way of developing 
the Reductive Supervenience Objection – it seems that, when the debate 
about supervenience and reduction is framed in this way, it results in a 
stalemate.18 Descriptivists and Non-Reductivists both end up defending 
arguments that fail to be dialectically effective, for they rely on intuitions 
that their opponents – the very people they are trying to convince – lack. 
Specifically, intuitions concerning highly abstract issues pertaining to the 
Necessary Coextension principle. Given that such differences in intuition 
tend to be very difficult to adjudicate, it is likely that Jackson’s argument 
will ultimately offer little assistance as a way of settling the debate about 
supervenience and reduction in metaethics. True, it may be that there is 
a way out of the impasse. But it may also be that we have to move on from 
Jackson’s supervenience objection to move forward. I suspect that this is 
the case, so I won’t discuss Jackson’s objection further. However, there is 
a way of framing the Reductive Supervenience Objection that presents a 
more worrying threat to the claim that there exists an irreducible moral 
reality. 
This threat comes from an argument made by Campbell Brown, 
an argument that goes as follows: 
(1) Moral properties supervene on descriptive properties. 
(2) If moral properties supervene on descriptive properties, 
then all non-descriptive moral properties are redundant 
in the sense that they do no work in distinguishing 
possibilities. 
(3) No properties are redundant. 
(4) So, all moral properties are descriptive properties.19 
Before considering how Brown’s version of the Reductive Supervenience 
Objection improves upon Jackson’s, let’s consider its premises in more 
detail. As we’ll see, it only makes a few claims, each of which seems highly 
plausible. 
                                                             
18 This is also suggested by Suikkanen (2010: §3). Suikkanen seeks a way to move forward 
in the debate about Jackson’s objection. This is a legitimate avenue to explore, though I 
am not persuaded that it is ultimately a fruitful one. Given limitations of space, I prefer to 
focus on Brown’s more recent version of the Reductive Supervenience Objection. I discuss 
his argument below.   
19 Brown (2011: 210). He goes on to modify the argument in light of a potential objection, 
but the modification makes no difference to my discussion so I set it aside.   
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The claim made by (1) is that moral and descriptive properties 
have a certain modal relationship, and Brown is clear in his discussion 
that he has Global Supervenience in mind. In other words, the first part of 
this Reductive Supervenience Objection is simply Moral Supervenience. I 
have already considered this principle in §3.2. It is widely accepted and I 
take it to be common ground, so I won’t discuss it further here. The claim 
made by (2) is that Moral Supervenience entails the redundancy of moral 
properties, where redundancy is interpreted as follows:  
Redundancy. A set of properties is redundant just in case it 
makes no contribution to distinguishing possibilities.  
Brown thinks that moral properties fail this test. That is, the set of moral 
properties makes no contribution to distinguishing possibilities. To see 
this consider that, if A-properties supervene on B-properties, two worlds 
that are alike in their A-properties will thus be alike in their B-properties. 
In other words, the worlds will be indistinguishable in respect of these 
properties. So, if redundancy consists in failure to make a contribution to 
distinguishing possibilities, all supervening properties will be redundant. 
Moral properties supervene, and are therefore redundant in the relevant 
sense. 
 The claim made by (3) is that there are no redundant properties. 
Brown’s rationale for this position is a “maxim of ontological parsimony: 
posit only so many properties as are required to distinguish possibilities” 
(2011: 212). This is just a specific version of ‘Ockham’s Razor’ – a widely 
accepted norm that tells us to accept the simpler of two equally successful 
explanations. Now, if moral properties are redundant, and if there are no 
redundant properties, then we are only entitled to posit moral properties 
if we reduce them to the descriptive properties on which they supervene. 
We must therefore see moral properties as purely descriptive properties. 
This is (4), which is just Descriptivism. In short, Brown seeks to move all 
the way from Moral Supervenience to Descriptivism, via his Redundancy 
principle. 
The attraction of framing the Reductive Supervenience Objection 
in this way is that it avoids the risk of stalemate that arises from Jackson’s 
reliance on Necessary Coextension, a principle about which people differ 
in intuition. Brown’s argument relies on no such controversial principle 
to bridge the predicate-property gap. It is a directly metaphysical case for 
Descriptivism, and relies on just three principles that are apparently very 




This way of formulating the Reductive Supervenience Objection 
is therefore the deeper threat to irreducible moral properties. Defenders 
of Non-Reductivism need a way to avoid or overcome this threat. I offer 
them a way of doing this in the next section, in which I argue that one of 
Brown’s principles is not as plausible as it seems. It needs to be modified 
to be defensible, and once modified it opens the door to a Non-Reductivist 
view. 
 
3.4 Necessity and Redundancy 
One way of responding to Brown’s supervenience objection would be to 
show that irreducible moral properties are not redundant, that they do 
contribute to our being able to distinguish possibilities.20 Another way of 
responding to the objection would be to accept that moral properties are 
redundant in Brown’s sense, whilst also arguing that there are redundant 
properties in exactly this sense.21 These are both interesting ways to go, 
but I intend to offer a different sort of response to Brown. My preferred 
way of responding is to cast doubt on redundancy as Brown understands 
it. 
Recall that Brown’s supervenience objection to Non-Reductivism 
relies on the following conception of redundancy:  
Redundancy. A set of properties is redundant just in case it 
makes no contribution to distinguishing possibilities.  
Now, this principle has to be modified in some way, for it cannot be true 
as it stands. To see this, consider mathematics. The pure and basic truths 
concerning mathematical entities hold necessarily. For instance, it is true 
at all possible worlds that the number nineteen has the property of being 
prime. In general, all worlds are indistinguishable in respect of such pure 
and basic mathematical truths. But should we therefore conclude that the 
mathematical is redundant? This, it seems to me, would be an extremely 
strange basis for that claim. Even if there are reasons to be suspicious of 
abstract mathematical entities, the fact that truths about them do not help 
us to distinguish possible worlds is not one of them. I’m not saying that 
mathematical entities exist. I’m just saying that the supervenience of the 
mathematical would be an odd basis for treating mathematical entities as 
redundant. 
                                                             
20 This is how Enoch (2011: 139-140) responds to Brown.   
21 This is how Wielenberg (2011) responds to Brown. For a reply, see Brown (2012). 
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To clarify, what is odd is the idea that redundancy automatically 
falls out of mathematical supervenience. Maybe mathematical entities are 
dispensable, and thus redundant, but it will take a lot of work to expose 
this fact. Specifically, one must show that the best scientific theories can 
do without mathematics. Perhaps this can be done, but actually doing it 
will be extremely difficult. After all, even one of the best known and most 
detailed stabs at doing this sort of technical work – namely, Hartry Field’s 
effort to show that mathematical abstracta are dispensable in Newtonian 
mechanics – is explicitly incomplete.22 So, my claim is not that there are 
mathematical entities. I’m simply agreeing with Mark Colyvan’s view that 
mathematical nominalists have to take the ‘hard road,’ like Field, for there 
is unlikely to be any ‘easy road’ available.23 And, given that it would be 
unacceptably strange to regard mathematical entities as dispensable and 
redundant on the basis that they don’t help us to distinguish worlds, we 
should reject the formulation of Redundancy on which Brown’s argument 
relies. 
Again, this is not to claim that there are mathematical properties. 
I am neutral on that score. The point is just that it is a mistake to regard 
this debate in the philosophy of mathematics as being settled just by the 
contribution that the truths concerning mathematical properties make to 
our distinguishing between possible worlds. It is clear that they make no 
contribution here, for pure and basic mathematical truths are the same at 
all worlds. Now, one might think that this just points us toward a fix for 
Brown’s argument. After all, it is pretty well known that the necessity of 
mathematical truths makes them a special case within the supervenience 
debate. They are a special case because truths concerning mathematical 
properties hold as a matter of necessity, and this ensures that every class 
of property supervenes upon them. Two worlds that are exactly alike in 
their geographical or psychological properties, for example, will also be 
exactly alike in their mathematical properties. And that’s simply because 
all possible worlds are exactly alike with respect to their mathematical 
properties.24 
                                                             
22 Field (1980). 
23 Colyvan (2010) argues that three influential, attractive, and representative attempts to 
take the easy road in the end require the success of a hard road strategy. As he makes 
clear, the claim is not that there is definitely no easy road. It’s just that the prospects look 
dim, given that the best shots at providing one fail in the relevant way.  
24 Cf. Williamson (2001: 626).   
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Things are different with most other supervenience claims, for to 
say that the class of A-properties supervenes on the class of B-properties 
is typically to say that those classes of property necessarily co-vary across 
worlds. And there is no co-variance in the mathematical case, for the basic 
mathematical truths don’t change – they are necessary. The mathematical 
case thus differs from most other cases of supervenience. So, even though 
Redundancy has strange results for the mathematical, the fact that this is 
a special case means we can probably modify it to avoid those results:  
Modified Redundancy. If the truths pertaining to a set of 
properties are all contingent, then that set of properties is 
redundant just in case it makes no contribution to 
distinguishing possibilities.  
Note that this modification of Redundancy is not ad hoc. It is a response 
to the widely accepted fact that the necessity of the mathematical makes 
it a special case in the supervenience debate. So, even though Redundancy 
is a flawed test for redundancy, Modified Redundancy has more going for 
it. 
 Perhaps, then, this Reductive Supervenience Objection still works 
against Non-Reductivists. That is, Brown’s argument might succeed when 
Redundancy is replaced by Modified Redundancy. However, the matter is 
more complex than Descriptivists might hope, for Modified Redundancy 
opens the door to a Non-Reductivist view that accepts necessary moral 
truths. Basically, if we say that some moral truths, like the pure and basic 
mathematical truths, are fixed across all worlds, then Non-Reductivism is 
left untouched by a version of Brown’s argument that has undergone the 
modifications required to avoid odd results in the mathematical case. So, 
accepting necessary moral truths provides Non-Reductivists with a way 
forward. The idea that there are necessary moral truths is controversial, 
of course.25 Many moral truths are quite clearly contingent. It was morally 
impermissible for me to punch Perkins in the face. This is true, but not in 
all worlds. There are worlds in which we don’t exist, worlds in which we 
do exist but I didn’t punch Perkins in the face, worlds in which the punch 
was the only way to avoid war, and so on. So, even if it was impermissible 
for me to punch Perkins in the face, this is evidently a contingent moral 
truth. 
                                                             
25 Various metaethicists – like Parfit (2006), Enoch (2011), and Scanlon (2014) – defend 
it, but it is still up for debate. 
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 Perhaps, then, it will be unwise for the Non-Reductivist to rely on 
necessary moral truths in answering Brown’s supervenience objection. 
To see whether this is the case, we need to hear more about the idea that 
there are necessary moral truths. I will delay that discussion, however, so 
that I can examine it more fully later on. I argue in §3.8 that we can at least 
reasonably believe in necessary moral truths, and in Chapter 4 I provide 
a more detailed model of such truths. On my view, there are moral norms 
whose modal status is not limited by any contingent presuppositions or 
facts, just as there are basic mathematical truths whose modal status is 
not limited by any contingent presuppositions or facts. I will get to this in 
due course, but first let’s consider the second supervenience objection. As 
I’ll explain, the answer to this objection requires necessary moral truths 
as well. 
 
3.5 Explanatory Supervenience Objections 
Reductive Supervenience Objections seek to establish Descriptivism. The 
second supervenience objection that I’ll consider is more modest, for it 
doesn’t try to establish a specific theory. It just says that Non-Reductivists 
cannot explain the modal link between the moral and the descriptive. In 
short, if moral properties are irreducible, then moral supervenience is a 
mystery.  
 Call this the ‘Explanatory Supervenience Objection.’ In some early 
discussions of this objection, it can be hard to tell exactly how it is meant 
to work. Consider the following, from J.L. Mackie:  
What is the connection between the natural fact that an 
action is a piece of deliberate cruelty … and the moral fact 
that it is wrong? … The wrongness must somehow be 
‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a 
piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is 
signified by this ‘because’? (1977: 41).  
Mackie finds Moral Supervenience mysterious, or ‘queer.’ But this doesn’t 
amount to an objection to Non-Reductivism. It seems more like a call for 
information. Mackie says nothing to show that Non-Reductivists cannot 
just answer this call, and nothing to expose any special mystery for that 
view.26  
                                                             
26 Mackie does go on to explain supervenience via our subjective responses to the natural 
world. However, he does not develop a potential account for Non-Reductivists, so he has 
nothing with which to compare his subjectivist explanation.   
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So, we must look elsewhere to find a version of the Explanatory 
Supervenience Objection that has bite against the irreducibility of moral 
properties. Simon Blackburn (1993b; 1993c) has a more rigorous version 
of it. His discussion is hard to interpret, but one reading is that he thinks 
it a conceptual truth that there can be no moral changes without relevant 
descriptive changes, and that Non-Reductivists are unable to explain this 
conceptual truth.27 Whether or not this is what Blackburn had in mind, it 
is a mistake to suppose that it is a deep problem for Non-Reductivists. It 
plausibly is a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene on some 
descriptive properties – if someone were to deny this we’d regard them 
as conceptually deficient – but, as David Enoch (2011: 149) notes in this 
context, conceptual necessities do not cry out for explanation. So this way 
of understanding the Explanatory Supervenience Objection lacks serious 
bite. 
However, there is an Explanatory Supervenience Objection that 
has bite. Whilst it is a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene 
on some descriptive properties, it is not a conceptual truth that moral 
properties supervene on the particular set of descriptive properties they 
in fact supervene on.28 Suppose, for example, that the moral property of 
being a wrong act globally supervenes on the purely descriptive property 
of being an act that fails to maximise happiness. If this is the case, then it 
is the case in all possible worlds. And that means that many things that 
seem possible, and are defended by philosophers, are not in fact possible 
at all. 
For instance, if being a wrong act supervenes on being an act that 
fails to maximise happiness, then (contra Kantianism) there is no world at 
which an act is wrong just because treats another merely as a means. The 
fact that it treats another merely as a means may be involved in its being 
wrong, but only if it somehow results in its failure to maximise happiness. 
In short, we must explain why the combination of being a wrong act and 
being an act that treats someone merely as a means is impossible rather 
than just non-actual. That is, we must answer the following question: why 
do moral properties supervene on the set of descriptive properties they 
in fact supervene on? All metaethical theories must answer this question, 
but some say that Non-Reductivism is in an unusually bad position on this 
score. 
                                                             
27 Dreier (1992) helpfully interprets and assesses Blackburn’s version of the argument.   
28 Cf. Enoch (2011: 142) on the distinction between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ supervenience.   
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 After all, the Descriptivist can explain this modal relation in terms 
of a metaphysical relation – identity – that they say holds between moral 
and descriptive properties. And the Expressivist can explain it by saying 
that the purpose of moral judgement is to guide desires and choices about 
descriptive parts of reality in a fully consistent way.29 But what explains 
the modal relation if moral and descriptive properties are metaphysically 
distinct? This is a problem that seems unique to Non-Reductivism, and it 
is the core of the Explanatory Supervenience Objection as I understand it 
here.  
Note as well that, according to the defenders of the Explanatory 
Supervenience Objection, we cannot reply by appealing to some brutely 
necessary connection between the descriptive and the moral. Building on 
traditional Humean dogma, according to which there can be no necessary 
connections between distinct existences, critics of Non-Reductivism hold 
that one cannot say that it is just a basic fact about reality that moral and 
descriptive properties are modally linked in the way they are. At worst, 
they see it as impossible for there to be such brute necessary connections. 
At best, they maintain that the commitment to such connections counts 
significantly against a view.30 I discuss this in §3.7, but first I’ll outline an 
answer the Explanatory Supervenience Objection on Non-Reductivism’s 
behalf. 
 
3.6 Necessity and Norms 
My preferred answer to the Explanatory Supervenience Objection draws 
on necessary moral truths or, specifically, norms. This is not a novel claim. 
Torbjörn Tännsjö holds that such norms can answer the supervenience 
question, but the idea is developed in depth by Enoch.31 In this section I 
outline how we can explain supervenience by appeal to necessary moral 
norms. In the next section I defend the explanation against key objections 
to it. 
                                                             
29 Blackburn’s (1993c: 137), though this explanation is problematised by Dreier (2015).   
30 Hume (Understanding: §VII) and McPherson (2012: 217). Wilson (2010; 2014; 2015) 
argues that this view is currently unmotivated – the motivations that Hume gave for it are 
implausible, and other potential motivations are also unconvincing. She thus suggests that 
we should not give this Humean idea such a big role in the dialectic. Hills (2009) says that 
realists might like to try dealing with their supervenience problem by appeal to constant 
conjunction and not necessary connection, but this seems to me a drastic move.   
31 Tännsjö (2010: 47) and Enoch (2011: 143-146). Cf. Skarsaune (2015). 
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 Before moving to the moral case, it is helpful to flesh out the core 
explanatory move by considering a non-moral case of supervenience that 
can be explained via the existence of various norms. Enoch appeals to the 
supervenience of legal drinking status on age. The idea is that, within a 
legal jurisdiction and other things being equal, if two people are the same 
age then either both of them are permitted to purchase alcohol or neither 
of them are permitted to purchase alcohol.32 This is obviously explicable 
via relevant legal norms: if the law is that one must be eighteen or over to 
purchase alcohol, then two eight-year-olds are both not permitted to do 
so and two eighty-year-olds are both permitted to do so. The legal norms 
mean that differences in legal drinking status co-vary with differences in 
age.  
In other words, legal drinking status supervenes on age. As this is 
happening in a legal jurisdiction, the co-variance of legal drinking status 
on age is pretty localised. But, as Enoch points out, there is no mystery as 
to why legal drinking status supervenes on age. We can explain this just 
by appealing to the existence of certain legal norms that determine legal 
drinking status within a given legal jurisdiction. And this provides us with 
a general model for explaining cases of supervenience; the supervenience 
of A-properties on B-properties is explicable via norms that link one and 
the other. Call this ‘The Norms Approach’ to explaining supervenience.  
This model won’t apply in all cases – that is, we will probably have to use 
models other than The Norms Approach to deal with certain other cases 
of supervenience. But all that matters here is its applicability to the moral 
case. 
 The idea in the moral case is fairly similar to that of the legal case. 
Just as there are legal norms that hold within a certain legal jurisdiction, 
there are moral norms hold within a certain moral jurisdiction. A moral 
norm directs a moral agent to behave in a certain way. Perhaps the major 
difference between the moral and legal case is the fact that, whilst a legal 
jurisdiction is modally restricted in certain ways, morality’s jurisdiction 
is modally unrestricted. To use Enoch’s helpful way of putting it, moral 
norms have a ‘modally maximal jurisdiction.’33 They hold at all possible 
worlds. 
                                                             
32 We need the ‘other things being equal’ qualifier because the law may involve certain 
subtleties. For instance, it may say that no one under 18 can buy alcohol, except 17 year 
olds who are with an adult and eating a meal. For clarity, we can set such subtleties aside. 
33 Enoch (2011: 145). 
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 It is important to the success of the explanation of supervenience 
in the moral case that moral norms have a modally maximal jurisdiction. 
The supervenience in the legal case might be pretty localised but, as we’ve 
seen, Moral Supervenience is ‘global.’ Moral and descriptive properties 
co-vary across all worlds, so if this co-variance is explicable in terms of 
moral norms, the norms had better hold across all worlds. Enoch does not 
offer a specific way of modelling the modally maximal necessity that this 
approach requires of moral norms; he is neutral on this score. I consider 
this in the Chapter 4, in which I give an account of the necessity in Robust 
Realism.  
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. First we must clarify how the 
explanation is actually meant to work. Enoch offers a nice illustration: 
Suppose that some fairly basic version of utilitarianism is 
true. Then the relevant moral norm states, roughly, that an 
action is wrong if and only if there is an alternative action (or 
inaction) that could be opted for, and that had a larger 
(perhaps expected) utility value. Given that this is the 
content of the norm, no mystery remains about the 
supervenience of wrongness on the (perhaps expected) 
utility values of the relevant action and its alternatives 
(2011: 144). 
So, if someone asks you why moral properties globally supervene on the 
specific set of descriptive properties that they in fact globally supervene 
on, you can just direct them to the relevant moral norms. It is those norms 
that link up a specific set of moral and descriptive properties and, because 
they hold necessarily, the link is the same across every world. Enoch’s 
example uses a simple version of utilitarianism, but The Norms Approach 
could be adapted to any potential view of the content of necessary moral 
norms. 
 I said above that The Norms Approach is not the only explanatory 
model available to us. For instance, it is sometimes best to explain the 
supervenience of A-properties on B-properties by maintaining that there 
is an asymmetric dependence relation linking those classes of property. 
The modal relationship arises because of the fact that the A-properties 
are ‘higher level’ properties that metaphysically depend on ‘lower level’ 
B-properties. Call this ‘The Levels Approach.’ Some think that this model 
should be applied to the moral case. So, before considering an objection 




 After all, The Levels Approach is popular with Non-Reductivists. 
A number of versions of it have been proposed, often involving different 
dependence relations. One might go for ‘constitution’ or ‘realisation,’ for 
example, or ‘grounding,’ or ‘making,’ or some other relation.34 In general, 
however, the claim is that there are lower level descriptive properties 
that in some sense ‘give rise to’ higher level moral properties, and that it 
is this metaphysical relation that explains the modal relation between the 
moral and descriptive. So, why can there be no moral difference without 
a descriptive difference? Because the moral properties are constituted by 
descriptive properties, or grounded in such properties, or whatever. They 
are modally linked because they are metaphysically linked. There is thus 
no moral difference without a descriptive difference, for the moral level 
somehow ‘emerges’ from the descriptive level. The Levels Approach thus 
seems to explain supervenience without commitment to necessary moral 
norms. 
 The devil is in the detail, and I don’t have room for details. But let 
me explain why The Norms Approach is more promising, or at least more 
basic, than The Levels Approach. Our rationale for Non-Reductivism is the 
apparent difference between direction and description – this is evidence 
for distinctiveness of moral and descriptive properties. My worry about 
The Levels Approach is that it is not clear how robustly irreducible moral 
direction can emerge from description, given that these seem to be very 
different things. That is, there appears to be a deep discontinuity between 
directive and descriptive properties. So, without something else to link 
them – a norm, say – it is hard to see how the directive emerges from the 
descriptive. Indeed, many suppose that there must be such links in other 
cases in which we might appeal to higher and lower level properties. For 
instance, we may need bridge laws to link the physical and the chemical, 
or the neurological and the psychological. So, it is plausible that we need 
bridge laws or norms within The Levels Approach, otherwise it will have 
nothing to say about the emergence of direction from description. Thus, 
even if there is an element of truth in The Levels Approach, it still requires 
appeal to norms. Personally, however, I find the image of levels unhelpful. 
I prefer to focus directly on necessary moral norms, leaving levels to one 
side. 
                                                             
34 Shafer-Landau (2003) talks of constitution. Dancy (2004a; 2004b), Huemer (2005), and 
Wielenberg (2014) talk of making. Wedgwood (2007) talks of realisation. Audi (2013) 
talks of grounding, as does Väyrynen (2013), though he does not advocate it.   
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Put another way, given the deep discontinuity between direction 
and description, it is hard to see how appeal to some dependence relation 
alone can constitute a real advance for the Non-Reductivist. After all, the 
accusation against the Non-Reductivist is that they make a mystery out of 
morality’s supervening on the descriptive. And, without bridging norms, 
The Levels Approach simply creates another mystery; that of direction’s 
emergence from description. It is unclear how this emergence can happen 
without norms to bridge the gap between the moral and the descriptive 
levels. Thus, even if one appeals to levels, one must also appeal to norms. 
Moreover, the emergence question does not arise for moral norms that 
count as fundamental – fundamental entities don’t emerge from anything. 
Thus, whatever problems it might face, The Norms Approach that I favour 
is more promising, or more basic, than The Levels Approach that many 
favour. 
So, at present our best chance of satisfactorily responding to the 
Explanatory Supervenience Objection involves an appeal to necessary 
moral truths or, specifically, norms. The need to get clearer on the claim 
that there are such truths or norms is thus becoming more pressing. I will 
be coming to it very soon, I swear. But first I would like to examine a way 
of putting pressure on The Norms Approach as a genuine explanation of 
the modal connection between moral and descriptive properties. In doing 
so I will strengthen this way of answering the Explanatory Supervenience 
Objection. 
 
3.7 Norms and Explanations  
Suppose we agree that the property of moral wrongness supervenes on 
the descriptive property of failing to maximise utility. You might object to 
The Norms Approach by saying that, if someone requests an explanation 
for why this is true, they are unlikely to be satisfied by the claim that it is 
true because actions are wrong just in case they fail to maximise utility. 
At first glance, you might be inclined to think that this is no explanation 
at all. According to Erik J. Wielenberg, for example, this is nothing more 
than a restatement of what is supposed to have been explained.35 In short, 
whilst we were seeking to explain the modal link between the moral and 
descriptive, all The Norms Approach appears to do is insist that there is 
such a modal link. It rephrases it via norm-talk, but to rephrase is not to 
explain. 
                                                             
35 Wielenberg (2014: 22-23). 
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 Another way to put the problem is to suggest that, in response to 
a call for explanation, the Non-Reductivist just says that there is a brutely 
necessary connection between distinct existences. The distinct existences 
in this case are moral properties like being a wrong act on the one hand, 
and descriptive properties like being an act that fails to maximise utility 
on the other. And critics of Non-Reductivism and The Norms Approach 
maintain that it is a problem if this is all that can be offered. They either 
deny that there can be brutely necessary connections between distinct 
existences, or they suggest that a commitment to such connections counts 
significantly against a theory. At best, then, it counts significantly against 
the commitment to Non-Reductivism if it ‘explains’ supervenience just by 
appealing to a brutely necessary connection. For that is no explanation at 
all.  
 But, properly interpreted, The Norms Approach does explain. For 
norm-talk doesn’t simply rephrase supervenience-talk. To see this, recall 
that supervenience is a modal relationship that holds between classes of 
property. A norm, however, is something else. I discuss norms in more 
detail in Chapter 4, but here we can say that norms are entities that direct 
agents in certain circumstances or kinds of circumstance. A legal norm is 
an entity that directs you not to drink if you are under 18. A moral norm 
is an entity that directs you not to kill just for fun. In short, norms are 
entities that govern the behaviour of an agent. It is by appealing to such 
entities that we are able explain cases of property co-variance. It would 
certainly be problematic for The Norms Approach if this very instance of 
co-variance were invoked to explain this very instance of co-variance. 
That would fail to explain, but that is not what’s happening. Instead, we 
appeal to a distinct entity – a norm – and use that to do the explanatory 
work. 
Now, in certain cases, the norms can themselves be seen in more 
basic terms. For instance, there is no doubt a deeper story to tell about 
even the most basic legal norms, one that draws on our conventions and 
institutions to explain how such social entities come to be. It may be hard 
to find the true story, but we know that there is one. But the fact that there 
is a deeper story about legal norms does not mean that such norms do no 
explanatory work, for at a certain level of inquiry it is quite legitimate to 
draw on such norms in explaining the modal link between legal drinking 
status and age. There is a deeper story about the nature of legal norms, 




In other cases, however, the norms cannot be understood in more 
basic terms. Robust Realists say that this is so in the moral case, they see 
the most basic moral norms as existing independently of conventions and 
institutions. (As I’ll discuss in subsequent chapters, they see moral reality 
as mind-independent.) So, unlike the basic legal norms, there is no deeper 
story to tell for basic moral norms. But the idea is the same. We draw on 
the existence of certain distinct entities – fundamental moral norms – to 
explain the co-variance of moral and descriptive properties. Assuming 
that there is no deeper story to tell about moral norms, this is the level of 
inquiry at which the explanation of Moral Supervenience bottoms out.36 
So, by accepting fundamental moral norms as independent entities that 
link moral and descriptive properties, we explain supervenience in a way 
that is more than a restatement of the phenomenon that we were trying 
to explain. This is how The Norms Approach does genuine explanatory 
work. 
 You might worry that The Norms Approach is still unsatisfying 
because it still posits necessary connections between distinct existences. 
It is true that it involves a brute necessity, but this isn’t a major problem.37 
The main legitimate worry about necessary connections between distinct 
existences – beyond dogmatic Humean prejudice – is that they fail to 
explain. And, as I have said, The Norms Approach does explanatory work. 
It involves a certain sort of bruteness, for it relies on fundamental moral 
norms. But this is not a bruteness that involves failure to explain. It is a 
bruteness that is just inevitable, given the way explanation works. Most 
explanations bottom out eventually. A non-fundamental moral norm may 
of course be explained via deeper moral norms, but ultimately we reach 
fundamental moral norms, which cannot be had in more basic terms. This 
makes them brute, but in an unobjectionable way. For the claim is not that 
supervenience itself is inexplicably brute. Instead the claim is that there 
exist fundamental (‘brute’) moral norms that can explain supervenience. 
And these fundamental norms are like fundamental laws of nature, in that 
to ask why they are as they are is to fail to understand what ‘fundamental’ 
means. 
                                                             
36 You might deny that there are fundamental moral norms that cannot be understood in 
more basic terms. But that’s not an objection to Non-Reductivism as I understand the view, 
it’s just a bare-faced denial of it. We do need a debate about the existence of fundamental 
moral norms, but this will be a separate debate from the one we’re having at present.  
37 Cf. Enoch (2011: 147). 
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 In sum, it is a mistake to attack The Norms Approach on the basis 
that it posits necessary connections between distinct existences. Whilst it 
involves brute necessity, it is not a problematic aspect of the view. I thus 
claim that The Norms Approach stands as a response to the Explanatory 
Supervenience Objection against Non-Reductivism. Now, this means that 
I have drawn on the existence of necessary moral truths or norms in my 
responses to both of the supervenience objections I have considered. To 
ensure that these responses really are workable ways of rebutting efforts 
to undermine Non-Reductivism, we thus need to show that it is at least 
reasonable to believe that some moral truths or norms hold as a matter 
of necessity. In the next section, I will argue that this can be reasonably 
believed.  
 
3.8 Necessary Moral Truths 
Are there any moral truths that hold at all possible worlds? Maybe. That’s 
as strong an answer as I’m willing to give in this section. I won’t say that 
there definitely are necessary moral truths, I’ll simply argue that it is not 
unreasonable to believe in them. This may seem rather modest, but I will 
explain how it is enough to ensure that we are provisionally entitled to 
retain our belief in the irreducibility of moral properties. After all, if we 
can show that it is at least reasonable to believe that there are necessary 
moral truths, then we will have a tenable reading of Non-Reductivism that 
survives the Reductive and the Explanatory Supervenience Objections. 
This will mean that argument has (so far) failed to overturn or outweigh 
the defeasible evidence in favour of the existence of an irreducible moral 
reality. 
 Now, some moral propositions may be thought to hold as a matter 
of necessity just because they are conceptual truths that help to structure 
moral thought and discourse itself. Take, for example, the idea that moral 
judgement is universalisable and the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ These 
are at least plausible candidates for conceptual necessity. Whilst there are 
debates and controversies about them, even philosophers who question 
these claims will agree that there are things to be said in favour of seeing 
them as conceptual truths. I take it, however, that Non-Reductivists need 
something more substantive than universalisability or ‘ought’ implies 
‘can.’38 
                                                             
38 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argue there are some substantive moral truths are 
conceptual truths. I address their view in Chapter 4. 
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 After all, even if these claims count as moral truths, they are not 
very interesting moral truths. And, even if they are in some sense norms, 
they are not the sort of norms that help us to explain supervenience. So 
we need to look for substantive moral norms that can be reasonably seen 
as necessary. And, as I said in §3.4, this might be tricky. After all, many of 
the most everyday moral truths or norms are contingent. Here is a moral 
truth: it was morally impermissible for me to punch Perkins in the face. This 
may be true, but it is not true in all possible worlds. There is a world, for 
example, in which it was morally obligatory for me to punch Perkins in 
the face, for it was the only way to prevent a nuclear war. Even if we ask 
for a more general norm in virtue of which it was impermissible for me 
to punch Perkins in the face, we’ll potentially get something contingent: 
it is (pro tanto) impermissible to punch people in the face. This is true in 
our world, but not in a world whose inhabitants like to be punched in the 
face. 
 However, the Non-Reductivist does not need every moral truth to 
be necessary. For my responses to both of the supervenience objections 
to work, we just need one or more necessary moral norms. So the fact that 
certain moral norms are contingent is fine, for what matters is that there 
is at least one respectable candidate for moral necessity. And there is. Ask 
yourself why my punching Perkins is impermissible. A plausible answer 
is that, in doing so, I deliberately caused undeserved and undesired pain 
that wasn’t required as a means to any valuable end. For brevity, let’s use 
the term ‘T-Pain’ to refer to undeserved and undesired pain that is not 
required as a means to any valuable end.39 Here is a substantive moral 
norm: it is morally impermissible to deliberately cause T-Pain. This claim, 
I submit, is a credible candidate for a moral norm that holds at all possible 
worlds. 
 To assess whether it really is a necessary moral norm, we can try 
to imagine worlds at which it is obligatory or permissible to deliberately 
cause T-Pain. If we can assume that there is at least a rough correlation 
between conceivability and possibility, then the ability to imagine such a 
world would indicate that even this highly credible candidate for moral 
necessity is merely contingent. If we cannot imagine such a world, then 
this is (defeasible) evidence for there being at least one necessary moral 
truth. 
                                                             
39 The ‘T’ is for ‘Transworld’ – my claim will be that Non-Reductivists may reasonably take 
it as a necessary truth that it is impermissible to deliberately cause such pain.   
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 I suspect that different people will feel differently about this. But 
if at least some sincere and reasonable judges struggle to imagine a world 
at which deliberately causing T-Pain is obligatory or permissible, then the 
view that at least one moral norm is necessary can be reasonably held. I 
personally struggle to imagine a world at which it is either obligatory or 
permissible to deliberately cause T-Pain, and I think that there are others 
who are pretty much as sincere and reasonable as me who will struggle 
too.  
I can imagine worlds at which causing pain is either obligatory or 
permissible. Indeed, ours is no doubt such a world. It may be that justice 
sometimes requires that we cause pain, for example. Punishment is rarely 
free of some sort of pain, after all. And it is often the case that causing pain 
is required to bring about a valuable end, such as when you put yourself 
through painful physical training to compete at a sporting event. So ours 
is a world in which causing pain is sometimes obligatory or permissible. 
I can even imagine worlds in which causing pain is always obligatory or 
permissible, for I can imagine worlds in which pain is only ever caused 
deliberately when it is deserved or desired or required as a means to a 
valuable end. However, none of these are examples of causing T-Pain, for 
to cause T-Pain is to cause undeserved and undesired pain that is not 
required as a means to any valuable end. It is the moral status of causing 
T-Pain that matters here, so we need to ask what its moral status is across 
worlds. 
I can imagine worlds in which people think that causing T-Pain is 
obligatory or permissible. In some such worlds, people are misinformed 
about non-moral facts relating to the nature of pain. In others, they know 
these facts but have a warped sensibility. But the possibility of worlds in 
which people think that causing T-Pain is obligatory or permissible does 
not entail that it is actually so in such worlds. Some take morality to be 
mind-dependent in this way, but this has not been shown at this point in 
the dialectic and thus cannot be relied upon in rejecting necessary moral 
truths. I can also imagine possible worlds in which the impermissibility 
of causing T-Pain is in an interesting sense irrelevant. For instance, there 
are no doubt worlds whose inhabitants are incapable of causing pain, for 
example, or incapable of feeling it. The inhabitants of these apparently 
possible worlds would no doubt find it very difficult to understand or be 




However, the idea that causing T-Pain is morally impermissible is 
not thereby false in those worlds. It’s simply irrelevant to the lives of its 
inhabitants. This is fine, and there may be moral norms – even necessary 
ones – that are irrelevant in our world. The relevance of a moral norm 
may be contingent, but this does not mean that such norms are themselves 
contingent. Thus, someone who is sceptical about the existence of moral 
norms that hold at every world must do more than just point to worlds at 
which the norms that seem most plausible for our world would fail to be 
relevant. 
I’m struggling to conceive of a world at which causing T-Pain is 
obligatory or permissible. To the extent that conceivability determines or 
is at least correlated with possibility, I take this as (defeasible) evidence 
for the claim that there are no possible worlds in which it is obligatory or 
permissible to deliberately cause T-Pain.40 On that basis, I am prepared 
to tentatively suggest that it is morally impermissible to cause T-Pain in 
all possible worlds. And, if this is right, there is at least one claim about 
the moral properties of a certain type of act that is true as a matter of 
necessity. This is all I need to vindicate the answers that I gave to both the 
Reductive and the Explanatory Supervenience Objections. In responding 
to those objections, I drew on the claim that there are at least some moral 
truths that hold necessarily, and we can reasonably believe that this is the 
case. 
Of course, I may be idiosyncratic in my inability to imagine worlds 
at which causing T-Pain is obligatory or permissible. The evidence given 
by what I can imagine is defeasible, for my imaginative capacities might 
be uncommonly dull. Moreover, our modal intuitions may differ. You may 
think that you can imagine worlds in which causing T-Pain is morally fine, 
for example, even if I think that I cannot imagine such worlds. This is a 
case of modal disagreement – a disagreement over how things might have 
been. 
                                                             
40 To be clear, I’m only making a modest assumption here about the relationship between 
conceivability and possibility. My assumption is that conceivability is defeasible evidence 
for possibility. I think that this is plausible, but I don’t wish to assume any view about the 
reasons for its plausibility. For all I know, the strong claim that conceivability entails 
possibility is true. This view is suggested by Chalmers (1996). Alternatively, it may be that 
knowledge of possibilities derives from knowledge of essences, and that conceivability 
only correlates with possibility insofar as it helps us to get knowledge of essences. This 
view is articulated and defended by Lowe (2012) and Hale (2013). There are other views 
too, there is a big literature on this topic. But all I need is a modest claim. 
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Getting into the general problems of modal disagreement among 
epistemic peers would take us too far afield at present, but there are two 
things that we can say insofar as it applies to the present discussion. First, 
one should be careful about how theory affects one’s modal judgement. If 
you already accept a theory that treats morality is mind-dependent, you 
may find it easy to imagine worlds in which causing T-Pain is permissible 
(even if you find such worlds abhorrent). But, as I’ve already said, appeal 
to morality’s mind-dependence cannot be utilised because it has not been 
established in the dialectic. Equally, an appeal to the mind-independent 
status of moral reality cannot be utilised, as this has not been established 
either. It would beg the question if one were to rely on either of these 
theoretical commitments to vindicate one’s modal intuitions about the 
moral status of causing T-Pain. Even though my intuitions seem to fit with 
a theoretical commitment to Mind-Independence, I hope that they aren’t 
infected by theory. I don’t think that they are, but this is a hard thing to 
assess. 
This brings me to the second point, for it is part of what motivates 
the modesty of my proposal. I only require that my modal intuitions are 
reasonable. That is, for the moment my aim is just to show that necessary 
moral truths are respectable enough to be taken seriously, not that there 
definitely are such truths. What I have said in this section indicates that 
intuitions supporting the existence of necessary moral truths are indeed 
reasonable. This is enough to uphold the Robust Realist’s commitment to 
Non-Reductivism: if the supervenience objections that I have considered 
fail against any versions of Non-Reductivism that accept necessary moral 
truths, and if the commitment to necessary moral truths or norms can be 
reasonably maintained, then Non-Reductivism remains the position to 
beat. 
To clarify, recall from §3.1 that the apparent difference between 
direction and description constitutes evidence for irreducibility of moral 
properties. But this evidence is defeasible, and Non-Reductivism is thus 
vulnerable to being overturned in light of objections. Still, the onus is on 
critics to provide such objections. And we have now seen that the most 
influential ways of objecting to Non-Reductivism fail to threaten a version 
of it that accepts necessary moral truths. Since commitment to necessary 
moral truths – in the form of moral norms that have modally maximal 
jurisdiction – can be reasonably held, we have yet to see adequate reason 




Of course, Robust Realists do not maintain that all moral norms 
hold as a matter of necessity. Indeed, as I explained in §3.4, some of the 
more ordinary moral norms are most plausibly seen as contingent. So, if 
there are both necessary and contingent moral norms, a question arises: 
how are the necessary and the contingent norms related, given that they 
have different modalities. I answer this question in some detail in the next 
chapter, in the course of developing an account of the necessity in Robust 
Realism. But what matters for now is that, by accepting that are at least 
some necessary moral norms, Robust Realists can maintain their external 
metaphysical Realist Commitment to Non-Reductivism. They can carry 
on believing that moral properties do not reduce to purely descriptive 




The apparent difference between direction and description is evidence 
for the Robust Realist’s commitment to Non-Reductivism. But this sort of 
evidence is defeasible, and Non-Reductivism is therefore vulnerable to 
attacks. That is, argument might lead us to reject the appearances. But we 
have seen that an appeal to the existence of necessary moral norms helps 
to answer the most powerful ways of objecting to Non-Reductivism. Both 
the Reductive and Explanatory Supervenience Objections fail to undercut 
a version of Non-Reductivism that posits necessary moral norms. I have 
also provided some support to the modest claim that commitment to such 
truths can be reasonably held. It cannot be quickly dismissed as obviously 
untenable. So, the crucial lesson of this chapter is that Robust Realists can 
maintain Non-Reductivism via a commitment to necessary moral truths. 





4 The Necessity in Robust Realism 
 
Saying that Robust Realists should rely on the necessity of (some) moral 
truths is one thing, but advancing our understanding of these necessary 
truths is another. My aim in this chapter is to examine the necessity in 
Robust Realism, in order to sketch a view of how it works. However, the 
necessity in Robust Realism is a fairly underdeveloped topic. So, whilst I 
take the claims made here to be plausible, I only make them provisionally, 
for further inquiry may lead us in different directions. Although there is 
not time here to consider all viable accounts off the necessity in Robust 
Realism, I’ll contribute by discussing two. I reject one, and provisionally 
endorse the other. At the end of this chapter I won’t say that my proposal 
is the end of the story, but I will say that we have made headway on the 
issue. We will have a workable way of understanding of necessary moral 
truths. 
 I start with an idea from Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau, 
on which some moral truths are conceptual necessities. I outline this idea 
in §4.1, and I explain why I am sceptical of it in §4.2 and §4.3. The rest of 
the chapter develops a different view of the necessity in Robust Realism. 
This is the view that I’ll provisionally endorse, and it starts with the idea 
that some norms involve ‘limiting factors’ that restrict their jurisdiction. 
So, if there are norms that have no limiting factors, they will have modally 
maximal jurisdiction. I discuss moral norms in §4.4, and limiting factors 
in §4.5. In §4.6 I show how a commitment to Mind-Independence allows 
Robust Realists to remove a major limiting factor on moral norms. I thus 
examine a leading way of defending Mind-Independence in §4.7. I discuss 
whether moral norms that have had their limiting factors stripped away 
will be of practical use in §4.8, arguing that some will. I conclude in §4.9 
by reiterating the need for further discussion of the necessity in Robust 
Realism. 
 
4.1 Moral Fixed Points 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) offer a view of necessary moral truths 
on which some substantive moral propositions are conceptual truths. If 
this is right, it provides a way to interpret the necessity in Robust Realism 
as conceptual necessity. This proposal is worth discussing, and if it works 
it has the potential to take Robust Realism in an interesting new direction. 




 First, let’s consider how Cuneo and Shafer-Landau make sense of 
the idea that some substantive moral propositions are conceptual truths. 
Their initial suggestion is that certain non-trivial moral propositions help 
to determine the boundaries of our moral framework. That is, according 
to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, a system of normative claims that does not 
include these propositions is not a genuinely moral system. They name 
these framing propositions ‘moral fixed points,’ and propose that they are 
conceptual truths.1 The following propositions are suggested as probable 
moral fixed points: 
 It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational 
slaughter of a fellow person; 
 There is some moral reason to offer aid to those in 
distress, if such aid is very easily given and comes at very 
little expense; 
 If acting justly is costless, then, ceteris paribus, one 
should act justly. 
We might add ‘it is impermissible to deliberately cause T-Pain.’ That is, 
perhaps it is a conceptual truth that it is impermissible to deliberately 
cause undeserved and undesired pain that is not required for a valuable 
end. 
It might sound strange to say that the necessity in Robust Realism 
is conceptual necessity. These moral fixed points are substantive moral 
propositions, after all, but ‘conceptual’ is often used interchangeably with 
‘analytic’ in this context, and many see analytic truths as strictly formal. 
On this view, a sentence is true as a matter of analytic necessity if it is true 
solely in virtue of the meanings of its constituent terms. For instance, the 
sentence ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’ is analytically true because 
‘bachelor’ just means ‘unmarried man.’ Analytic truths are not always this 
obvious, but they will always be this formal. Moreover, linguistic analysis 
seems unsuitable for Robust Realism given its commitment to irreducible 
moral properties. Robust Realists can’t allow that basic moral properties 
and terms analytically reduce in the same way that ‘bachelor’ analytically 
reduces. 
                                                             
1 In addition to their ‘framework status,’ other factors are said to support treating moral 
fixed points as conceptual truths. First, if they are true, they are necessarily true. Second, 
denial of them tends to evokes bewilderment. Third, they are knowable a priori. For these 
claims, see Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014: 407-408). 
81 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau seem happy to treat analytic truths as 
formal and vacuous, and I’m happy to follow them in doing so. But they 
do not identify conceptual truths with analytic truths. For one thing, they 
think that conceptual truths can be substantive. In addition to the moral 
fixed points, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014: 408) suggest the following 
as respectable candidates for substantive conceptual truth:  
 Justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge; 
 God’s possible existence entails his necessary existence; 
 A meaningful statement may be neither empirically 
verifiable nor analytic. 
So, as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau use the terms, conceptual truths can be 
substantive even though analytic truths are all trivial. And this is one key 
difference between conceptual and analytic necessity. This is no doubt 
controversial, but for the sake of argument I am prepared to grant these 
points. 
 Another key point is that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau understand 
analytic necessity, but not conceptual necessity, to be strictly linguistic. 
Analytic truths are said to be sentences that are true solely in virtue of the 
meanings of their constituent terms. Conceptual truths, however, are said 
to be propositions. Propositions are often expressed through sentences, 
but not always. As Cuneo and Shafer-Landau note, some propositions “we 
have yet to discover; others may permanently elude us, owing, perhaps 
to their complexity” (2014: 411). It might be that all analytic truths are 
conceptual truths, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau tell us, but it is not the case 
that all conceptual truths are analytic. So, accepting that the necessity in 
Robust Realism is conceptual does not require that one also accepts that 
it is analytic. The so-called moral fixed points are substantive (as well as 
analytically irreducible) even though they hold as a matter of conceptual 
necessity. 
What is conceptual necessity, then, if it is not analytic necessity? 
At this point Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014: 410) make the important 
claim that concepts have essences. They suggest, for example, that it is of 
the essence of the concept ‘being human’ that it applies to exactly those 
things that are human. A proposition is conceptually necessary, on this 
view, if it holds in virtue of the essence of its constituent concepts. More 
precisely, a proposition [that x is F] is a conceptual truth if it belongs to 




To illustrate how these suggestions are supposed to help us with 
understanding the necessity in Robust Realism, consider the substantive 
moral proposition [that it is impermissible to deliberately cause T-Pain]. 
The idea is that this holds as a matter of conceptual necessity just in case 
it is of the essence of the concept ‘being impermissible’ that, necessarily, 
if anything satisfies the concept ‘deliberately causes T-Pain,’ then it will 
also satisfy the concept ‘being impermissible.' Building from this thought, 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau ultimately end up with the following position:  
Moral Conceptual Necessity. There are non-natural moral 
truths. These truths include the moral fixed points, which 
are a species of conceptual truth, as they are propositions 
that are true in virtue of the essences of their constituent 
concepts.2 
As it stands, Moral Conceptual Necessity is compatible with various forms 
of moral non-naturalism. However, the Robust Realist can embellish it by 
maintaining that non-natural moral truths are truths about irreducible, 
non-natural, mind-independent, and categorical moral properties or facts 
that exist in an external metaphysical sense.3 Moral Conceptual Necessity 
can thereby provide a neatly fleshed out view of the necessity in Robust 
Realism. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau think that Moral Conceptual Necessity 
has important payoffs, specifically when it comes to answering certain 
influential objections against views like Robust Realism. They argue that 
their approach to moral necessities helps us to deal with the existence of 
persistent moral disagreement, with evolutionary debunking arguments, 
and with an Explanatory Supervenience Objection of the sort considered 
in Chapter 3. If this is correct, it will be an appealing approach to take. 
However, there is reason to doubt Moral Conceptual Necessity. Even if its 
truth would have the suggested payoffs – something that one might wish 
to question on another occasion – there are still some important worries 
about Moral Conceptual Necessity. In the next two sections I develop just 
one such worry, and in the process I explain why we should be sceptical 
about taking a moral fixed points approach to the necessity in Robust 
Realism.  
 
                                                             
2 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau call this ‘The Embellished Core Claim,’ for it embellishes what 
they call ‘The Core Claim,’ which is just the claim that there are non-natural moral truths.  
3 As it happens, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are sympathetic to a robust view of this sort. 
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4.2 Conceptual Deficiencies 
If a proposition is true as a matter of conceptual necessity, then anyone 
who rejects it can be accused of having made a conceptual mistake. They 
either fail to possess the relevant concepts, or they possess them but lack 
an adequate understanding of them, or they possess and understand the 
relevant concepts but are unable or unwilling (or have otherwise failed) 
to appreciate what these concepts imply. In short, if we choose to accept 
Moral Conceptual Necessity we will also have to accept that anyone who 
rejects the moral fixed points is conceptually deficient in one of these 
ways. 
But we can doubt that all such people are conceptually deficient. 
Consider the Error Theorist – someone who says (a) that moral discourse 
presupposes a robust moral reality, and (b) that there is no such moral 
reality. Error Theorists reject all the moral fixed points, on the basis that 
accepting them requires what they regard as unacceptable metaphysical 
commitments. Is the Error Theorist conceptually deficient? Plausibly not. 
At least, we are entitled to deny that they are deficient in this way. And if 
we are entitled to deny that Error Theorists make a conceptual mistake 
in rejecting the moral fixed points, then it is not compulsory to suppose 
that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. This, in turn, seriously 
weakens Moral Conceptual Necessity as a view of the necessity in Robust 
Realism.  
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are sensitive to an aspect of this worry, 
for they acknowledge that their proposal might seem uncharitable to the 
Error Theorist. They offer the following remarks as a response:  
When we say that error theorists are mistaken … we are not 
thereby committed to attributing to them simple-minded 
positions or flat-footed philosophical mistakes. Rather, our 
claim is that error theorists are failing to recognize a set of 
conceptual truths as a result of having been convinced by 
sophisticated, albeit unsound, philosophical arguments. 
Assessing the force of such arguments is anything but 
straightforward … Those who come down on what we 
regard as the wrong side of those arguments needn’t be 
making any silly or obvious mistakes (2014: 438).  
Even careful thinkers can make conceptual mistakes. The questions that 
we are discussing are very difficult. We can thus accuse Error Theorists 




 This seems a decent response to the ‘lack of charity’ objection, but 
the matter does not end there. We don’t just want to know whether it is 
uncharitable to accuse Error Theorists of conceptual deficiency. We also 
want to know whether they are actually conceptually deficient. It is worth 
stressing that these are different points. To ask if one can accuse Error 
Theorists of making a conceptual mistake whilst taking them seriously is 
one thing. To ask if Error Theorists are actually conceptually mistaken is 
another thing altogether. In saying that Error Theorists are conceptually 
mistaken, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are not dismissing Error Theory as 
silly or stupid. But it is still open to critics of Moral Conceptual Necessity 
to deny that the Error Theorist makes any conceptual mistake in the first 
place.  
And I suspect that there is a strong case to be made here. Recall 
that there are a number of ways in which a person might be considered 
conceptually deficient. First, they might fail to possess relevant concepts. 
Second, they might possess these concepts whilst failing to satisfactorily 
understand them. Third, they might possess and understand the relevant 
concepts whilst failing to appreciate what they imply. It seems clear that 
defenders of Moral Conceptual Necessity cannot accuse Error Theorists 
of the first two forms of conceptual deficiency. After all, both parties will 
largely agree about the nature of moral concepts, and moral discourse in 
general. Robust Realists and Error Theorists both see moral concepts as 
presupposing the existence of a robust moral reality, even if they disagree 
over whether or not this reality actually exists. In other words, the central 
disagreement between Robust Realists and Error Theorists relates to the 
existence of moral properties, and not to the best interpretation of moral 
concepts.  
Robust Realists must therefore avoid accusing Error Theorists of 
failing to possess or understand moral concepts. They might still accuse 
them of failing to appreciate what these concepts imply, but one can’t just 
assert this. It automatically casts doubt on a theory if it entails that Error 
Theorists are conceptually deficient, for it is prima facie unlikely that they 
are deficient in this way. So one must make an independent case for the 
charge to avoid it being ad hoc. If the conceptual deficiency charge cannot 
be validated, we are entitled to deny that Error Theorists are conceptually 
deficient in rejecting the moral fixed points. This will ensure that it is not 
compulsory to see the moral fixed points as conceptual truths, which will 




We thus need to consider how one might support the claim that 
Error Theorists are conceptually deficient. If no support for this claim can 
be found, we should be sceptical about the tenability of Moral Conceptual 
Necessity. In the next section, I draw out a case for a conceptual deficiency 
charge from Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s discussion, before arguing that it 
fails. 
 
4.3 Against Moral Fixed Points 
How might defenders of Moral Conceptual Necessity support the charge 
that Error Theorists fail to appreciate what their moral concepts imply? 
An idea that we might glean from Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s discussion 
is that the Error Theorist is misled by a certain methodology. For it is a 
mistake, according to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, to reject highly evident 
moral propositions (such as the moral fixed points) simply on the basis 
of certain highly controversial metaethical claims (such as the claim that 
our moral beliefs can be debunked, or that moral reality is unacceptably 
‘queer’).  
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau diagnose Error Theorists as falling foul 
of this “suspect philosophical methodology” (2014: 438). What exactly 
they are getting at here is not fully clear, but maybe they are gesturing to 
something like the following line of thought. In philosophical inquiry, best 
practice generally involves seeking to accommodate our intuitions about 
our chosen topic by developing theories that are able to vindicate these 
intuitions. Error Theorists thus fail to follow best philosophical practice, 
for their view repudiates our strongest moral intuitions by rejecting the 
moral fixed points. The idea is thus that we can provide indirect support 
to the accusation of conceptual deficiency by pointing to a questionable 
methodology – Error Theorists miss what their concepts imply due to a 
distorting process of philosophical reasoning, one that gives too much 
weight to contentious metaethical claims, and too little weight to moral 
intuition. 
If this is true, it means that the conceptual deficiency charge is not 
just an ad hoc claim that one is forced to make if one already accepts that 
some substantive moral propositions are conceptual truths, for the idea 
that Error Theorists make a conceptual error is independently supported 
by a diagnosis of their methodological situation. However, if this is what 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are getting at, it is unconvincing. There are two 




First, the methodology of which Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are 
suspicious is widely employed in philosophy. Claims that seem intuitively 
plausible are very often given up in light of deeper reflection and more 
considered argument. To illustrate, intuitively it seems highly plausible 
that time is real, that scientific investigation delivers correct theories of 
reality, that human beings have free will, and that most moral agents have 
reasonably stable character traits. Yet all of these claims are subject to 
apparently legitimate debate, and there are philosophers who reject them 
by appeal to contentious philosophical (and empirical) arguments. If this 
methodology is suspect when it is used by the Error Theorist, then it is 
presumably suspect when used by any philosopher. Perhaps it is indeed 
a bad methodology wherever it is used, but we must recognize that a wide 
range of fields in philosophy would be radically altered if philosophers 
were directed only to construct theories that accommodate our strongest 
intuitions. 
Second, it is not actually clear that Error Theorists operate with a 
bad methodology. To see this, consider the following as a rough guide to 
philosophical inquiry. Step One: sort out your intuitions. You may find 
that some of them seem to conflict, so you will need to deal with that. On 
closer examination, it might be that the conflicts are merely apparent. If 
they’re not, however, you’ll have to repudiate some intuitions. You should 
give priority to those intuitions that seem to you most credible. You are 
now ready to proceed to Step Two. Step Two: develop a theory that can 
vindicate your considered intuitions, and test this theory for its intuitive 
acceptability, its internal coherence, its consistency with the known facts, 
and so on. If it passes these tests, accept the theory. If it doesn’t, move to 
Step Three. Step Three: try revising your theory, and perhaps some of the 
least evident intuitions that the theory has been designed to support. If 
the theory remains problematic despite your efforts to get it to work, you 
may find that you need to move to Step Four. Step Four: accept that the 
intuitions with which you started are in error. Explain why this is so. You 
might also explain why they seemed so plausible, even though they are in 
error. 
Although it is stated a little roughly, I take it that this four-step 
programme is a familiar process of philosophical theorising. It also seems 
obvious that this methodology is a legitimate one. So, what matters here 
is whether we can see the Error Theorist as someone who has taken this 




Most people are likely to find that their moral intuitions, including 
the moral fixed points, seem highly evident. So (like most people) the 
Error Theorist begins with Step One by getting their moral intuitions in 
order. They then proceed to Step Two, and (like the Robust Realist) they 
judge that they need to invoke a robustly realistic metaethical theory in 
order to vindicate their moral intuitions. However, in testing this theory, 
the Error Theorist (unlike the Robust Realist) concludes that it is in some 
way unacceptable. They might judge that its metaphysical commitments 
are ‘queer,’ for example. So they move on to Step Three, at which point 
they attempt to revise their robust theory in such a way that it avoids any 
awkward metaphysical commitments. But now the Error Theorist finds 
that this revised (non-robust) theory in some way fails to vindicate their 
considered moral intuitions. Despite their best efforts, they can’t find an 
appropriate balance between their moral intuitions and a theoretically 
acceptable account of them. In the end they judge that they have to move 
to Step Four, at which they acknowledge and explain the error underlying 
those apparently obvious moral intuitions. In short, they arrive at Error 
Theory.  
Now, we can debate whether the Error Theorist is right to think 
that a robust moral metaphysics is unacceptable. That is, one might say 
that the Error Theorist makes a mistake at Step Two; this is what Robust 
Realists can say. Alternatively, one might suggest that the Error Theorist 
makes a mistake in thinking that a non-robust theory cannot vindicate at 
least a respectable chunk of our moral intuitions. That is, one might say 
that the Error Theorist makes some mistake at Step Three; this is what 
defenders of non-robust theories can say. Either way, there doesn’t seem 
to be anything wrong with the Error Theorist’s methodology. Indeed, it 
seems that they have proceeded entirely legitimately along our plausible 
four-step programme. The significance of this is that it undermines the 
support that we were hoping to see provided for a conceptual deficiency 
charge. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau seemed to suggest that the conceptual 
deficiency charge can be supported by a diagnosis of the Error Theorist’s 
methodological situation, but the diagnosis in question is implausible. 
This means that defenders of Moral Conceptual Necessity cannot appeal 
to it as an independent justification for the claim that Error Theorists are 
conceptually deficient in rejecting the moral fixed points. The conceptual 




If we are entitled to deny that Error Theorists are conceptually 
mistaken in their rejection of the moral fixed points, then we do not need 
to accept that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. We must thus 
remain sceptical about the idea that the necessity in Robust Realism is 
conceptual necessity. Of course, defenders of Moral Conceptual Necessity 
might seek some other justification for the conceptual deficiency charge. 
Even if the Error Theorist makes a mistake at Step Two or Step Three of 
the four-step programme outlined above, it is still possible that this is a 
conceptual mistake. The defender of Moral Conceptual Necessity thus has 
to engage in the project of finding an independent way of supporting the 
claim that Error Theorists make some conceptual mistake at one of these 
points. I am pessimistic about this project, however, and I think that we 
are better off looking elsewhere for an account of the necessity in Robust 
Realism.4 
 
4.4 Moral Norms 
We saw in Chapter 3 that necessary moral norms help the Robust Realist 
with the Explanatory Supervenience Objection. So perhaps an account of 
the necessity in Robust Realism can begin with the idea of a moral norm. 
Norms abound. We often call them rules, standards, prescriptions, laws, 
principles, guidelines, constraints, codes, strictures, and so forth, but in 
general their role is to specify directions for agents within given sets of 
circumstances. In other words, a norm governs what counts as legitimate 
behaviour in a set of relevantly similar situations, and one can thus satisfy 
or fail to satisfy a norm depending on how one behaves. If a norm directs 
humans to exercise three times a week, then I – a human – satisfy it by 
exercising three times a week, and fail to satisfy it by exercising twice a 
week.  
The norms that govern legitimate behaviour in a situation may be 
implicit, but in principle they can be stated in directive sentences using 
terms like ‘should’ and ‘ought’ and ‘must.’ So, norms are satisfaction-apt. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, it is satisfaction-aptness that makes it hard to see 
how the moral could be captured in purely descriptive terms. A sentence 
like ‘deliberately causing T-Pain is impermissible’ has the same form as 
‘the table is brown,’ but the former has a directive aspect that the latter 
lacks. Such claims involve or imply direction that one can satisfy or fail to 
satisfy. 
                                                             
4 A shorter version of §4.1 to §4.3 has been published as Ingram (2015b). 
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In addition to moral norms, there are epistemic norms, prudential 
norms, legal norms, professional norms, and so on. There is a question to 
ask about the relations among types of norm – maybe professional norms 
are a type of prudential norm, for example. The boundaries can blur, and 
they are often hard to pin down, but the distinctions are useful. There is 
moral region of the broad normative domain, though it may well overlap 
with other aspects of this domain. Various criteria have been suggested 
to demarcate this specifically moral region. As we’ll see in Chapter 5, one 
is that moral norms play a role in interpersonal justification with respect 
to conduct. Another is that they are norms that tend, when we obey them, 
to help us achieve eudaimonia. Yet another is that they are norms whose 
satisfaction realises the good, where the good is indefinable but knowable 
via intuition. I don’t know exactly what makes a norm moral, but I assume 
that there is a category of norm that we can usefully classify under this 
term. 
At first glance, norms seem like a distinct type of entity. The idea 
of a norm is not that of a substance, fact, property, relation, or kind. They 
appear to form a distinct category of being. Having said that, norms do 
seem a bit like laws, for both govern behaviour. Laws of nature govern the 
behaviour of entities studied by the natural sciences. Moral norms are not 
laws of nature, but they do govern the behaviour of moral agents. They 
may fail to govern actual behaviour – it is possible to disobey them – but 
norms govern us by fixing whether our conduct counts as legitimate. So, 
even if norms are not laws of nature, we can see them as a special type of 
law. 
Are any norms explicable via a more basic category of being? Yes, 
in some cases, for many norms are purely social entities. Whilst it is often 
pointless to explain social categories in more basic terms, it is typically 
possible in principle. For instance, one may think that professional norms 
simply reflect descriptive facts about how we have agreed to behave in a 
certain context. Such norms are not part of a distinctive category, for they 
can be re-categorised as descriptive facts. However, other types of norm 
won’t submit to a re-categorisation of this sort, for they are irreducible. 
They are not a subset of the category substance, or property, or fact, or 
whatever. These norms appear to form a distinct category of being. Thus, 
whilst even the most fundamental professional or prudential norms may 
be re-categorised at a more basic level of explanation as facts, the most 




Before moving on, note that I defined Robust Realism (in §1.1) as 
a view about moral properties and not moral norms. Given my current 
emphasis on the role of norms, it is worth stating why I defined it in this 
way. I did so because, though I argued in Chapter 3 that Robust Realists 
should give norms a key role in their metaphysics, we must allow that one 
can be a Robust Realist without appealing to norms at all. Most obviously, 
a ‘particularist’ – someone who is hostile to the idea of general moral 
norms – can be a Robust Realist.5 That is, a particularist can endorse the 
Realist Commitments whilst viewing them in an external metaphysical 
sense, and will thereby be a defender of Robust Realism. It’s simply that 
this is not (I claim) the best form of Robust Realism, for the best form of 
Robust Realism involves necessary moral norms. As I said in Chapter 3, 
such norms help us with the Explanatory Supervenience Objection. In the 
next section, I begin to develop an account of moral necessity by looking 
at how contingent factors limit the range of many non-fundamental moral 
norms. 
 
4.5 Limiting Factors 
A moral norm, by its nature, has jurisdiction across some set of worlds. It 
won’t just apply in a one-off circumstance, for moral norms universalise. 
But we can ask about the modal range of a moral norm. A norm may have 
authority in some worlds but not others, or it may be authoritative in all 
worlds. What the Robust Realist needs is an understanding of how at least 
some moral norms are authoritative in all possible worlds. But let’s start 
with the fact that, even for the Robust Realist, not all moral norms are 
necessary. Consider a moral norm that prohibits recreational violence. 
This is a norm that plausibly has authority in our world, and in worlds 
like ours. But it doesn’t have authority in all worlds. For instance, there is 
a world whose inhabitants can only experience pleasure whilst others are 
being recreationally violent toward them. This is a peculiar but possible 
world, in which recreational violence is the only means to a valuable end. 
Plausibly, the norm prohibiting recreational violence has no authority in 
this world. So, even if there are necessary moral norms, this one is clearly 
contingent. I propose that we might begin to understand the necessity in 
Robust Realism by providing an explanation of these contingent parts of 
morality. 
                                                             
5 For more on particularism, see Dancy (1993; 2004a) and Little (2000).   
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 We can begin to see how a norm prohibiting recreational violence 
gets to be authoritative in some worlds but not others by noting that it is 
non-fundamental. That is, this norm in some way rests on or presupposes 
a deeper, more fundamental norm. For instance, the norm that prohibits 
recreational violence plausibly presupposes a deeper norm according to 
which it is wrong to cause undeserved and undesired pain that is not 
required for any valuable end – that is, a norm that prohibits deliberately 
causing T-Pain. This means that a norm prohibiting recreational violence 
has authority in our world because (a) it is impermissible to deliberately 
cause T-Pain and (b) to participate in recreational violence in our world 
is almost always to cause T-Pain. But there are worlds in which engaging 
in recreational violence never causes T-Pain, for instance worlds in which 
the only available means to a certain valuable end, like the experience of 
pleasure. A norm prohibiting recreational violence lacks authority in such 
worlds. 
 To clarify, in our world, a norm prohibiting recreational violence 
has authority, and this involves two things being the case. First, that there 
is a more basic norm that prohibits deliberately causing T-Pain. Second, 
that to engage in recreational violence in our world is almost always to 
cause T-Pain. But this second aspect of the norm’s authority in our world 
is contingent, for there are worlds in which participating in recreational 
violence is the only way to cause pleasure. Recreational violence will thus 
be permissible (maybe even obligatory) in such worlds, as the only means 
to that valuable end. The fact that it relies upon this second element thus 
ensures that a norm prohibiting recreational violence only has contingent 
authority. 
Put another way, the norm is contingent because it presupposes 
a contingent fact. This contingency limits the worlds at which the norm 
has authority. It is a ‘limiting factor’ on the norm’s modal jurisdiction. Of 
course, this is not to deny that the norm has authority in many worlds. 
But its authority comes from the fact that it presupposes a more basic and 
perhaps necessary moral norm, in combination with a contingent fact that 
is actualised within some worlds. In our world, engaging in recreational 
violence tends to cause T-Pain, so a norm that prohibits it has authority 
here. But there are also worlds in which engaging in recreational violence 
never causes T-Pain. In such worlds, a norm prohibiting it lacks authority. 
This is the source of its contingency. The contingent presuppositions that 




More abstractly, a contingent moral norm inherits its contingency 
from a contingent limiting factor that is in some way presupposed by it, 
even though it also presupposes a more basic moral norm that may count 
as necessary. The authority of the more basic norm, combined with the 
specifics of the limiting factors, determine the range of worlds at which 
the non-fundamental norm has authority. Now, this suggests that there is 
a hierarchy of norms. I don’t know if there is a fundamental norm that can 
unify all others but, at some point, the hierarchy of norms will end with 
either one basic norm, or a plurality of equally basic norms. Either way, it 
is the most basic moral norms are the clearest candidates for necessity. 
They don’t rest on any limiting factor, for they don’t rest on anything. In 
other words, they don’t involve any contingent fact capable of restricting 
their modal jurisdiction. They are thus ‘unlimited,’ and have what David 
Enoch calls ‘modally maximal jurisdiction.’ They have authority in every 
world, and this gives us a way to model the necessity in Robust Realism. 
The necessary moral norms are those that presuppose no limiting factors. 
These include (but are perhaps not limited to) the fundamental moral 
norms.6 
We can clarify the suggested way of interpreting the necessity in 
Robust Realism by looking at an analogous but non-normative case from 
mathematical domain. Consider a straightforwardly mathematical claim 
like ‘19 is an odd number.’ This, we can agree, is a necessary truth. Maybe 
the necessity of this mathematical truth involves or presupposes some 
other necessary mathematical claim that is more fundamental than it, for 
instance the necessary mathematical truth that a number is prime if and 
only if it is a natural number greater than 1 that has no positive divisors 
other than 1 and itself. But it doesn’t appear to involve or presuppose any 
contingent element. It is thus modally unlimited, and true at all worlds. 
Now consider the claim ‘19 is an odd number, though I wish it was even.’ 
This is true, but contingently. It is contingent despite the fact that it is 
partly composed of a necessary mathematical truth. This claim is made 
contingent by its inclusion of my wish, which I don’t have at all possible 
worlds.  
                                                             
6 I’m suggesting here that all of the fundamental moral norms are necessary, but I’m not 
suggesting that all of the necessary moral norms are fundamental. Many non-fundamental 
norms are contingent, but some norms might be necessary despite presupposing some 
more basic necessary norm. For instance, in my view a norm that prohibits causing T-Pain 
is a candidate for necessity, as it doesn’t seem to involve any limiting factor. However, we 
should be open to the possibility that it rests on a more basic necessary norm. 
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Put another way, the statement inherits its contingency from this 
contingent bit of its content. Without the contingent ingredient, it would 
be necessary. Adding my wish limits the range of worlds at which the 
statement is true. It is a ‘limiting factor,’ as I am putting it. And, as we’ve 
seen, there are also limiting factors in the case of many non-fundamental 
norms. A claim like ‘it is impermissible to engage in recreational violence’ 
only has its authority insofar as it presupposes the fact that recreational 
violence almost always causes T-Pain.7 But there are possible worlds in 
which it doesn’t do this. The link between recreational violence and the 
deliberate causing of T-Pain is contingent. And this contingency is what 
constitutes the limiting factor on the modal jurisdiction of the moral norm 
that prohibits recreational violence. So, if there moral norms that do not 
involve (or presuppose) any contingent elements – that is, any limiting 
factors – then they will have unlimited authority. They’ll have a modally 
maximal jurisdiction. In short, their authority will extend to all possible 
worlds. 
In sum, certain moral norms are contingent because they involve 
or presuppose at least one limiting factor – that is, at least one contingent 
element that restricts the range of possible worlds over which the norm 
has authority.8 To establish whether there are necessary moral norms, 
we thus need to consider whether there can be norms do not involve or 
presuppose any limiting factors. That is, Robust Realists can understand 
a moral norm as holding necessarily if it is not limited by any contingency 
in its content or in its presuppositions. These unlimited moral norms, if 
there in fact are any, provide a way to understand the necessity in Robust 
Realism.  
                                                             
7 If this remains unclear, it may help to consider the cancellability of the presupposition. 
For instance, as I have suggested, ‘it is impermissible to engage in recreational violence’ 
presupposes that recreational violence is almost never the means to some valuable end. 
We can cancel this by saying ‘it is impermissible to engage in recreational violence, unless 
it is the only means to a valuable end.’ When we cancel the presupposition we indicate 
that there are contexts in which the norm lacks authority. Specifically, contexts in which 
engaging in recreational violence is the only means to a more valuable end. Since it is clear 
that such contexts are possible, there are worlds in which the norm lacks authority. Thus, 
it is contingent due to its presupposing a contingent limiting factor. 
8 Cf. Scanlon (2014), who distinguishes pure normative claims, which don’t involve any 
non-normative claims – non-normative bits are “subjunctivised away” (2014: 40) – from 
mixed normative claims, which involve both a pure normative claim and some contingent 
non-normative claims. This distinction, also found in Schroeder (2014), is similar to what 
I have in mind, but I have not drawn on the idea of any bits being ‘subjunctivised away.’   
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To get clearer on the idea of a limiting factor, and on how we can 
go about trying to strip away such factors to discover the necessary or 
modally unlimited moral norms, I’ll consider an important case study in 
§4.6.  
 
4.6 A Case Study: Mind-Independence 
Robust Realists take moral reality to be objective in the following strong 
sense: 
Mind-Independence. Moral properties are constitutively 
independent of any agent’s or set of agents’ actual or 
hypothetical attitudes, beliefs, and conventions. 
Although this claim is about moral properties, Robust Realists can expand 
it to cover the mind-independence of moral norms. That is, they can say 
that moral norms govern us independently of our attitudes, beliefs, and 
conventions. In this section I show how Mind-Independence, interpreted 
as an external metaphysical claim, strips away a few big limiting factors. 
Now, to eliminate dependence on attitudes, beliefs, and conventions is to 
go some way toward necessity. Not all the way, by any means, for these 
are not the only contingent elements that may limit the range of worlds 
across which a norm has its authority. But we can use the commitment to 
Mind-Independence to illustrate the process of stripping away limiting 
factors that will help Robust Realists to identify robustly necessary moral 
norms. 
 We can begin to make the point by observing that at least certain 
simple mind-dependent views of moral reality involve significant limiting 
factors. Consider, for example, the following metaethical theory: 
Metaethical Conventionalism. The moral norms that govern 
human communities are conventional norms, which reduce 
to descriptive facts about agreements that hold within those 
communities. 
This is a reductive view, for it takes moral norms and reduces them to the 
conventions of a community. It then reduces these conventions to certain 
descriptive facts about the agreements that hold among members of that 
community. Here we can allow that these agreements may be implicit or 
explicit, and we can allow there may be members of the community who 
dislike the relevant conventions, and who will get rid of them if they can. 




 Metaethical Conventionalism is to be interpreted as a view about 
the nature of morality’s normativity. It tells us that the authority of moral 
norms is ultimately a matter of the agreements that hold within a given 
community. As it is stated here it is clearly a rather simplistic metaethical 
theory, not one that many metaethicists are likely to defend. But that’s ok. 
I’m not interested in the plausibility of Metaethical Conventionalism, for 
I just want to use it to illustrate how certain mind-dependent theories of 
moral norms are (modally speaking) inherently limited.9 We can then see 
how a mind-independent metaethical theory will eliminate these limiting 
factors.  
 Metaethical Conventionalism can be usefully compared to certain 
other ways in which conventions seem to bind us. Consider the following: 
The Rules of Tennis. The rules that govern the community of 
tennis players are conventional norms, which reduce to 
descriptive facts about agreements that hold within that 
community. 
Plausibly, the rules of tennis have a certain sort of authority over tennis 
players. For instance, by the rules of tennis, before one serves one must 
stand behind the baseline without touching it. So, if I serve with my foot 
on or over the baseline – that is, if I break the ‘foot fault’ rule – the umpire 
can truly say to me ‘you should not have done that.’ This is a normative 
claim, and it has a certain type of authority. And, as The Rules of Tennis 
says, it has this type of authority because the members of the community 
agree to be governed in certain ways. More broadly, the authority of the 
rules of tennis is said to be a matter of certain descriptive facts concerning 
an either implicit or explicit agreement within the community of tennis 
players. 
 The rules of tennis are not sewn into the fabric of reality. They 
bind in a meaningful sense, but their authority is mind-dependent. This is 
because it rests on the members of the relevant community having agreed 
to obey certain rules. Metaethical Conventionalism makes a similar claim 
about morality. Of course, we tend to care far more about morality than 
tennis. However, if Metaethical Conventionalism is correct, the authority 
of moral norms is of the same basic sort as the authority of the rules of 
tennis. 
                                                             
9 More sophisticated views employ rigidifying manoeuvres to extend the range of worlds 
across which moral norms have jurisdiction. I set this aside, for I’m just using this simple 
view to bring out a point about robust theories, not to criticise non-robust theories. 
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Now, the mind-dependence of the rules of tennis limits the range 
of worlds at which these rules have authority. This is because there are 
worlds at which the agreements that establish the authority of these rules 
are not in place. There are worlds, for example, in which a community has 
agreed to follow the rules of tennis except for the foot fault rule. In this 
world, if I were to break this rule by serving with my foot on the baseline, 
the umpire couldn’t correctly say ‘you should not have done that,’ for the 
convention that this presupposes is not actualised. The foot fault rule thus 
has authority in some worlds but not others, because the agreements that 
establish its authority are contingent – they exist at some worlds and not 
others.10  
In other words, the fact that the foot fault rule is mind-dependent 
ensures that it is merely contingently authoritative. Its authority depends 
on our agreements, and these agreements exist in some worlds but not in 
others. So, the mind-dependence of the rules of tennis is a limiting factor 
on their modal jurisdiction. They have a certain sort of authority, but it is 
contingent. As you might guess, the same point can be applied when we 
come to Metaethical Conventionalism. The social conventions that are 
said to govern our moral community have authority in a restricted set of 
worlds. Specifically, worlds at which the same agreements are in place 
among members of the moral community. And, since there are worlds in 
which these agreements are not in place, moral norms are contingently 
authoritative. At least, this is the case if Metaethical Conventionalism is 
true.  
Of course, if the authority of moral norms were not just grounded 
in agreements, things might be different. In particular, if they were taken 
to direct us independently of our attitudes, beliefs, and conventions, then 
the range of worlds at which they have authority would be less restricted. 
This simple mind-dependent view therefore involves limiting factors that 
mind-independent views do not. By committing to Mind-Independence, 
the Robust Realist thereby ensures that the set of worlds at which moral 
norms have authority is not limited by our contingent agreements. Nor, 
indeed, by contingent attitudes or beliefs. It may be limited in other ways, 
but Mind-Independence alone takes us part of the way to necessary moral 
norms.  
                                                             
10 Some rules may be constitutive of tennis; one cannot alter them without making a new 
game. The foot fault rule is not one. If you disagree, pick another rule. There must be some 
contingent rules of tennis. Its rules do change, and it isn’t a new game with every change. 
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Mind-Independence is thus a useful case study in the elimination 
of limiting factors that, on the view proposed here, helps us to understand 
the necessity in Robust Realism. Whilst certain mind-dependent theories 
suggest that moral norms can only possess a certain sort of authority by 
involving or presupposing contingent attitudes, beliefs or conventions, by 
treating moral norms as mind-independent the Robust Realist removes 
such contingencies. By seeing moral norms as constitutively independent 
of our attitudes, beliefs, and conventions, the Robust Realist strips away 
several factors that would limit the range of worlds at which moral norms 
have their authority. A commitment to Mind-Independence is thus part of 
the process of eliminating limiting factors, taking us some (but not all) of 
the way toward moral norms whose jurisdiction is unlimited or modally 
maximal. 
Note that, like every reductive view, Metaethical Conventionalism 
has first-order implications. If we accept its second-order claim about the 
nature of moral normativity, then we must accept the first-order claim 
that one ought to obey the community’s conventions. However, we’re not 
dealing here with a purely first-order view. After all, there can be a purely 
first-order conventionalism – even Robust Realists can take a first-order 
view on which one must always follow the community’s conventions. This 
purely first-order position does not count as a rival to Robust Realism, for 
it can be coherently combined with it. It thus matters that Metaethical 
Conventionalism is not just a first-order view. It is a second-order view 
that has some first-order implications, and is therefore a rival to Robust 
Realism. 
Hang on. If a Robust Realist adopts a first-order conventionalism, 
won’t their view of moral norms be just as modally limited as that of the 
Metaethical Conventionalist? No. Whilst a robust conventionalist has to 
hold that we must obey the community’s conventions, this ‘must’ is meant 
to be necessary, or mind-independent. The conventions themselves are 
contingent on agreements, but for robust conventionalists the claim that 
one must follow them is not. In contrast, the Metaethical Conventionalist 
cannot see the ‘must’ as necessary without altering their view. They may 
even have to accept Mind-Independence, to remove the contingency that 
limits the jurisdiction of the ‘must.’ Without some revision to their view, 
a Metaethical Conventionalist can only see the claim that one ‘must’ obey 
a community’s conventions as authoritative if they take it to presuppose 




In sum, the Robust Realist’s commitment to Mind-Independence 
is a useful illustration of the process involved in stripping away limiting 
factors. It helps to see how we can move toward necessary or unlimited 
moral norms. Mind-Independence doesn’t take us all of the way, but by 
removing dependence on contingent attitudes, beliefs, and conventions, 
it does take us some of the way toward the necessity in Robust Realism. 
Because it is an important to the necessity in Robust Realism, and because 
it is anyway an important part of Robust Realism itself, in the next section 
I briefly discuss a common way of trying to motivate and defend the idea 
that there are mind-independent moral norms. As we’ll see there, and in 
Chapter 6 as well, this common defence of Mind-Independence is in some 
ways unsatisfying. But it is interesting, and it is worth exploring in more 
depth. 
 
4.7 More on Mind-Independence 
After all, suggesting that the necessity in Robust Realism is to some extent 
tied to the commitment to Mind-Independence is one thing. Defending 
that commitment is another. In this section, I will outline a common way 
of arguing that moral properties or norms are constitutively independent 
of our attitudes. I will show in Chapter 6 that this way of arguing about 
moral reality fails to be dialectically effective, but it is worth introducing 
it here in order to clarify this element in our account of necessary moral 
norms. 
 The way of arguing in question draws on intuitions about certain 
cases – cases in which someone acts in a way that is intuitively wrong, but 
in which there is no attitude or convention (or whatever) that we can use 
to make sense of that intuition. Metaethical Conventionalism will help to 
clarify this way of arguing. On that view, moral norms get their authority 
from the members of a community having agreed (implicitly or explicitly) 
to be ruled by certain conventions. To show that this is false, defenders of 
Mind-Independence might ask us to imagine a community where a moral 
norm about which we are particularly confident is not backed up by any 
relevant convention or agreement. They then suggest that one ought to 
act as that norm directs, even if one cannot appeal to any convention or 
agreement to make sense of this claim. The basic thought is that we have 
substantive normative intuitions about the correct moral norms, and that 
mind-dependent theories like Metaethical Conventionalism are unable to 




We can clarify this style of argument by imagining a community 
with a set of moral conventions that direct agents to perform an annual 
sacrifice of one teenager, selected by a lottery system. The thought is that 
we want to be able to say, not just that we personally dislike the norms of 
that community, but that its members make a mistake about which norms 
are correct. But we have no resources to make that sort of claim if we hold 
that the authority of moral norms derives from conventional agreements 
and nothing else. All we can say is that, whilst the sacrifice of a teenager 
is genuinely obligatory given the conventions of the given community, we 
dislike those conventions, and will make different agreements when we 
decide how our community should be run. However, many consider this 
to be unsatisfactory. They say that, in order to vindicate the intuition that 
one ought not to sacrifice teenagers, we have to postulate a moral norm 
that prohibits such behaviour even if there are no agreements to back it 
up. 
At this point the Metaethical Conventionalist (or indeed any other 
defender of a mind-dependent view, for the point is meant to generalise) 
might reply by suggesting that they do have resources to criticise norms 
prescribing the sacrifice of teenagers. First, they might propose that the 
community accepting such norms is in some way incoherent – maybe the 
conventions that prescribe the sacrifice of teenagers are in conflict with 
other conventional norms accepted within the relevant community, like 
conventional norms that forbid causing harm to innocent members of the 
community. In that case, we can accuse the community of being irrational 
in the sense that their conventions are inconsistent and thus in need of 
revision. 
 Second, the Metaethical Conventionalist may say that the relevant 
convention derives from false non-moral beliefs. Even if the community 
is consistent in its conventions, it may have agreed to a sacrificial practice 
because of some falsity. For instance, they may have based the agreement 
on the need to please a certain higher being and, if no such higher being 
exists, the norm can be thus criticised and rejected because it rests on a 
false non-moral belief. In short, those who understand moral norms as 
mind-dependent can appeal to requirements of both coherence and true 
non-moral belief in order to capture the intuition that those who annually 
sacrifice a teenager ought not to do so. No mind-independent norms are 
needed. All we need to do is show that those who practice sacrifice work 




 However, defenders of Mind-Independence will not be convinced 
that this is sufficient to deal with the problem. After all, they can point to 
the possibility of a community that prescribes the annual sacrifice of a 
teenager whilst having coherent conventions and true non-moral beliefs. 
If this community has no norm that forbids causing harm to innocents, 
there may be no conflict in their conventions. You might think that such a 
community will be unstable, and that it won’t last long without forbidding 
the harming of innocents. But perhaps it can rub along quite nicely with 
a more fine-grained norm that forbids harming innocents unless they are 
teenagers who have been selected by lottery for the annual sacrifice. This 
norm can stabilise the community and doesn’t conflict with the norm that 
requires the annual sacrifice of teenagers. Moreover, the community may 
engage in this practice of sacrificing teenagers not to please or appease a 
non-existent higher being, but just because it gives them pleasure. So, it 
is consistent in its conventions and agreements, and it doesn’t rest these 
strange conventions on false non-moral beliefs. Such a community is odd, 
and maybe no community like it has existed in the actual world. Still, it is 
possible.11 
The idea is that Metaethical Conventionalism, like all metaethical 
theories, should give the right answer even in odd or far-fetched cases. If 
it fails to do so, that seems to be a problem for the theory. At least, that’s 
the idea that is commonly put by defenders of Mind-Independence, and it 
generalises to pretty much all mind-dependent views, for all such views 
presumably have to allow the possibility of coherent and well-informed 
individuals and communities with very different attitudes to our own.12 
In such communities, different norms and values and reasons will obtain. 
Those who defend Mind-Independence will thus accuse mind-dependent 
views of giving incorrect answers to questions about what is right and 
wrong in certain cases, and often argue from this to Mind-Independence 
itself.  
                                                             
11 The community imagined here is akin to a type of character who Street (2009) names 
the ‘Ideally Coherent Eccentric.’ I discuss this character further in Chapter 6.   
12 Maybe it doesn’t generalise to views that take on at least some Kantian commitments, 
like the theories developed by Smith (1994) and Korsgaard (1996; 2009). For instance, 
Korsgaard says that moral norms are self-legislated, but that the nature of rational agency 
ensures that we are all rationally committed to self-legislating some moral norms and not 
others. So this is an ultimately mind-dependent view, but it is meant to accommodate the 
sort of intuition to which defenders of Mind-Independence are appealing. I am sceptical 
about these Kantian views, but I set them aside to be considered on another occasion. 
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I should note, however, that I am not keen on this way of arguing. 
Arguments that rely on substantive moral intuitions are unlikely to lead 
to metaethical progress. I began to explain why at the end of Chapter 2, 
and I say more on it in Chapter 6. I raise it here because, by eliminating 
certain limiting factors, Mind-Independence is key to robustly necessary 
moral truths. If this common way of defending it is problematic, then the 
Robust Realist has reason to worry. So this, if you like, is an initial warning 
that we need to more carefully evaluate the tenability of a commitment 
to Mind-Independence. That’s the job of Chapter 6, however. In the next 
section, I will ask a different question about the nature of necessary moral 
norms. 
 
4.8 Necessary Norms in Ordinary Life 
What role do necessary moral norms, interpreted as norms that lack any 
contingent limiting factors, play in ordinary moral life? One possibility is 
that they don’t have an interesting role to play here, for it may be that the 
process of stripping away limiting factors will leave us with norms that 
are staggeringly complex. Such norms might be too unwieldy to do useful 
work in ordinary life. Even if we can use such entities to understand the 
necessity in Robust Realism, one might worry that they do not deserve to 
be called ‘norms.’ My suspicion is that it doesn’t ultimately matter if there 
is no significant role for necessary moral truths in ordinary moral thought 
and discourse, but it would be nice if can find some sort of role for them. 
I think that we can find such a role, and in this section I will explain what 
it is. 
 Let’s start with a useful distinction made by Sean McKeever and 
Michael Ridge in a discussion of particularism.13 The initial distinction is 
between norms as standards and norms as guides. Standards are “entirely 
exceptionless generalisations” and “should be understood as necessary 
moral truths” (2006: 7). However, whilst standards apply in all possible 
worlds, they might be useless in practice. Perhaps so much so that we will 
be reluctant to call them genuine norms. Specifically, a standard might be 
so complicated that human beings will find them impossible to apply and 
internalise. These standards are of little use in everyday life. So, standards 
are necessary or unlimited moral truths, but they can fail to give practical 
guidance.  
                                                             
13 I haven’t engaged with particularism directly, but I noted earlier that I reject it. So do 
McKeever and Ridge, and I am sympathetic to many of their responses to it. 
102 
 
As you might expect, this is not a problem with norms that are 
understood as guides. McKeever and Ridge see guides as everyday norms 
that “provide useful direction to a conscientious moral agent,” where this 
usefulness involves something like “reliably leading the agent to perform 
the right action for the right reasons” (2006: 8). Guides are just rules of 
thumb, like ‘it is wrong to lie’ and ‘one ought to be kind.’ These norms are 
helpful in everyday life, for in most cases they get us to do the right thing 
for the right reasons. But they are too rough to be necessary truths. We 
can easily imagine cases in which lying or being unkind are the right ways 
to go. Guides are useful, then, but are too rough to eliminate all contingent 
limiting factors. So, whilst standards are modally unlimited but very often 
practically unhelpful, guides are modally limited but of great practical 
use. 
What we need are norms that combine the necessity of standards 
with the practicality of guides. We need action-guiding standards. There 
might be a number of ways of developing this notion. McKeever and Ridge 
(2006: 10) offer one that seems pretty promising. They propose that an 
action-guiding standard is a standard that necessarily plays a role in the 
moral psychology of an ideally virtuous moral agent. It may not figure in 
such an agent’s conscious moral reflection, at least in ordinary cases, but 
it plays some role in their moral psychology. For one thing, it is there as 
the final arbiter of what one ought to do. When everyday rules conflict, 
one may appeal to an action-guiding standard to settle what is right in the 
specific case. As a rule of thumb, it is wrong to lie. And as a rule of thumb, 
it is obligatory to be kind. But how should I act if lying is the kindest thing 
to do? I can answer this question by appealing to a deeper action-guiding 
standard.  
So, rules of thumb presuppose action-guiding standards. The rule 
that prohibits lying and the rule that demands kindness rest on deeper 
moral norms that, in combination with contingent facts about our world, 
determine their authoritativeness in many situations. This fits with what 
I said in §4.5; a contingent norm that prohibits recreational violence rests 
on a necessary norm that prohibits causing T-Pain. What matters here is 
that part of the point of the contingent norms is that they are useful rules 
of thumb. A norm that prohibits causing T-Pain is not wildly complex, but 
it involves elements that can be ignored in many situations. It is part of 
the psychology of virtuous agents, insofar as it grounds the rules of thumb 




I take it that any substantive theory can make use of the notion of 
an action-guiding standard, but the easiest way to see how they might be 
used is to look to the ‘two-level’ utilitarian theories of Henry Sidgwick and 
R.M. Hare.14 On this view, the foundational utility norm is rarely (if ever) 
employed in our ordinary moral thought. For instance, if you must choose 
between (a) keeping your promise to help your friend to move house and 
(b) taking the dog to the vet for a relatively minor injury, you don’t think 
of the norm that directs one to maximise utility. You consider the duty to 
keep one’s promises, the significance of doggy welfare, and so forth. But, 
according to two-level utilitarians, such considerations count as duties or 
have significance ultimately in virtue of the foundational utility norm. So, 
the notion of action-guiding standard plays an indirect role in your moral 
life, by determining the rules of thumb by which you live, and perhaps by 
settling the conflicts that sometimes emerge when you apply the rules of 
thumb. 
Whilst the Robust Realists may not need necessary moral truths 
or norms to play a role in ordinary life, there is thus a plausible way in 
which they might do so. If there are action-guiding standards – that is, 
necessary norms that play some role in the moral psychology of an ideally 
virtuous agent – then there is a way in which necessary moral norms have 
practical significance. Of course, one might object that there are no such 
norms. In other words, one might think that the only way for a norm to 
be necessary is for it to include a near infinite disjunction of exceptions, a 
huge list of limiting factors being stripped away. In that case, there aren’t 
action-guiding standards. There are standards, but of a practically useless 
sort. I suggest, however, that there is at least one action-guiding standard. 
Consider the norm according to which it is impermissible to cause T-Pain. 
This is not a wildly complex disjunctive claim. It involves some disjuncts 
that are designed to eliminate limiting factors – specifically, it is wrong to 
deliberately cause pain unless it is deserved, or desired, or required as a 
means to a valuable end – but this is hardly unwieldy. It could easily play 
the role of an action-guiding standard. I therefore suggest that the Robust 
Realist can see necessary norms as playing an important role in ordinary 
life. 
 
                                                             
14 Sidgwick (1907) and Hare (1981). The example of two-level utilitarianism is also used 
by McKeever and Ridge though, it is worth emphasising again, it is just an example. The 




The claim that there are necessary moral norms plays a crucial role in the 
metaphysics of Robust Realism as I construe it, and in this chapter I have 
explored how these necessary norms can be understood. It’s not plausible 
to see them as holding with conceptual necessity, as some suggest. More 
promising is the view that they are norms that have had their contingent 
limiting factors eliminated. Such moral norms are often, but perhaps not 
always fundamental. And this is how we can view the necessity in Robust 
Realism. 
One might wonder how this form of necessity is to be categorised. 
It’s not conceptual necessity, for it has nothing to do with the meanings 
of moral terms or the content of moral propositions. But can it be classed 
as a necessity of some other type? I’m not sure that identifying an easily 
labelled type of necessity would be helpful here. In a sense, the necessity 
in Robust Realism is nomic – it is to do with moral norms rather than 
natural laws, but moral norms may be laws of some sort. They are laws of 
morality, governing the behaviour of moral agents. In another sense, the 
necessity in Robust Realism is metaphysical – the moral norms would be 
just the same even with a different set of natural laws, and this is how 
metaphysical necessity is commonly understood. In yet another sense, 
the necessity in Robust Realism might be classed as a distinctive type of 
‘normative necessity’ – it is a matter of there being norms that are purely 
normative, for they have had all contingent descriptive elements stripped 
away.15 
You can use one of these labels if you like, but we don’t really need 
to choose a specific classification. After all, what matters most is the idea, 
not the category or the label. And the idea is just that certain moral norms 
have modally maximal jurisdiction, because the range of worlds in which 
they have authority is not diminished by any limiting factor. Maybe other 
ways of interpreting necessary norms are available. I’d like to see further 
discussion, so that the ideas developed in this chapter can be compared 
against rival views. Still, we’ve made progress, and a neat account is now 
on the table. In the next chapter, I appeal again to necessary moral norms. 
This time, they play a role in explaining how the categorical authority of 
moral direction lends crucial support to the non-natural status of moral 
reality. 
                                                             
15 For the idea of a distinctive ‘normative necessity,’ see Fine (2002). I’m not sure my view 
really gels with what Fine has in mind, however. It is closer to Scanlon (2014).   
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5 The Authority of Morality 
 
Of the commitments that constitute Robust Realism, there are two that I 
have yet to discuss. In this chapter I clarify these Realist Commitments, 
and show how one provides support for the other. The commitments are 
as follows: 
Categorical Authority. The authority of moral direction is 
paradigmatically categorical. 
Non-Naturalism. Moral properties are beyond the purview of 
the natural and social sciences. 
My ultimate aim is to clarify how commitment to the former can motivate 
commitment to the latter. In other words, I intend to explain how Robust 
Realists can draw on the categoricity of moral direction in order to defend 
the claim that moral properties and norms force us beyond the natural 
world. 
I start by examining Categorical Authority in depth. We can begin 
to understand this commitment by looking at the images that are used to 
evoke it. I discuss these in §5.1, to put a rough idea of categoricity on the 
table. But these images are considered obscure and inchoate by many, so 
I explore the notion of categoricity further in §5.2 and §5.3. My aim there 
is not to provide any sort of analysis of categoricity. Rather, it is to identify 
important facts about it, facts that will help us to get a clearer grip on it. I 
will explain how one important fact about categorical normativity is that, 
other things being equal, a moral agent is necessarily blameworthy – in a 
certain modally strong sense – if they culpably violate a categorical moral 
norm. 
After clarifying Categorical Authority, I then assess how it matters 
for Non-Naturalism. There are various ways of distinguishing natural and 
non-natural properties in metaethics. One needn’t assume that there is a 
uniquely correct way of drawing the distinction, but one has to be clear 
about one’s chosen approach. I thus explain what I don’t have in mind by 
the distinction in §5.4, and what I do have in mind by it in §5.5. In §5.6 
and §5.7 I show how the naturalist position that stands the best chance of 
capturing categoricity cannot in fact do so. I discuss the accusation that 
categoricity is ‘queer’ in §5.8, and I conclude in §5.9 that the categorical 





5.1 Images of Authority 
Robust Realists, as I understand them, endorse the following view about 
the authority of moral direction: 
Categorical Authority. The authority of moral direction is 
paradigmatically categorical. 
Why claim that moral direction is paradigmatically categorical? After all, 
we could instead claim that it is always and essentially categorical, or that 
it is just occasionally categorical. However, both of those claims introduce 
certain problems. The problem with saying that moral direction is always 
and essentially categorical is that this is a very strong claim, and is thus 
very hard to defend.1 The problem with saying that it is only occasionally 
categorical is that this might mean that the categorical parts of our moral 
framework could be eliminated without much loss to moral thought and 
discourse.  
Saying that the authority of moral direction is ‘paradigmatically’ 
categorical provides a middle-ground between these extremes. The claim 
is that certain model cases – plausibly the fundamental moral norms – are 
categorically normative. It will be easier to defend this than the claim that 
all moral norms are always and essentially categorical. Moreover, making 
the paradigm claim will mean that categorical direction cannot be cut out 
of moral discourse without much loss, for it would entail the loss of some 
model cases. The middle-ground is thus a good way for Robust Realists to 
go. 
What is categorical normativity? It is hard to rigorously answer 
this question. Philippa Foot (1972) famously suggested that claims about 
categoricity express a ‘fugitive thought,’ for the commitments involved in 
and entailed by such claims are notoriously difficult to identify and pin 
down. As an initial way in, it is therefore worth exploring certain images 
that philosophers have often used to evoke the notion of categoricity. 
Imagery can only get us so far, but it is a useful starting point. I’ll discuss 
two images. First, the image of inescapable bondage. It’s often said that, if 
a claim about what one ought to do is categorically authoritative, one is 
inescapably bound by it.2 What this amounts to is up for debate, but it is 
a way into seeing the apparently unconditional character of categorical 
norms. 
                                                             
1 Error Theorists make this claim, and it makes life hard for them. 
2 Foot (1972), Williams (1985) Garner (1990), Joyce (2001; 2006), and Cuneo (2014).   
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Consider that some directive claims have a sort of authority, even 
though it is conditional on some contingent desire or convention. Take 
this case: if you want to impress your boss, you should offer to work late this 
evening. This is a case of ‘hypothetical’ direction – the traditional contrast 
to categorical direction. Here the direction does have authority, but only 
for those who want to impress their boss. If no other relevant conditions 
are in play, then this direction will be escapable for anyone who lacks that 
desire. The thought is that categorical normative claims are not like this. 
Such claims are unconditionally normative and, as a result, inescapably 
binding.3  
Jean Hampton puts this by saying that the authority of categorical 
direction is “independent of social or psychological contingencies” (1998: 
96). As this suggests, categoricity has something to do with necessity. One 
might propose that a categorically authoritative moral claim will in some 
sense necessitate the performance of a certain act, or perhaps that failure 
to perform a certain act in some sense necessitates the suffering of some 
moral demerit. I expand on this shortly, but there seem to be two lessons 
to glean from the image of inescapable bondage. First, a plausible view of 
Categorical Authority will include the idea that moral authority involves 
a necessity claim. Second, however this necessity claim works, it should 
connect up to the unconditional character of moral direction, and should 
thereby give sense to an agent’s being ‘inescapably bound’ by categorical 
norms.  
For another evocative image, consider the following from Richard 
Joyce: 
One important feature of moral judgements … is the degree 
of practical clout that they often purport to have in our 
deliberations and interactions: Calling an action “morally 
correct” or “virtuous” or “wrong” or “just” is (putatively) to 
draw attention to a deliberative consideration that cannot 
be legitimately ignored or evaded (2006: 57-58). 
Several ideas appear to be at work in this image of practical clout. I have 
already addressed what is perhaps the main idea, for the claim that one 
cannot legitimately ignore a consideration with practical clout is similar 
to the claim that the authority of categorical direction is inescapably 
binding.  
                                                             
3 Foot (1972) argues that ‘systems of hypothetical imperatives’ provide the inescapability 
of categoricity whilst being ultimately conditional. I discuss this below.  
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But there is another idea suggested by practical clout, to do with 
deliberative weight. Ideally, our view of categoricity will illuminate why 
categorical claims tend to be experienced as stronger than other directive 
claims. In other words, the practical clout of a categorical norm consists 
partly in our giving it a lot of weight in our reasoning about what to do. I 
take it that the idea of categoricity is distinct from that of overridingness, 
and that the question of whether moral factors can ever be overridden by 
non-moral factors is not automatically settled by their categoricity. But it 
is clear that, in addition to being illegitimate, ignoring categorical moral 
direction is quite hard. It’s certainly not impossible, for people can and do 
ignore it. But ordinary reasoners tend to give categorical direction a lot 
of weight in their practical deliberation. So, a lesson of the multi-faceted 
image of practical clout is that our view of Categorical Authority should 
ideally provide some insight into the weight that we give to categorical 
direction. 
The pair of images sketched above expose the core of categoricity: 
in further developing this notion, we must shed light on the unconditional 
or ‘inescapably binding’ character of moral direction via a necessity claim, 
whilst also aiming to clarify the weight or ‘clout’ that such direction has 
in practical reasoning. With these considerations in mind, in the next two 
sections I look at Categorical Authority in depth.4 The hope is to develop 
a way of getting a decent grip on this commitment, and to thereby provide 
clarity to those who worry about the inchoateness of the images sketched 
above. I won’t be offering a fully-fledged analysis of categoricity. I doubt 
that a deep analysis of it can be had, and I doubt that one is needed. Maybe 
a shallow (‘intra-normative’) analysis of categoricity is available, but its 
shallowness will mean that it has little interest. So, instead of offering an 
analysis, I aim to identify and clarify certain interesting facts about how 
categorical normativity relates to certain necessity claims. This will help 
us get a better grip the images outlined above, and will put us in a position 
to ask whether Categorical Authority supports a Non-Naturalist view of 
ethics. 
 
                                                             
4 Another image used in relation to categoricity is that of a ‘demand without a demander.’ 
For example, Garner (1990) uses this image in the course of claiming that categorically 
authoritative moral norms will be intolerably mysterious or ‘queer.’ I return to this claim 
in §5.8. Note as well that Anscombe (1958) uses a somewhat similar image of ‘legislation 
without a legislator’ in order to challenge the idea that moral obligation or duty make 
sense without God. 
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5.2 Categoricity and Practical Necessity 
Like many others, I have said that categorical direction has something do 
with necessity.5 In this section and the next I clarify the nature of the link 
between necessity and authority. One idea is that categorical direction 
necessitates the performance of a certain act. Like many others, however, 
I find this obscure. I will thus improve on it with something a little more 
careful. 
 Note first that, whilst our view of categoricity should illuminate 
the weight that categorically normative claims carry for the deliberating 
agent, we should distinguish the necessity in Categorical Authority from 
the necessity that some suggest is involved in moral motivation. In other 
words, we must not treat categorical normativity as a matter of an agent’s 
being necessarily motivated to Φ by a moral norm that directs them to Φ. 
Moreover, we must not treat categoricity as a matter of an agent’s being 
necessarily motivated to Φ by their judgement about such a norm. These 
are different issues, different sorts of necessity claim than that involved 
in categoricity. I don’t know that anyone makes the mistake of conflating 
them – Mackie (1977) can seem to do so if interpreted uncharitably – but 
the necessity in Categorical Authority is not a motivational matter. So we 
cannot get a grip on categoricity by pinning it to this sort of motivational 
necessity. 
More interestingly, one might try to get a grip on categoricity in 
terms of an agent’s being such that a certain act seems unavoidable to 
them. The idea is that an agent’s practical commitments – which go some 
way toward forming their character – are such that they regard an act as 
one that they must perform. The famous claim that has been attributed to 
Martin Luther – ‘here I stand, I can do no other’ – is supposed to illustrate 
the phenomenon. Although he probably didn’t actually say it, the thought 
is that Luther’s character and commitments were such that the option of 
recantation seemed (to him) practically unavailable. As a result, he could 
not escape his refusal to recant. This phenomenon is termed ‘practical 
necessity’ by Bernard Williams (1981a) and ‘commitment authority’ by 
Hampton (1998: 86). So, does this practical necessity help us to pin down 
categoricity?  
                                                             
5 This claim is made by those hostile to robust categoricity and by those sympathetic to it. 
For the hostile, see Foot (1972: 311), Williams (1985: 188), and Finlay (2014: Ch. 7). For 
the sympathetic, see Hampton (1998: Ch. 3). 
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Well, it might seem to help us to grasp both the inescapability of 
categoricity and the weight that it carries in our deliberations. After all, if 
you feel that you can do no other than Φ, then Φ-ing will seem inescapable 
to you. And the deliberative weight of categorical direction is explicable 
in terms of the strength of your practical commitments. So, one may think 
that we can get a grip on Categorical Authority by pinning it to practical 
necessity. However, this would be a mistake. Cases of practical necessity 
are interesting and important, but we mustn’t tie categorical direction to 
them. 
To see that there is a difference the two phenomena, consider that 
practical necessity provides a much weaker form of inescapability than 
can be found within categoricity. Even if one feels bound to Φ in light of a 
practical commitment, one could presumably escape the direction to Φ as 
a result of some change in that commitment. The change may be in the 
strength of the commitment, or in its relationship to one’s various other 
commitments. Or the practical commitment might disappear altogether, 
perhaps to be replaced by another commitment. Categorical demands are 
not like this. They need not change in line with changes in one’s practical 
commitments, and we should therefore avoid tying practical necessity to 
categoricity. The inescapability involved in practical necessity is weaker 
than the unconditional force of categorical direction. To view categorical 
direction through the lens of practical necessity is, therefore, to settle for 
less. 
You might object that the depth of the practical commitments that 
generate practical necessity ensures that any changes in them will entail 
fundamental changes in character. If that’s true, then one can only escape 
the requirements of practical necessity by becoming a different person. 
And this is a pretty strong notion of inescapability, you may think, for to 
escape the demands of practical necessity you must entirely change who 
you are. If this is true then, in the closest possible world at which Luther 
failed to do as he actually did, he was a different person. But would Luther 
genuinely have been a different person if he had done otherwise? I don’t 
know for sure. I never met him. But it’s very far from obvious. After all, if 
Luther had done otherwise, it would make sense for him to feel bad about 
himself. Presumably he couldn’t feel bad about himself unless he was still 
himself.6  
                                                             
6 One might try to gloss his feeling bad about himself as a feeling of regret at no longer 
being the same man, but that seems implausible and potentially ad hoc. 
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It’s also worth noting that the Luther example has the potential to 
mislead, for the practical commitments that made him unable to recant 
possess a certain social and historical significance, and involve a level of 
nobility and self-sacrifice. This might give this case of practical necessity 
the appearance of an authority that it doesn’t in fact possess. After all, it 
is possible to imagine cases in which the commitments are far less noble, 
and thus less intuitively linked to categoricity. Imagine a neo-Nazi who is 
practically committed to the extinction of the Jewish culture. Even if these 
commitments generate practical necessity for him, this can only be seen 
as a psychological or motivational matter, and not as a normative form of 
inescapability, for we cannot tie the neo-Nazi’s practical commitments to 
anything categorically normative. Put another way, even if one’s practical 
commitments create a psychological inescapability, this gives us no grip 
on categorically authoritative normativity, for we can still ask whether or 
not we are categorically required to either cultivate or eliminate any of 
our practical commitments, including those that may generate practical 
necessity. 
In sum, although certain forms of inescapability and deliberative 
weight may appear in the phenomenon of practical necessity, they do not 
help us get a grip on categoricity. We must look elsewhere to clarify this 
idea. 
 
5.3 Categoricity and Necessitation of Blameworthiness 
If practical necessity doesn’t help, then what necessity claim should we 
make in trying to get a better grip on Categorical Authority? I suggest that, 
rather than looking to interpret the idea that an act is necessitated by a 
categorical norm, a nice way to proceed is to focus on what is necessitated 
by an agent’s failure to perform the act prescribed by that norm. For here 
there is an obvious and attractive answer: blameworthiness. If an agent is 
categorically required to Φ, and if they nevertheless fail to Φ and are also 
culpable for that failure, then they’ll necessarily acquire the property of 
being blameworthy. This is an inescapable aspect of categorical direction: 
one cannot escape the blameworthiness that comes from failure to follow 
it.7 The acquisition of this property is not conditional on a convention or 
desire. 
                                                             
7 One also cannot escape the praiseworthiness that comes from Φ-ing, though only if one 
does so for the right reasons. I’ll ignore this, however, to avoid orthogonal complexities 
involved in the idea of acting for the right reasons. 
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More carefully, I suggest that the following is an important truth 
about categorically normative direction: 
Necessitation of Blameworthiness. For any norm N, if N 
categorically directs one to Φ in a set of circumstances C, 
then an agent’s culpable failure to Φ in C would necessitate 
their being blameworthy. 
We can then appeal to this claim to get a grip on Categorical Authority. A 
defender of this Realist Commitment will hold that the authority of moral 
direction to Φ is paradigmatically such that, necessarily, one is morally 
blameworthy if one culpably fails to Φ. One cannot escape the acquisition 
of this moral property. Note that Necessitation of Blameworthiness is not 
an analysis of categoricity. It just expresses an important and plausible 
fact about it. It may even be a platitude, but by focusing on this fact we’ll 
get a clearer view of the necessity in Categorical Authority. And, crucially, 
it will help us to develop a way of testing naturalistic approaches to moral 
reality. 
 To illustrate how Necessitation of Blameworthiness applies in the 
moral case, consider Watkins. Like all moral agents, Watkins is subject to 
a categorical norm that prohibits causing T-Pain, that is, undeserved and 
undesired pain that is not required as a means to any valuable end. But, 
being a ne'er-do-well, Watkins tortures someone just for fun. Moreover, 
he is aware of the fact that he is subject to categorical moral norms that 
prohibit such activity. He knows that he is culpably violating a categorical 
moral norm. The idea is just that, having culpably violated the norm that 
prohibits causing T-Pain, Watkins is necessarily morally blameworthy. No 
desires or conventions get him out of this. It is something that he cannot 
escape. 
This is certainly not to suggest that Watkins will ever be subjected 
to those forms of social censure that commonly go with judging someone 
to be blameworthy; he’ll escape punishment and ostracism if no one finds 
out that he was the one who did the deed. The idea, though, is that he has 
become worthy of moral censure. This is something that he cannot escape, 
for it is necessitated by his violation of a categorical norm. It was a moral 
norm that he violated, so his blameworthiness is of a specifically moral 
sort.8 
                                                             
8 I have nothing interesting or new to say about the nature of moral blame. For some 
prominent and recent discussions, see Watson (1996), Hieronymi (2004), Scanlon (2008), 
Wolf (2011), Wallace (2011), and Fricker (2016). 
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Again, this might seem obvious. But it helps us to clarify some key 
points about categorical normativity. First off, it helps to distinguish two 
forms of categoricity. To see this, consider that we can use Necessitation 
of Blameworthiness to understand a weak form of categoricity that one 
finds in certain non-moral norms, like the norms involved in the game of 
tennis. It’s true that a tennis player might not be morally blameworthy if 
they culpably violate a rule of the game, but it is plausible that they are 
nevertheless blameworthy in another sense.9 They merit a certain type of 
censure – this is why certain penalties are used to meet rule-violations in 
tennis.  
Moreover, these penalties are merited as a matter of necessity: 
once you violate a rule of tennis, you necessarily merit whatever penalty 
has been specified as corresponding to that particular rule-violation. You 
can’t escape being worthy of the relevant penalty, whatever your desires, 
and even if you in fact go uncensured because the umpire did not notice 
your rule-violation. So, do the rules of tennis have the same authority as 
categorical moral norms? Foot (1972) answers affirmatively. She thought 
that inescapability is found in ‘systems of hypothetical imperatives.’ Such 
systems include the sets of institutionalised rules that constitute games, 
social clubs, etiquette, and so on. You can ignore the rules of etiquette, for 
example, but you remain subject to them. These systems of norms don’t 
go away just because you ignore them, even if you don’t care about them 
at all. 
Foot thought that morality should also be viewed as a system of 
hypothetical imperatives.10 It might be an especially complex and messy 
system, and we generally attach more importance to it than we do to most 
other systems, but on Foot’s account it is still just a set of institutionalised 
rules of the same basic sort as those involved in tennis. So, if categoricity 
is read in terms of Necessitation of Blameworthiness, doesn’t this play 
into the hands of a non-robust view of morality – like Foot’s? Not quite. 
We need to make a distinction between two types of categoricity. One is 
modally ‘fragile,’ whilst the other is modally ‘robust.' This distinction 
maps on to one I made in Chapter 4, between limited and unlimited moral 
norms. 
                                                             
9 You may say that it is immoral because it is cheating. But one can break a rule of tennis, 
and be culpable for doing so, without cheating. For to cheat one must violate a norm on 
purpose, and one can culpably violate a norm without this doing so purpose. 
10 At least, she did in 1972. Foot (2001) offers a different story. 
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Recall that a limited moral norm is one that in some way rests on 
or presupposes contingencies – ‘limiting factors’ – and that, as a result, 
has authority at some worlds but not at others. An unlimited moral norm 
is one that involves no limiting factors, and that, as a result, has authority 
with modally maximal jurisdiction. A system of hypothetical imperatives 
is not as limited as some views of the normative, but it is still restricted 
by its ultimate contingency on the rules being instituted at a world. The 
modal jurisdiction of the direction provided by a system of hypothetical 
imperatives is thus limited. Within this jurisdiction, direction provided by 
the system in question may be inescapable. So we can call it categorical. 
But this is a modally fragile form of categoricity, for there are worlds in 
which it fails to apply – worlds in which the rules are not instituted. By 
contrast, modally robust categoricity is inescapable at every world.11 For 
there to be a modally robust categoricity, we thus need necessary norms. 
And, as we saw in earlier chapters, Robust Realists accept such norms. So 
they can appeal to them in interpreting Categorical Authority as modally 
robust. 
In itself, then, Necessitation of Blameworthiness does not force us 
to choose either a modally robust or fragile view of Categorical Authority. 
This choice will be determined by debate about the existence of necessary 
moral norms: if there are necessary or unlimited moral norms, then we 
can have a modally robust form of categoricity, but if all moral norms are 
in some way limited and contingent, then the most we can hope for is a 
modally fragile form of categoricity. I have already argued (in Chapter 3) 
that Robust Realists can reasonably maintain that there exist necessary 
norms. So, whilst rival metaethical theories can draw on Necessitation of 
Blameworthiness, a robustly realistic theory is able to do so in a modally 
robust way that fits with a far more uncompromising view of categoricity 
than Foot’s. Moreover, a modally robust view of morality’s inescapability 
is no more obscure than the modally fragile view. All the modally robust 
view alters is the range of worlds in which a norm applies. You might deny 
the existence of unlimited moral norms, but you can’t accuse the modally 
robust view of categoricity of an obscurity that the fragile views somehow 
avoid. 
                                                             
11 Foot might get this robust inescapability by employing a rigidifying manoeuvre. Even if 
this is so, it doesn’t change my distinction. Unlike robust views, fragile views must rigidify 
to get modally general inescapability. Given that Robust Realists already accept unlimited 
norms, they needn’t be hostage to the viability of a rigidifying move. Foot’s categoricity is 
also different to stronger forms because the latter is ‘reason-giving’ – cf. Joyce (2001). 
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 So far we’ve seen how Necessitation of Blameworthiness is a fact 
about categoricity that helps us to get a grip on its inescapability: part of 
what is inescapable in categorical direction is the blameworthiness that 
is necessitated by culpable violation of it. This necessity claim comes in a 
modally robust or a modally fragile form, depending on whether there are 
necessary moral norms. Robust Realists will clearly opt for the modally 
robust approach. Again, this is not a deep analysis of categoricity. But it 
should help us to get a grip on its inescapability, and it will help us when 
we come to discuss naturalistic views of ethics. For we can test such views 
by seeing whether they are able to capture the claim that there are moral 
norms with an authority such that they necessitate, in a modally robust 
sense, the moral blameworthiness of moral agents who culpably violate 
them. 
One final point before moving on. In addition to getting a grip on 
the inescapability of categorical direction, we also want to get a grip on 
the weight that it has in our deliberation. Although one can fail to do what 
one is categorically required to do, categorical direction has a practical 
clout that weighs very heavily for us. If we operate with Necessitation of 
Blameworthiness, we can explain this in terms of the negative feelings 
that (for most of us) go hand in hand with our judging ourselves worthy 
of blame. At the mild end of the spectrum one may feel embarrassment, 
whilst at the more serious end of the spectrum one might experience guilt 
or shame. These are feelings that most find unpleasant or distressing. We 
want to avoid them. The psychological impact of judging oneself worthy 
of blame should not be underestimated. If failure to Φ necessitates your 
being blameworthy, then you will probably give a lot of weight to Φ-ing 
in your reasoning, for being blameworthy is probably something that you 
dislike. 
I haven’t have analysed categoricity, but I have provided a way of 
getting a grip on it that improves on the evocative but vague images that 
are often found in the literature.12 Failure to follow categorical direction 
necessitates blameworthiness. Now, in the moral case, there is a question 
about the scope of this necessity. Given that I have already explained why 
Robust Realists can and should postulate necessary moral norms, at this 
point we can allow that a modally robust view of categoricity is what we 
want.  
                                                             
12 I’ve no doubt that some will still find categoricity mysterious and obscure. I consider a 
version of this charge in §5.8, but I’ve introduced enough clarity to push forward. 
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I’ll soon argue that we have to go beyond naturalism to capture 
this modally robust view of categorical moral normativity, but note that 
Categorical Authority – even if it is interpreted as modally robust – does 
not build in a view of the natural or non-natural status of moral norms. If 
we wish to use Categorical Authority to defend Non-Naturalism, we must 
identify the naturalist view with the best chance of capturing categoricity, 
and argue that it cannot adequately do so. I make some such arguments 
in §5.6 and §5.7, but first let’s discuss the natural/non-natural distinction 
itself. 
 
5.4 Non-Naturalism and Metaphysics 
Question: what is the correct way to distinguish natural and non-natural 
properties? Answer: there isn’t one. In saying this, I don’t mean to suggest 
that there is no reason for making the distinction. My point is that, whilst 
ordinary language places some constraints on the extension of ‘natural,’ 
it is unlikely to be uniquely definable. Its ordinary or everyday usage has 
various aspects, so it would be a mistake to regard just one philosophical 
account of naturalism as legitimate. In sketching my preferred approach, 
I am thus not denying that there are other interesting distinctions in the 
vicinity. 
 There are two broad ways of distinguishing between natural and 
non-natural properties. One is metaphysical, the other is methodological. 
The former approach seeks to identify a metaphysical commonality that 
characterises natural properties. If there are non-natural properties, they 
are those that cannot be characterised via this commonality. By contrast, 
a methodological approach seeks a methodology that is characteristic of 
our inquiry into the natural world. If there are non-natural properties, 
they are those that are beyond this form of inquiry. In this section I clarify 
why I don’t take a metaphysical approach. That is, I explain why I will not 
try to find a feature of natural properties that all such properties have in 
common.13 
                                                             
13 Note that some views of this feature are dialectically awkward. For instance, Plantinga 
views naturalism as the claim that there is “no all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good 
creator of the universe; furthermore, there are no beings much like him” (2010: 251). 
Depending on what ‘beings much like God’ means, this view may tie naturalism too closely 
to atheism. In other words, it may turn all atheists into moral naturalists. Many atheistic 
metaethicists see themselves as moral non-naturalists. Plantinga’s approach turns them 
into naturalists, so it is dialectically awkward. We should thus seek to provide a different 
view of the natural/non-natural distinction. 
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 One metaphysical proposal is that the natural entities are those 
that are causally networked. That is, those that have some causal impact 
on the world. The non-natural properties, if there are any, are those that 
have no causal impact. One might think that this is an appealing way to 
view the natural/non-natural distinction in metaethics, for most Robust 
Realists do in fact see moral properties as causally inert. So, maybe moral 
properties are non-natural precisely because they are causally inert. The 
problem is that it is not clear that Robust Realists must see moral reality 
as non-causal – this was no part of the definition given in §1.1 – and there 
are some who do not. Graham Oddie has a robust view of value, but thinks 
that “values can affect us, causally, and it is through their causal impact 
on us that we can have knowledge of value” (2005: 2). Of course, this is a 
controversial claim. But it would be unwise to say that Oddie is neither a 
Non-Naturalist nor a Robust Realist simply because he takes this view of 
value. 
 Anyway, there is an even bigger reason to avoid the causal form 
of metaphysical naturalism. As many have noted, it fails to respect one of 
the few restrictions that ordinary language places on our account of the 
natural/non-natural distinction. I take it that competent speakers deny 
that we can view angels, demons, ghosts, and gods as part of the natural 
world. The same goes for the magical spells cast by wizards and witches. 
But such entities, if they exist, have a causal impact. So angels and ghosts 
(and so on) all count as natural entities if we take this causal approach to 
metaphysical naturalism. This is an unacceptable result, so we will have 
to look elsewhere in distinguishing natural and non-natural aspects of 
reality. 
 A second way of developing metaphysical naturalism is to identify 
the natural world with the physical world. On this sort of physicalist view, 
natural properties are those properties that are (or are reducible to) the 
entities posited by physics. So, the non-natural properties, if there are 
any, are those that are not (or are not reducible to) the entities posited by 
physics. Note that this is not just a methodological approach, on which a 
natural/non-natural distinction is drawn via the methods of physics. It is 
metaphysical, for what unites the natural properties on this view is not 
anything about the nature of inquiry in physical science, but rather the 
fact that natural properties are (or are reducible to) the various entities 
that physics posits. This physicalist view looks attractive, for it seems to 




 However, it also has serious flaws. Consider the famous dilemma 
that Carl Hempel proposed for physicalism.14 Physicalists understand the 
natural properties as those properties that are (or are reducible to) the 
entities posited by fundamental physics. But we might wonder whether 
they are talking about current physics, or the physics at which we’ll arrive 
at the end of inquiry. Both options lead to serious issues. The first option 
is to draw on the entities posited by current physics. But if we go this way, 
physicalism is probably false. After all, current physics is incomplete. It is 
not done with its positing of properties, and there is a decent chance that 
its current posits will be radically revised in the future. Of course, this is 
more likely in some cases than others, but the history of science suggests 
that it would be a mistake to rely too heavily on assumptions about how 
our current physics will compare to future physics. So it would be unwise 
to rely on current physics. This is the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma. Our 
other option is to appeal to the entities that will be posited at the end of 
physical inquiry. But if we go this way, then physicalism is vacuous. It can 
offer us no real guidance, for no one can say what entities will be posited 
by physics at the end of its inquiry. This is the second horn of Hempel’s 
dilemma.15  
In short, drawing the natural/non-natural distinction in terms of 
a physical/non-physical distinction is going to be tricky at best. It may be 
that there is a way of getting a clear physical/non-physical distinction on 
the table, but there is at present no way of doing so that is uncontroversial 
and clear. It is therefore unlikely to be useful in our discussion of moral 
reality. Other approaches to developing a strictly metaphysical account 
of natural/non-natural properties are no doubt available, but the two that 
I take to be most promising are not particularly helpful ways to go in this 
context. In the next section, I’ll thus consider a methodological approach 
instead. 
 
                                                             
14 Hempel (1969). For a more recent attempt to carefully refine Hempel’s dilemma, see 
Stoljar (2010: Ch. 5). 
15 One might respond by saying that it is rational to believe that our current physics is 
correct and mostly complete. Alternatively, one might seek a way of understanding the 
physical/non-physical distinction that doesn’t appeal to either current or future physics. 
Perhaps we can appeal to common sense, or a model case of a physical theory. I doubt that 
any of these proposals will work, but it would take me too far afield to go into it here. What 
matters here is that the physicalist/non-physicalist approach to the natural/non-natural 
distinction will at best need serious development to have any chance of being workable. 
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5.5 Non-Naturalism and Methodology 
A methodological approach to naturalism seeks to identify a methodology 
or form of inquiry that characterises our discovery of properties that are 
generally taken to be natural. This approach means that, if there are any 
non-natural properties, they are those that cannot be discovered via this 
methodology or form of inquiry. I take a methodological approach to the 
natural/non-natural distinction. Specifically, I see the difference between 
them in terms of certain differences between scientific and non-scientific 
inquiry. 
 So, a property is natural if it is within the purview of a natural or 
social science, like physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, psychology, 
anthropology, economics, and so forth. A property is then non-natural if 
it is not within the purview of a natural or social science, that is, if the 
means by which we inquire into the existence and character of the given 
property is non-scientific. In other words, the natural properties can be 
investigated by certain a posteriori forms of inquiry that characterise the 
methodology of the sciences, whereas the non-natural properties cannot 
be investigated in this way. This means that moral properties are natural 
if inquiry into their existence and status is an empirical matter involving 
the methodology of the sciences, and they are non-natural if inquiry into 
their existence and character is at least primarily a non-empirical matter 
that must be pursued by a methodology other than those involved in the 
sciences.16 
There are a number of ways in which both moral naturalism and 
moral non-naturalism can be developed, of course, even within this sort 
of methodological approach. Before exploring moral naturalism in more 
depth, however, I will first expand on my preferred way of drawing the 
natural/non-natural distinction, for whilst it is a common way of setting 
things up in metaethics, it does raise certain issues.17  For instance, if we 
distinguish natural and non-natural properties via the natural or social 
sciences, we might want to see a way of assessing whether a discipline is 
scientific.  
                                                             
16 I admit that I’m short on details as to what exactly this will be. This is because my project 
is in moral metaphysics, and I set questions relating to moral epistemology aside for now. 
I will, however, say that insights from modal epistemology are going to be relevant in a 
moral epistemology. For some Non-Naturalist epistemologies, see Shafer-Landau (2003), 
Audi (2004), Huemer (2005), Tropman (2008; 2009), and essays in Hernandez (2011). 
17 The methodological approach goes back at least to Moore (1903). For recent uses, see 
Brink (1989), Darwall et al. (1992), Shafer-Landau (2006), and Cuneo (2007b). 
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I don’t have a definition, and I’m not sure that one is available. But 
we have reason to see a discipline as scientific if it gives a central role to 
repeatable empirical experiments as a way of gathering data that either 
corroborate or falsify unifying or explanatory hypotheses about specified 
parts of reality. That is, scientific inquiry starts with a specific and often 
novel hypothesis, one that is in some way linked to a theoretical system 
of (in normal cases) well-supported core and auxiliary hypotheses. The 
specific and novel hypothesis aims to unify a set of disparate hypotheses 
within that theory, or to explain certain recently discovered phenomena 
that pertain to the relevant portion of reality. A scientist then performs 
repeatable empirical experiments that either corroborate or falsify their 
hypothesis.  
This is certainly plausible as a rough gloss of what happens in the 
natural sciences, where the researcher is likely to been involved in the 
design of the experiment. But we can also suggest that it happens in the 
various social sciences, like economics, where the adoption of a certain 
economic theory in one set of societies and the adoption of another in a 
different set of societies may play the same sort of experimental role. Of 
course, this gloss ignores many important details about the natural and 
especially the social sciences. However, it will do here. I take it that any 
plausible view of science will put such methodological factors front and 
centre.  
Another question: why draw on science and not empirical inquiry 
in general? David Copp opts to take that broader approach, on the basis 
that “we can have empirical knowledge that is not scientific, including 
knowledge of street names, dollar bills, aches and pains, and popular 
foods” (2003: 185). First off, note that the science-focused approach as I 
understand it does not exclude our being able to get empirical knowledge 
by non-scientific means. I said that natural properties can be known by 
the empirical methods of the sciences, not that they can only be known in 
this way. And it is clear that street names and such could be investigated 
by scientific methods – they are within the purview of the sciences – even 
if in practice we don’t need to use scientific methods to get knowledge of 
them. But we still require a reason to tie natural properties to scientific 
inquiry, rather than to empirical inquiry more generally. My worry about 
an empirical approach is the same as my worry about a causal version of 
metaphysical naturalism. Both violate the same rare restriction that our 




Recall that competent speakers will deny that angels and ghosts 
(etc.) can be captured within the natural world. But such entities, if they 
exist, can have a causal impact. Angels and ghosts will thus be knowable 
empirically, via their effects. An empirical approach will thus treat them 
as natural, even though ordinary discourse does not. However, despite 
their causal impact, angels and ghosts (etc.) are not amenable to scientific 
inquiry.  
Hypotheses about angels or ghosts are rarely as novel and riskily 
specific as scientific hypotheses, and angelic and ghostly hypotheses are 
likely to be part of unfalsifiable and therefore unscientific theories.18 Any 
experiments that could feasibly expose the existence of angels and ghosts 
are unlikely be repeatable, for such beings do not reveal their presence 
upon the whim of our research into them, and it is not within our limited 
power to make them appear on such occasions. So, if we tie the natural to 
the scientific, we thus avoid treating such entities as natural. One might 
object that we could at least in principle get a falsifiable and fully scientific 
theory of, for example, ghosts. However, even if we are able to do this 
without losing something that is essential to the concept of a ghost, my 
judgement is that bringing ghosts into the purview of the sciences would 
in fact be sufficient to naturalise them. For this reason, a methodological 
approach does better to tie the natural to scientific rather than empirical 
inquiry. 
Before moving on, let’s consider how what I’ve said relates to the 
descriptive properties. Simplifying just a little, properties can be: 
(a) descriptive and natural; 
(b) descriptive and non-natural; 
(c) non-descriptive and natural; 
(d) non-descriptive and non-natural. 
The first two categories are straightforward. Into (a) goes a property like 
being pleasurable, and into (b) goes a property like being loved by the gods. 
If you identify a moral property like goodness with the former, you are a 
reductive naturalist. If you identify it with the latter, you are a reductive 
supernaturalist. I discussed and rejected these reductive views in Chapter 
3.  
                                                             
18 Popper (1959) was wrong to treat empirical falsifiability as the demarcation criterion, 
but it is still part of being scientific. This is consistent with the lesson of the Duhem-Quine 
thesis: we needn’t automatically reject a theory because of a falsifying result. 
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The third category is more controversial, but it captures one way 
of understanding a naturalist view that I will discuss in detail in the next 
two sections. On this view, goodness cannot be picked out by any purely 
descriptive predicate, but it is still within the purview of the sciences. It 
therefore goes in (c). Robust Realists put goodness in (d), however, for 
they see it as both distinct from the descriptive and beyond the sciences. 
I have already argued – in Chapter 3 – that moral properties do not go in 
(a) or (b). I will shortly argue that they probably go in (d) rather than (c). 
But what matters for now is that, in denying that the moral properties are 
natural, Robust Realists are committed to the following: 
Non-Naturalism. Moral properties are beyond the purview of 
the natural and social sciences. 
Now we are in a position to ask why Robust Realists should treat moral 
properties or norms as non-natural, that is, as being beyond the purview 
of the sciences. As we’ll see in the next two sections, an appealing answer 
is that the most plausible conception of moral naturalism remaining to us 
is unable to accommodate some important facts about categorical moral 
direction. 
 
5.6 Beyond Naturalism: Part I 
Appealing to categoricity as a way of motivating Non-Naturalism is a not 
new idea. Many have held that naturalistic theories are unable to capture 
the authority of morality. However, this suggestion is sometimes made 
rather quickly, and without much serious argument as to how a naturalist 
might try to capture a strong form of categorical normativity. Perhaps this 
is because some Non-Naturalists are unclear in their view of categorical 
normativity, relying on evocative but vague images. I, however, provided 
a specific way of getting an intuitive grip on categoricity: Necessitation of 
Blameworthiness is a crucial fact about categorical normativity, and it can 
help us to grasp the notion of inescapably binding authority. But it doesn’t 
straightforwardly imply anything for the natural or non-natural status of 
ethics. 
This is true even when we see categoricity as modally robust. And 
at this point in the dialectic, we are entitled to view it in such terms. So, 
our question is whether a naturalist view can capture moral norms whose 
violation by a culpable moral agent would necessitate that agent’s being 
morally blameworthy in any possible world in which the agent so acted. 




What form of moral naturalism is this? Well, not a Descriptivist 
form of the sort that many defend.19 In a Descriptivist naturalism, moral 
properties are identical to natural properties that can be picked out by 
purely descriptive predicates (like being pleasurable or being desired) 
rather than non-natural properties that can also be picked out by such 
predicates (like being loved by the gods). I will not pay attention to this 
Descriptivist naturalism here, for I rejected it in Chapter 3. After all, if we 
have to reject Descriptivism, then we’ll have to reject both naturalist and 
non-naturalist forms of it. But there is one form of naturalism that may 
have the resources to capture Categorical Authority in modally robust 
terms. 
The view I have in mind is a naturalistic style of moral realism.20 
Its core metaphysical claim goes as follows: 
Synthetic Naturalism. There is a synthetic identity between 
moral properties and certain natural properties. 
To say that there is a synthetic identity between the moral and the natural 
is to say that this identity is not implied by the conceptual content of our 
moral terms. Just as the identity between water and H2O is not implied by 
the conceptual content of ‘water’ and ‘H2O,’ the identity between moral 
property M and natural property N is not implied by the conceptual 
content of ‘M’ and ‘N.’ Because of this, these are identities that can only be 
discovered a posteriori. The most prominent attempts to defend this view 
can be found in the work of Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David 
Brink.21 
                                                             
19 Smith (1994), Jackson and Pettit (1995), Jackson (1998), and Brown (2011). 
20 The view that I focus on below is the one that I think has the best chance of capturing 
Necessitation of Blameworthiness in modally robust terms. I don’t deny that other forms 
of naturalism can capture Necessitation of Blameworthiness in modally fragile terms. For 
instance, Finlay (2008; 2014) develops a pragmatic approach to categorical language that 
may succeed on that more modest score. Moreover, it may well be that neo-Aristotelian 
views – like those of Nussbaum (1992), Hursthouse (1999), Foot (2001), and Thomson 
(2001; 2008) – can also give a modally fragile categoricity. A fuller discussion would 
explain why these styles of naturalism are unlikely to succeed in modally robust terms, 
but given limitations of space I’ll focus on the naturalist view that forms the most direct 
competition to Robust Realism when it comes to robust categorical normativity. 
21 Brink (1984; 1989; 2001), Boyd (1988; 2003a; 2003b), and Sturgeon (1988; 2006). The 
view is often called ‘Cornell Realism,’ but for mostly boring reasons I prefer to just call it 
‘Synthetic Naturalism.’  
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If we accept that M and N are related by synthetic identity, such 
that the terms used to pick out those properties are not interchangeable, 
then we can categorise moral properties as natural but non-descriptive.22 
Although many treat the natural as a part of the descriptive, the Synthetic 
Naturalist claims that moral predicates and natural predicates diverge in 
their conceptual content. If this is true, moral properties cannot be picked 
out by any purely descriptive predicate. In the sense discussed in Chapter 
3 – on which we treat the purely descriptive properties as those picked 
out by purely descriptive predicates – the moral properties are thus not 
appropriately understood as descriptive properties. Nevertheless, moral 
properties are natural properties because they are within the purview of 
the sciences. By this use of terms, moral reality is thus understood by the 
Synthetic Naturalist as being non-descriptive but natural. So, even though 
defenders of this view make an identity claim, it is not the sort of identity 
claim that Descriptivists make. Synthetic Naturalism is not a Descriptivist 
view.  
 Synthetic Naturalism was originally motivated by a certain moral 
semantics, an early version of which comes from Richard Boyd. Boyd saw 
moral terms as having their referents fixed in the following way: 
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a 
kind (property, relation, etc.) k just in case there exist causal 
mechanisms whose tendency is to bring about, over time, 
that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately 
true of k … Such mechanisms will typically include the 
existence of procedures which are approximately accurate 
for recognising members of instances of k … and which 
relevantly govern the use of t, the social transmission of 
certain relevantly approximately true beliefs regarding k, 
formulated as claims about t ... etc. When relations of this 
sort obtain, we may think of the properties of k as regulating 
the use of t (via such causal relations), and we may think of 
what is said using t providing us with socially coordinated 
epistemic access to k (1988: 195). 
More crudely, the referent of a moral predicate is fixed by the natural 
properties that causally regulate its use. Some natural property causally 
regulates our use of ‘… is blameworthy,’ and this fixes the referent of this 
term. 
                                                             
22 They thus belong to (c) in the categories discussed in §5.5. 
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I don’t know exactly what the Synthetic Naturalist should suggest 
as the referent of ‘… is blameworthy,’ but what matters for now is simply 
whether they can capture the idea that culpable norm-violators acquire 
this property as a matter of unlimited necessity. That is, we want to know 
whether the Synthetic Naturalist’s approach to morality is able to capture 
a modally robust view of Categorical Authority. Initially, it seems that it 
cannot. To see why this is so, consider Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ 
classic ‘Moral Twin Earth’ objection to Synthetic Naturalism.23 At the core 
of this objection is the thought that the use of moral terms can be causally 
regulated by different natural properties on different worlds. Consider 
two worlds – Earth and Moral Twin Earth – that are indistinguishable, 
save for the fact that their use of a moral term – ‘blameworthy,’ say – is 
causally regulated by different natural properties. It has the same sort of 
practical role on both worlds – both Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings 
use it to justify inflicting certain forms of censure on norm-violators – but 
for the Earthlings it is causally regulated by consequentialist factors, and 
for the Moral Twin Earthlings it is causally regulated by deontological 
factors. 
The issue for Synthetic Naturalists is that it seems as though they 
must treat ‘blameworthy’ as meaning different things on Earth and Moral 
Twin Earth, even though this is implausible. After all, inhabitants of these 
worlds seem to disagree, but this would be impossible if they just mean 
different things by ‘blameworthy.’ Now, this objection can be developed 
in various ways, but what matters is the contingency that it reveals. Given 
that ‘blameworthy’ has distinct causal histories (and therefore distinct 
referents) in different possible worlds, a culpable norm-violator will not 
be necessarily blameworthy – in a modally robust sense – for their act. 
There will be worlds in which the use of ‘blameworthy’ is such that it 
would not apply to the norm-violator, even when it plays the same sort of 
practical role. This is a sort of interplanetary relativism, which may well 
slide into intraplanetary relativism.24 So, if Synthetic Naturalists draw on 
Boyd’s semantics, they cannot capture Categorical Authority in a modally 
robust form. At this point in the dialectic, Robust Realists have the upper 
hand. 
 
                                                             
23 Horgan and Timmons (1991; 1992a; 1992b). For a precursor see Hare (1952: 148-149). 
24 These terms are from Brink (2001). Harman (2015) embraces this result as clarifying 
the nature of relativism, though most Synthetic Naturalists would want to avoid it. 
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5.7 Beyond Naturalism: Part II 
A potential way forward for Synthetic Naturalists is to introduce a more 
subtle moral semantics, one that modally rigidifies the view so that it can 
avoid collapsing into some form of relativism. David Brink provides the 
two most promising rigidification proposals. The first starts with the idea 
that Boyd’s semantics goes wrong in its focus on properties that causally 
regulate our actual use of moral terms. We will be better off if we instead 
see moral terms as referring to properties that regulate not just the actual 
use of these terms, but also the “counterfactual or hypothetical usage – in 
particular, the way speakers would apply terms upon due reflection in 
imagined scenarios and thought experiments” (Brink 2001: 168). This 
counterfactual view means that Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings can 
have a dialogue about the referent of ‘blameworthy,’ and it is possible that 
they will ultimately converge on a single way of using this term. Indeed, 
reflection may lead competent speakers to one use in all worlds. Perhaps, 
by taking this line, Synthetic Naturalists can see categoricity as modally 
robust. 
 This counterfactual approach to regulation does appear to be an 
improvement on what Boyd was proposing, but it is still not compelling. 
It might be a reasonably healthy optimism to assume that there will be 
convergence among Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings – they do live 
on almost indistinguishable worlds, so they start with a lot of common 
ground.25 But it seems unreasonably optimistic to assume that competent 
speakers in any world would converge on one use of ‘blameworthy.’ Even 
if it does have the same referent at every possible world, it would take a 
great deal of argument to show that we can get universal convergence on 
it. I don’t know exactly how unlikely it is that we’ll achieve this universal 
convergence, but given that the range of worlds in question will differ in 
many more respects than Earth and Moral Twin Earth, pessimism is not 
unreasonable.26 This is not to deny that the possibility of convergence may 
provide interplanetary dialogue with a sort of regulative hope. But this 
makes Synthetic Naturalism hostage to the fortunes of that discussion, for 
convergence in our use of ‘… is blameworthy’ might nevertheless fail to 
occur. 
                                                             
25 Laurence et al. (1999) argue that it will be hard to isolate those regulating properties, 
for different uses of M require many natural differences. So they may not have that much 
common ground. Even so, they have more with each other than they do with many worlds. 
26 For discussion of non-convergence in moral matters, see McGrath (2008; 2010). 
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Brink’s second (and preferred) proposal starts with the shared 
referential intentions “that would justify us in interpreting a community 
of inquirers as engaged in moral inquiry” (2001: 172). And he thinks that 
the relevant referential intentions pertain to interpersonal justification. 
According to Brink, a predicate counts as moral if those who use it do so 
with the “intention of picking out properties … that play an important role 
in the interpersonal justification of people’s characters, their actions, and 
their institutions” (2001: 174). And, perhaps most significantly of all, this 
shared referential intention provides the semantic content of our moral 
terms. 
To clarify, the thought is that ‘… is morally blameworthy’ refers to 
certain properties – whatever they in fact are – that play an important 
role within the correct substantive moral view – whatever it in fact is – of 
interpersonal justification.27 This allows Synthetic Naturalists to handle 
Moral Twin Earth by saying that Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings do 
disagree. They disagree about which natural properties make people and 
their actions and institutions interpersonally justifiable. Earthlings hold 
consequentialist views on this. Moral Twin Earthlings hold deontological 
views on it. Inhabitants of other possible worlds may hold very different 
views on it, but the meaning and referent of ‘blameworthy’ will not differ 
in those worlds as long as they share referential intentions with respect 
to it. 
The contingency that was a problem before seems to be removed 
by a focus on shared referential intentions rather than causal regulation. 
True, inhabitants of other worlds may differ in their referential intentions 
with respect to predicates like ‘… is morally blameworthy.’ But the point 
is that such speakers are not part of genuinely moral inquiry unless their 
referential intentions do relate to interpersonal justification, for genuine 
moral inquiry and discussion has interpersonal justification as one of its 
core constitutive aims. Can the Synthetic Naturalist thus deliver a modally 
robust approach to categoricity? I remain sceptical. A lot hinges on how 
exactly we cash out the notion of interpersonal justification. Brink doesn’t 
go into much detail on this, but he does have some things to say. However, 
as we’ll see, what he says causes problems for the Synthetic Naturalist’s 
ability to interpret Necessitation of Blameworthiness in modally robust 
terms.  
                                                             
27 Note that van Roojen (2006) takes a similar approach to Brink. Both rely on there being 
true substantive normative claims in developing their semantics.  
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In developing the idea of interpersonal justification, Brink draws 
on some remarks from Hume. The most relevant tells us that for a person 
to engage in moral talk he “must choose a point of view, common to him 
with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, 
and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and sympathy” 
(Hume Morals: §9.1). This is nice, but it does raise questions. What is the 
status of Hume’s must? What is its modal jurisdiction? Brink’s spin on the 
Humean approach to morality fails to clear this up, for he only says that 
“what is distinctive of the moral point of view is that we assess people, 
and actions, and institutions according to standards that others can and 
should accept” (2001: 174). Brink’s remarks just raise the same questions 
as Hume’s: what exactly is the nature and modal jurisdiction of Brink’s 
should. 
 We can probably assume that Hume’s must and Brink’s should are 
practically normative.28 This leaves us with the question of their modal 
jurisdiction. As we know, two types of answer are available. One is that 
Hume’s must and Brink’s should are limited in their modal jurisdiction. 
The other is they are unlimited in their modal jurisdiction. Let’s start with 
the former option. A simple version of this idea involves reading Hume 
and Brink as making conditional claims: if you want to participate in moral 
discourse, you must/should intend (by your use of moral terms) to refer to 
properties that play a role in interpersonal justification. If we go this way, 
however, we cannot view Categorical Authority as modally robust. After 
all, if categoricity is modally robust, then it is authoritative for all. Not just 
for those who want to participate in moral discourse. Of course, there are 
more sophisticated views than the above conditional claim, but the worry 
generalises. Any modally limited account will only support a fragile view 
of categoricity, for it won’t speak to those who refuse to engage in moral 
inquiry despite having a capacity for moral agency. Hume dealt with this 
by arguing that justice is “in the true interest of each individual.”29 But 
this seems optimistic, if we have to include the moral agents of all possible 
worlds. 
                                                             
28 This is how Rubin (2015) reads them. I came to Rubin’s article after developing the 
ideas below, but our objections to Brink operate with a similar strategy of questioning his 
theory’s ability to deliver a suitable underpinning for interpersonal justification. 
29 This is how Hume (Morals §9.16) replies to the ‘sensible Knave’ problem. Of course, he 
wasn’t seeking modal generality – the circumstances of justice obtain only in some worlds. 
Hume would not have worried about getting the robust authority that we’re after. 
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Many modern Humeans will be happy to take a different sort of 
line, and embrace the result that moral direction is escapable for some 
agents.30 But that would be to abandon the goal of naturalising a modally 
robust reading of Categorical Authority. Perhaps the Synthetic Naturalist 
can be fine with that. I don’t know if Brink himself would be, but (more 
pertinently) it is not what we want at present. At present we are asking if 
naturalists can provide a modally robust view of Categorical Authority, 
and they clearly cannot do so if they pursue this sort of modern Humean 
line. So let’s assume that Synthetic Naturalists will deny that moral norms 
are limited in their modal jurisdiction, and that they will go the other way 
instead. 
The other way for them go is to interpret Hume’s must and Brink’s 
should as being unlimited in their modal jurisdiction. In other words, the 
authority of their practically normative claims – that moral agents must 
touch a string to which all humanity has an accord and sympathy, or that 
they should appeal to standards acceptable to others – extends to every 
world. It is inescapable for anyone with the capacity for moral agency – 
they must engage in the moral project of interpersonal justification. This 
would provide our modally robust account of categoricity. The demands 
made within moral discourse would not be contingent on any constitutive 
aims of that discourse. Such demands would be categorically binding, for 
even if those with the capacities constitutive of moral agency were to fail 
to engage in moral discourse, they would necessarily be at fault for doing 
so.  
However, this also raises some difficult questions. If one’s goal is 
to provide a naturalistic explanation of the modally robust categoricity of 
moral direction, one cannot just appeal to the modally robust categoricity 
of non-moral direction without raising questions about how that modally 
robust non-moral categoricity is itself to be understood. In other words, 
Synthetic Naturalists must now provide a general account of categorical 
normativity. But this creates problems, for there are two paths available 
to Synthetic Naturalists and neither are promising. The first path involves 
providing a view of categorical normativity in Synthetic Naturalist terms. 
The second path involves appealing to some alternative meta-normative 
theory.  
                                                             
30 Sophisticated versions of this modern Humean line can be found in Lenman (2010) and 
Street (2009; 2012). 
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Start with the first path. The idea is to find referential intentions 
constitutive of categorical normative discourse, and to then treat them as 
securing the referent of categorical normative terms. Such terms refer to 
whichever natural properties play the role fixed by the shared referential 
intentions of the participants in that discourse. I am not sure of what the 
relevant referential intentions will be, but I am sure that any workable 
proposal faces serious issues. This is because, to be workable, a proposal 
must have normative content built into it. Brink’s appeal to interpersonal 
justification seems neat for the moral case because it gives moral norms 
a deeper normative underpinning. To work for categorical normativity in 
general, we’d therefore need some deeper normative underpinning for 
the normative underpinning offered by Brink. And this is where problems 
emerge. 
After all, once that deeper normative underpinning is provided, 
the same questions that arose for the shallower normative underpinning 
will just re-emerge. Specifically, we have to ask for information about the 
nature and modal jurisdiction of that deeper normative underpinning. If 
it is modally limited, we lose the modal robustness that we’re after. If it is 
modally unlimited, we must provide another normative underpinning for 
it. In that case, regress threatens – we will have to keep coming up with 
normative underpinnings. Either way, the first path is not a promising 
one for the Synthetic Naturalist. It cannot be used to vindicate a modally 
robust interpretation of Categorical Authority. So, what about the second 
path? The second path involves looking to some other meta-normative 
view of categoricity as providing the normative underpinning for ethics. 
Moreover, the view that we choose must support a modally robust view 
of categoricity. There aren’t many options here, but one involves building 
Synthetic Naturalism about moral norms on a more generally non-natural 
base.31  
                                                             
31 Perhaps another is the Kantian constructivism defended by Korsgaard (1996; 2009) 
and others. I’m not sure if this constructivist view is, in the sense relevant here, a form of 
naturalism or non-naturalism. If it is a form of naturalism, perhaps Synthetic Naturalists 
can build on that meta-normative view to avoid having to accept non-natural entities. 
However, we should note that to build Synthetic Naturalism on any rival meta-normative 
theory would be to accept a problematic disunity. So, even if Kantian constructivism is a 
naturalist meta-normative view, and even if Synthetic Naturalists can coherently adopt it 
as a normative underpinning for their view of morality, the second path is still not an 
attractive way for them to go, for it would force them into a strangely disunified theory. 
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That is, Synthetic Naturalism at the moral level could be sustained 
by the idea that Hume’s must and Brink’s should are non-moral but also 
practically normative terms, both of which are unlimited in their modal 
jurisdiction, where this commits us to the existence of something beyond 
the purview of the sciences. But once one says this, it is hard to see why 
one would not see categorical moral norms as non-natural too. First, this 
provides a more unified account of the normative domain. Second, if one 
aim of the Synthetic Naturalist is to avoid putatively mysterious entities 
that exist beyond the purview of scientific inquiry, then the second path 
is unpromising for them, for such entities are likely to be its ultimate end 
point.  
In sum, attempts to capture a modally robust form of categoricity 
in Synthetic Naturalist terms are likely to fail. Some ways of developing 
this view lead only to a modally fragile view of categoricity. This may be 
acceptable to some, but it is not what we want at present. Other ways of 
developing it are modally robust, but rely on a deeper non-naturalism. In 
short, to capture Categorical Authority in modally robust terms, we must 
deny moral naturalism and instead accept a Non-Naturalist view of moral 
reality. 
 
5.8 Arguing from Queerness 
If what I’ve said so far is correct, then a modally robust interpretation of 
categorical moral normativity will force us beyond the natural and social 
sciences. But one can accept this without agreeing that such norms exist. 
For example, Error Theorists can agree that moral discourse is committed 
to categorical moral norms, but they still think that there simply are no 
such norms.32 One of the most common accusations from Error Theorists 
is that categorical moral norms, at least when viewed as modally robust, 
would be metaphysically queer entities. According to Error Theorists, we 
should therefore avoid positing them, even if they are an essential part of 
moral discourse. The upshot will be that moral discourse is systematically 
infected with an error, because it is committed to the existence of queer 
entities. In this section, however, I will explain that it is not dialectically 
helpful to argue from queerness, for Robust Realists do not find morality 
queer.  
                                                             
32 There are routes to Error Theory that sidestep categoricity and focus instead on moral 
supervenience, moral knowledge, or moral motivation. It is ultimately more promising to 
look to categoricity, however. Cf. Garner (1990), Joyce (2001), and Olson (2014). 
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A lot hangs on how we are to interpret the idea of queerness itself. 
J.L Mackie’s original claim was that an entity’s queerness is somehow a 
matter of its being “utterly different from anything else in the universe” 
(1977: 38). This can make it seem as if the queerness charge is basically 
a charge of uniqueness. Understood in this way, however, it isn’t going to 
trouble any Robust Realists who follow the recommendation offered at 
above, and build into their theory the view that at least some moral norms 
are fundamental aspects of reality. After all, there is an obvious sense in 
which all fundamental entities, including those of physics, are unique. 
Nothing else does exactly what a quark does, and nothing else is quite like 
a lepton. In short, even if nothing else in the universe works quite like a 
categorical moral norm, in itself this is not enough to undercut belief in 
them.  
However, queerness is not best understood as uniqueness per se. 
Rather, it is the way in which moral norms are unique that makes them 
queer. According to Error Theorists, it is categoricity itself that is peculiar. 
At this point, however, things get rather murky. In particular, we must ask 
Error Theorists just who it is that finds categorical normativity queer. It 
doesn’t seem queer to me, or to most Robust Realists, so how exactly is a 
queerness charge meant to have bite against those of us who need to be 
swayed? Maybe an Error Theorist can reply by agreeing that categoricity 
won’t be obscure to everyone at first glance. They just claim that a careful 
examination of the idea of a categorical norm reveals it to be intolerably 
inchoate, such that we must treat it as committing moral discourse to an 
error. 
But that’s not a compelling move now, for I have already shown 
that there is no inherent obscurity even in the idea of a modally robust 
categorical moral norm. The point of Necessitation of Blameworthiness is 
that it helps at least some of us to get an intuitive grip on the notion of 
categoricity. It may not help an Error Theorist, but it does give me a clear 
grasp on the notion of categoricity.33 Even if the necessity here is modally 
robust, there is nothing obscure about it. It’s just like the modally fragile 
view, except applied to a wider range of worlds. Both the Robust Realist 
and the Error Theorist should thus agree that categoricity, understood in 
this way, is not inherently obscure. So, how can the Error Theorist sway 
those who still don’t see the queerness that they see in categorical moral 
norms? 
                                                             
33 This may be due to differences in temperament, an idea that I explore in Chapter 6. 
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At this point, an Error Theorist might fall back on their own vague 
but evocative imagery. After all, certain Error Theorists have made their 
queerness arguments by appealing to images designed to evoke concern 
about the notion of a categorical norm. One of the best-known is that of a 
‘demand without a demander,’ which some have used in an effort to sway 
those who believe in categorical moral norms. The thought is that, whilst 
other types of demand (like legal and social norms) derive their authority 
from identifiable demanders (such as legislators and communities), this 
is not true of categorical norms. Such norms do not derive their authority 
from anywhere else, and are thus a lot queerer than those that do. Richard 
Garner, for example, says that whilst we “know what it is for our friends, 
our job, and our projects to make demands on us, we do not know what 
it is for reality to do so” (1990: 143). So, perhaps critics of categoricity can 
use this sort of imagery to sway the Robust Realist against categorical 
norms. 
In response to this strategy, I suggest that it is both unhelpful and 
uncharitable to say that, by the Robust Realist’s lights, it is reality that 
makes demands on us. This makes it seem as though the Robust Realist is 
anthropomorphising reality, as if they are treating it as an agent with the 
capacity to give instructions, prescriptions, recommendations, and so on. 
This would of course be a bad move, and perhaps ‘queer’ is an apt term 
for the manner in which would be a bad move. However, when the Robust 
Realist says that there exists a categorically authoritative moral reality, 
they are not suggesting that reality itself somehow makes demands of us. 
They are just saying that categorical moral norms exist as part of reality. 
Of course, Robust Realists may be wrong in their claim that robust moral 
properties and norms do in fact exist. But it is a mistake to interpret their 
view in the way Garner does, and it is more generally a mistake for the 
Error Theorist to develop the queerness charge in this way. Imagery may 
have legitimate uses in the back and forth between Robust Realists and 
Error Theorists, but not if it ends up misleading us by caricaturing either 
view.34 
                                                             
34 In fairness to those who present an uncharitable interpretation of the Robust Realist’s 
commitment to categoricity, it is not often that the idea of a categorical moral norm gets 
developed in the rigorous sort of way discussed earlier in this chapter. Even so, the image 
of a demand without a demander is still unhelpful, and having put in place an account of 
categoricity – Necessitation of Blameworthiness – there is no serious pressure on me to 
provide an alternative. I have already proposed a rigorous interpretation of categoricity 
that involves no assumption of reality making demands. 
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However, my strong suspicion is that, in the end, arguments about 
the existence of robustly categorical norms are not going to be settled by 
intuitions pertaining to their queerness, or lack thereof. Error Theorists 
see something queer in robust categoricity, and are therefore unlikely to 
be persuaded that it exists. Robust Realists don’t see something queer in 
robust categoricity, at least not when it is seen as part of the fundamental 
structure of reality. They are therefore unlikely to be swayed by a charge 
of queerness. Jonas Olson is right to say that the queerness debate puts 
Robust Realists and Error Theorists “in a stalemate, staring incredulously 
at each other” (2014: 136). I would go further, and say that many debates 
between realists and anti-realists very often result in stalemate, and that 
this general stalemate needs some diagnosis. I develop this in detail in the 
next chapter, looking at how we might overcome the stalemate and move 
forward.  
For now, however, we can just note that categoricity cannot easily 
be dismissed on the grounds that it is queer. If the charge is just that it is 
a unique aspect of the universe, then this just means that the fundamental 
categorical moral norms are on a metaphysical par with quarks and other 
fundamental physical entities. If the charge is just that there is something 
odd about categoricity itself, then it won’t sway those who don’t see this 




Insofar as we are entitled to prefer a modally robust view of categorical 
moral norms to a modally fragile one, Categorical Authority helps us both 
to understand and motivate Non-Naturalism. Of course, this won’t worry 
those who reject modally robust views of categoricity. I haven’t shown 
that such views are definitely false. That is, I haven’t argued that moral 
discourse is committed to there being modally robust categorical norms. 
This is primarily a semantic rather than a metaphysical question, and as 
my present focus is metaphysics I’ll set that issue aside for another time. 
Nevertheless, in earlier chapters we saw that one can reasonably believe 
in modally unlimited moral norms. If we are entitled to believe in such 
norms, then we are entitled to take a modally robust view of categoricity. 
And in this chapter we’ve seen that this modally robust view will force us 





6 Arguing about Moral Reality 
 
In all that I have said so far, my goal has been to interpret and motivate a 
metaphysics for Robust Realism. I’ve developed a cluster of metaphysical 
claims that should be endorsed by Robust Realists, and that have enough 
support to ensure that even critics must take them seriously. However, 
what I’ve not yet asked is whether it is Robust Realists or their critics who 
are actually right. I haven’t given an argument for the claim that there are 
any fundamental moral norms that are at once irreducible, non-natural, 
mind-independent, and categorically authoritative. I have said that belief 
in robustly necessary moral norms is at least reasonable – there is some 
evidence for it, and the existence of robust moral norms cannot be quickly 
dismissed as unacceptably queer – but I haven’t shown that they do in fact 
exist. 
Nor do I intend to do so now, and not because I’m inclined against 
Robust Realism. Rather, because I judge that arguments for it are unlikely 
to convince those who need convincing. In this chapter I show that debate 
about moral reality faces major and perhaps insurmountable obstacles. I 
begin in §6.1 by outlining a common way of arguing about moral reality. 
In §6.2 I show how it generates an intractable stalemate. I diagnose the 
intractability of this stalemate in §6.3 and §6.4, showing how differences 
in temperament play a major role in its entrenchment. We thus need ways 
to avoid or overcome the influence of temperament. There isn’t space to 
look at every way of trying to do this, so I focus on just one argumentative 
strategy that might seem to move the debate forward at the expense of 
Robust Realism. I outline this evolutionary ‘debunking’ argument in §6.5. 
In §6.6 and §6.7 I show that it fails to avoid or overcome temperament. I 
consider how the future of metaethical inquiry can best proceed in §6.8, 
concluding in §6.9 that it may have to operate with surprisingly humble 
ambitions. 
 
6.1 The Substantive Strategy 
There is a common way of arguing about moral reality that generates an 
intractable stalemate. I explain this way of arguing in detail below, but it 
basically involves assessing metaethical views against their implications 
at the substantive moral level. So let’s call it ‘The Substantive Strategy.’ I 
sketched some examples of this style of argument in earlier chapters, and 




I’ll look mainly at how The Substantive Strategy plays a role in the 
debate about Mind-Independence, for this is the aspect of Robust Realism 
to which I have paid the least attention. Recall that it says the following: 
Mind-Independence. Moral properties are constitutively 
independent of any agent’s or set of agents’ actual or 
hypothetical attitudes, beliefs, and conventions. 
To illustrate how The Substantive Strategy is used to defend this claim, 
let’s start with the examples that we witnessed in earlier chapters. Recall, 
from §2.8, that Relaxed Realists try to defend the Realist Commitments 
by appeal to substantive moral intuition. Matthew Kramer maintains that 
mind-dependent views of moral reality – according to which moral truths 
depend on the attitudes of agents – are untenable because they imply 
intolerable views at the substantive moral level. Specifically, they imply 
that there are circumstances in which it is permissible to torture babies, 
for this is something that an agent might coherently desire. Kramer finds 
this repugnant, and says that it undercuts mind-dependent theories. For 
Kramer, the debate about moral reality and Mind-Independence is to be 
decided by examination of how theories fare against substantive moral 
views.1 
 Another example is from §4.7, in which I discussed a community 
whose conventional agreements permit the annual sacrifice of a teenager. 
Many will judge this community to be mistaken about what is right and 
wrong, even if their conventions are consistent, and even if they rest on 
no false non-moral beliefs. This substantive moral intuition is then used 
to argue that we must go beyond our attitudes (and so forth) to get to the 
correct moral norms. It is worth noting that this community is akin to an 
oft-discussed character in metaethical debate. Imagine someone whose 
desires (understood in the broad sense, as ‘pro-attitudes’) are internally 
consistent and whose non-moral beliefs are all true, but who has a desire 
for something that seems so odd or offensive that we consider them at 
fault.2 Such figures will be familiar to those acquainted with metaethical 
debate. Sharon Street (2009) calls them ‘Ideally Coherent Eccentrics,’ or 
‘ICEs.’  
                                                             
1 Kramer (2009). Cf. Dworkin (1996; 2011) and Nagel (1997). 
2 Clarifications. (1) Desires are internally consistent when the satisfaction of one does not 
preclude the satisfaction of any other. (2) It may be better to say that the agent has no 
false non-moral belief whose correction will alter their desires, not that their non-moral 
beliefs are true. This will depend on how much we should expect of agents. 
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This label is apt, for despite being ideally coherent in their desires 
and non-moral beliefs, these characters are eccentric in what they desire. 
So much so that they appear to make a substantive moral error, despite 
the fact that we can find no internal fault in the practical standpoint from 
which they deliberate and judge. ICEs often appear in debate about how 
our reasons relate to our attitudes. Here are some representative cases: 
Adil is ideally coherent, but he prefers the destruction of the 
world to the scratching of his finger (Hume Treatise: §2.3.3). 
Bert is ideally coherent, but he has no desire to avoid a future 
agony he is scheduled to suffer (Parfit 2011 v.1: §11). 
Caligula is ideally coherent, but he aims solely to maximise 
the suffering of others (Gibbard 1999: 145). 
Doris is ideally coherent, but she accepts norms prescribing 
starvation even if the result is a figure that cannot sustain life 
(Gibbard 1990: 171). 
Edwina is ideally coherent, but her only pleasure is to count 
blades of grass (Rawls 1971: 432). 
Francis is ideally coherent, but he is a Mafioso who values 
strength and honour above all else (Cohen 1996: 183). 
These cases, and others much like them, are extremely common in ethics 
and metaethics.3 They are very often employed in arguments about moral 
reality.  
To see how ICEs are employed, let’s start with attempts to defend 
Mind-Independence, and let’s focus on Caligula. Caligula’s sole aim is to 
maximise the suffering of others. And, according to many defenders of 
Mind-Independence, it is intuitively obvious that this aim is immoral. Yet 
we cannot fault Caligula for it if he is ideally coherent and if moral reality 
is mind-dependent. We could fault him if his desires were inconsistent, or 
if some of his non-moral beliefs were false, but by stipulation they’re not. 
So, if moral reasons derive from desires, and if Caligula is ideally coherent 
in desiring to maximise the suffering of others, we cannot derive a reason 
for him not to do so. So, to vindicate the substantive intuition that Caligula 
is morally mistaken, we must invoke some mind-independent reason or 
norm.  
                                                             
3 For many famous examples, see Parfit (1984). Note that some cases appear in debate 
about moral reasons, others in debate about reasons generally. Moreover, some see their 
impact as an ethical and not a metaethical matter. I see it as metaethical – see Chapter 2. 
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That, at least, is what many defenders of Mind-Independence who 
employ this version of The Substantive Strategy suggest. They think that 
intuitions about Caligula constitute evidence for Mind-Independence, for 
they reveal that mind-dependent theories are extensionally inadequate 
when it comes to capturing the substantive moral data. So, perhaps the 
Robust Realist can make use of such cases as part of an argument for their 
account of moral reality.4 How can mind-dependence theorists reply? A 
standard reply is to bite the bullet, whilst claiming that the bullet is quite 
edible.  
That is, many mind-dependence theorists have denied that ICEs 
provide evidential support for Mind-Independence, on the basis that their 
examination of characters like Caligula yield intuitions that are instead 
friendlier to a mind-dependent view of moral reality. They say that, for 
someone as eccentric as Caligula to genuinely count as ideally coherent, 
he must have a bizarre psychology, or have been raised in a very strange 
environment – somewhere utterly unlike any typical human community. 
According to Street, for example, once we fully grasp the psychology and 
history that Caligula must have if he is to count as ideally coherent, he will 
seem more like an alien than a human being.5 And the same goes for other 
ICEs.  
The mind-dependence theorist then claims that an appreciation 
of the strangeness or alien-like nature of ICEs ensures that it is no longer 
clear that such figures are mistaken or at fault. Indeed, many of them find 
it more intuitive that they are not mistaken. Street, for example, says that 
this is the case with Caligula. She suggests that, intuitively, he does have 
most reason to maximise suffering. And this is said to be evidence for a 
mind-dependent view of morality. After all, the intuition that Caligula has 
most reason to maximise suffering fits perfectly with the view that moral 
reasons derive from desires. So, the mind-independence theorist’s reply 
involves a readiness to tolerate or embrace a certain substantive view of 
Caligula. 
                                                             
4 Robust Realists do sometimes use moral claims, despite my definition in §1.1, on which 
they are to primarily appeal to metaphysical factors. See, for example, Oddie (2005: 106), 
Huemer (2005: 50), Shafer-Landau (2004; 2009), and Enoch (2010a; 2011: Ch. 2). 
5 Street (2009; 2012). For related claims, see Harman (1975: 7-8), Hare (1979), Williams 
(1981b), Lewis (1989), Shemmer (2007), Goldman (2009), and Lenman (2009; 2010). A 
different approach is to deny that ICEs are possible. Maybe ideal agents are logically or 
rationally committed to certain desires. See, for example, Smith (1994) and Korsgaard 
(1996). I find this implausible, but it won’t matter for my argument, as I explain in n.8. 
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Note that the suggestion is not that cases involving ICEs are too 
far-fetched for our intuitions about them to be reliable.6 Instead, the claim 
is either that they are psychological outliers about whom it is acceptable 
to bite a bullet, or else that they in fact present no real bullet to bite, for a 
careful examination of them supports a mind-dependent view of ethics. 
This won’t convince many defenders of Mind-Independence, I expect. For 
them, the intuition that Caligula has an immoral aim is likely to persist. I 
explore this in §6.2, but what matters for now is that cases involving ICEs 
illustrate how arguments about Mind-Independence – from its critics as 
well as its defenders – are often run in accordance with The Substantive 
Strategy. At the heart of this strategy is the thought is that we can assess 
metaethical theories by looking at their substantive moral implications. 
A good theory vindicates substantive moral intuitions. If a theory implies 
an unintuitive moral claim, this counts against it. We may disagree about 
what is unintuitive – more on this later – but the strategy is to defend 
metaethical conclusions by appeal to arguments with substantive moral 
premises.  
Many metaethicists buy into The Substantive Strategy, and it does 
have attractions. Most metaethical theories imply the same answers for 
everyday cases, but when ideal coherence and eccentricity are stipulated, 
they divide. Attention to cases involving one or another ICE can thus seem 
crucial in metaethical debate. Street even says that such cases “are where 
the action is if we want to get clear on the relation between our attitudes, 
value, and the world” (2009: 279). Still, the notion of an ICE is just a vivid 
illustration of the broader style of argument that I call The Substantive 
Strategy. This strategy manifests in various ways and in various debates.7 
Rather than seeing how else The Substantive Strategy can be developed, 
however, I’ll move on to showing how it leads to a stalemate. The major 
problem with it is that we differ in moral intuition. We are prepared to 
accept different moral views, and defend different metaethical views as a 
result. 
 
                                                             
6 For discussion of this point, see Wood (2011) and Elster (2011). 
7 For instance, some say that Mind-Independence is needed to capture the moral intuition 
that some acts are not just wrong but evil – see. Russell (2006). ICEs need not feature here, 
but this is an example of The Substantive Strategy. A related case is the ‘isolation test’ 
developed by Moore (1903) and used recently by Wielenberg (2014). For a metaethical 
debate that features ICEs without using them to defend Mind-Independence, consider the 




An implicit lesson of §6.1 is that it is possible for two competent inquirers 
to diverge in their substantive moral intuitions about an ICE, even if they 
are informed about the details of the case and even if they have given it 
careful thought. In this section I argue that this persistent difference in 
intuition (among seemingly competent inquirers) makes The Substantive 
Strategy a rather problematic way of arguing, for it leads to an intractable 
stalemate.  
 ICEs like Caligula are used by some to argue that moral reality is 
mind-independent. But people differ in their moral intuitions about this 
case. Some are happy (or at least willing) to accept that there is nothing 
immoral about Caligula’s aim, others see it as intolerably repugnant. How 
likely is it that one side will shift in their intuitions? Not very, for those 
who argue over ICEs are intelligent and informed philosophers who have 
reflected carefully on the relevant cases. They just persistently disagree 
about them. Moreover, it would be uncharitable to suppose that one side 
is being dishonest or unreasonably stubborn, clinging to a false view from 
some intellectual vice, like pride. It’s more likely that they are just arguing 
about difficult cases. In these difficult cases, reality does not present itself 
in a clear-cut way. If it did, reasonable and informed people who thought 
about them carefully would come to similar views. But it doesn’t, so they 
don’t.  
ICEs are thus controversial. Not just because we disagree about 
them – after all, we can disagree over p even if it is obvious that p – but 
because conscientious and informed inquirers disagree about them even 
after thorough reflection on the same considerations (cf. McGrath 2008). 
Some might be very confident about their intuitions concerning ICEs, but 
the fact that other competent inquirers come to the opposing view should 
make even the most confident among us see them as controversial in the 
relevant sense. The crucial point to which I wish to draw attention relates 
to the dialectical effectiveness of philosophical arguments. Suppose that 
you are a philosopher with an argument for X, and that a key premise in 
your argument relies on an intuition about a case. The argument will only 
convince your audience of X if they share that intuition. If they don’t, they 
won’t see your argument as successfully supporting X. Moreover, if their 
intuitions are directly opposed to those required to make the argument 




I suggest that this is what happens when Mind-Independence is 
assessed by appeal to ICEs. One side argues for Mind-Independence using 
the substantive intuition that, say, Caligula has no reason to maximise 
suffering. But this only persuades those who share that intuition, and see 
its capture as vital. It turns out that lots of competent inquirers don’t feel 
this way. After careful thought, they are fine with saying that Caligula does 
have reason to maximise suffering. The result is stalemate.8 Defenders of 
mind-dependent and mind-independent theories of morality persistently 
fail to persuade each other when their arguments rely on intuitions about 
cases involving ICEs, for their intuitions about these cases persistently 
differ.9 Of course, it’s not as if metaethicists are just impotently asserting 
their intuitions at each other. Sophisticated arguments are made on both 
sides of the divide. Still, when the arguments are reliant on controversial 
cases about which we persistently differ, they are dialectically ineffective. 
They fail to exert rational pressure on their primary targets, namely those 
not yet convinced of their conclusions. The Substantive Strategy is thus a 
problematic way of arguing about moral reality, for it leads to a stalemate. 
Given its position in current debate, the problem is not an inconsiderable 
one. 
In §6.3 and §6.4 I diagnose this stalemate, explaining how it gets 
entrenched. Before that, however, I should clarify a couple of things to 
pre-empt some potential issues. First off, I’m not saying that there is no 
use for controversial cases. After all, it can be worth making an argument 
even if it doesn’t speak to everyone. Such arguments might just preach to 
the choir, but some people haven’t given it any thought, and need to be 
shown that they are members of the choir. Another use relates to the fact 
that we can often elucidate a theory’s commitments by comparing cases 
with one another (cf. Eklund 2013). For instance, we say that if you make 
this claim about this case, then you must make the same claim about that 
case, or else show how they differ. And so on. This important process of 
comparing cases needn’t be impeded by the controversial character of a 
case.  
                                                             
8 As we saw in n.5, some mind-dependent theories try to capture intuitions that favour 
Mind-Independence via rich views of idealisation, on which ideal agents are committed to 
certain desires. This won’t help this stalemate. If rich views of idealisation are plausible, 
their defenders are on the same side of the stalemate as Mind-Independence theorists. If 
they are implausible, then their defenders must retreat to a thin view of idealisation, and 
are in the same boat as other mind-dependent theories. Either way, this move won’t help. 
9 I’m not saying that nobody is persuaded in this way, but I fear that it’s uncommon. 
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So, the problem with controversial cases is relative to our goal of 
convincing opponents. But you might now worry that I’ve misunderstood 
what philosophers aim to achieve when they develop arguments. They’re 
not attempting to convince others to achieve convergence, you may think. 
They’re just trying to find the truth, and we can do that without achieving 
convergence. So, perhaps we needn’t worry about dialectically ineffective 
arguments, for a philosopher’s job is to discover the truth, not to convince 
others. I think, however, that this is a bad view of philosophical discourse. 
I agree that philosophers aim to discover what’s true and what’s not. Or, 
more carefully, truth is a regulative ideal of philosophical inquiry as it is 
commonly understood. I also agree that there’s more to philosophy than 
attempts to convince others. But these aims are not mutually exclusive, 
and my experience is that most philosophical discourse is guided by both. 
That is, in making arguments we aim to convince others of what we think 
is the truth. We are rarely so immodest as to expect that our arguments 
will lead to total convergence, but in trying to convince others of what we 
think is the truth, convergence lurks in the background as a regulative 
ideal. 
So, even if there are many sound arguments that rely on intuitions 
about controversial cases, they are still problematic because they fail to 
persuade opponents. And the problem is big, for The Substantive Strategy 
that creates it is popular. We thus need to consider how we can overcome 
the stalemate and move forward. That’s a major job, and I can’t complete 
it in this chapter. I can, however, make a start. I diagnose the stalemate’s 
intractability in the next two sections. In later sections I put this diagnosis 




Those who spend time arguing about moral reality seem to be thoroughly 
and persistently divided. In other words, the stalemate discussed above 
is long-standing and intractable. It is worth considering why this is so, for 
if we can diagnose how the stalemate becomes entrenched, we’ll be in a 
better position to navigate future metaethical inquiry. My diagnosis of the 
stalemate’s intractability draws on aspects of individual temperament. In 
this section I develop a general view of temperament, to clarify the broad 
framework within which my diagnosis is located. In the next I develop my 




I take temperament to constitute the most significant obstacle to 
progress in the debate about moral reality. The idea is that, when some 
aspect of reality is not clear-cut, temperament can play a more decisive 
role in determining our view of it. So, when we differ in temperament, this 
leads us to different views of reality. In the case at issue, the effect is that 
metaethical debates stall. Before explaining how this happens, let’s first 
look at what temperament actually is. The idea that temperament plays a 
role in philosophical disputes was first put forward by William James, but 
James developed no explicit definition of what temperament actually is.10 
In fairness, ordinary use doesn’t appear to give very sharp boundaries to 
the term ‘temperament.’ Providing a fully-fledged definition is thus quite 
hard. 
But this doesn’t mean that nothing useful can be said. On my view, 
temperament is broadly speaking a cluster of conative dispositions that 
mediate an individual’s reactions to reality. These conative dispositions 
may include a desire for simplicity, an expectation of unity, a yearning for 
explanation, a need for meaning, a bias toward clarity, a hostility to error, 
a fear of being duped, a wariness of minority views, and so on. Everyone 
has a temperament, but we also differ in temperament. Differences arise 
because we can have aspects of temperament more or less strongly. Some 
have a stronger desire for simplicity than others, some are less wary of 
minority views, and so on. Thus, whilst we can expect to see fairly broad 
similarities between individual temperaments, especially within cultures 
and micro-cultures, we should also expect to find a significant amount of 
variation.  
Note that, being a group of conative dispositions, the existence and 
impact of temperament often remains unconscious. One will typically be 
unaware of the fact that it mediates one’s reactions to reality, for it fixes 
one’s pre-reflective sense of how reality will be. It implicitly shapes what 
we are inclined to see as possible and plausible, and predisposes us to see 
reality this way or that. True, such predispositions may be overridden by 
conscious thought. But even then they affect our starting point in inquiry 
and the assessment of evidence. So, even if we are likely to sometimes be 
aware of temperament, and can reflectively endorse or veto its influence, 
its pre-reflective character means that we will usually be unconscious of 
it. 
                                                             
10 James (1907). Also relevant are James (1896) and Nietzsche (1886). The account of 
temperament developed here gels with (and is influenced by) Bordogna (2008: 185). 
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James’ key insight was that temperament plays a role in inquiry. 
It helps us to identify and assess what counts as evidence for or against a 
proposition. Relatedly, it influences how one weighs this evidence. It does 
this by affecting our expectations of, and reactions to, reality. This means 
that when epistemic agents differ in temperament, they will often differ 
correspondingly in how they count and weigh the available evidence. Of 
course, differences in temperament will not always lead agents to draw 
different conclusions about how things really are. Reality often presents 
itself in fairly clear-cut ways, at least to reasonable and informed people 
who think about it carefully. When this is the case, there is less space for 
temperament to fix one’s ultimate view. Even if reality conflicts with one’s 
temperament, when things are clear-cut we override this and accept the 
truth.  
At least, this is what conscientious inquirers do. However, reality 
doesn’t always present itself in a clear-cut way, even to conscientious 
inquirers. Sometimes we face difficult and controversial cases, like those 
involving ICEs. In such cases, the truth is not clear-cut. When faced with 
this sort of controversial case, there is therefore room for temperament 
to more conclusively determine one’s ultimate view of the evidence. As a 
result, temperamental differences may lead us to accept different views 
of moral reality, by leading us to assess the relevant evidence in different 
ways.  
Now, when arguments about moral reality work in line with The 
Substantive Strategy, the evidence is taken to be substantive normative 
intuition. My thought is that temperamental differences may lead us to 
count and weigh this putative evidence differently, by affecting what we 
are prepared to say at the substantive normative level. In the next section 
I explain how this has a lot to do with a specific aspect of temperament. 
But the lesson of this section is that, whilst a stalemate arises because we 
argue about controversial cases, its entrenchment may be due to the fact 
that the controversy makes room for temperament to more decisively fix 
our views. A lot more can be said about the nature of temperament itself, 
but we have yet to assess whether and any how particular differences in 
temperament do in fact explain the entrenchment of the stalemate. So, 
rather than exploring the framework of temperament in greater depth, 
let’s see exactly how temperamental differences entrench the stalemate. 
In the next section I focus on the part of temperament that plays the key 





6.4 Existential Needs 
By ‘existential need’ I mean a need for something to be a certain way in 
order to experience one’s life as worthwhile, one’s goals as meaningful, 
or one’s choices as non-arbitrary. James did not delineate and discuss the 
idea of an existential need, but I suggest that they are an important aspect 
of temperament.11 Our existential needs will often affect our responses to 
reality, shaping how we count and weigh whatever evidence is available 
to us. 
 As with temperamental differences more generally, differences in 
existential need plausibly have an influence on one’s views about some 
question. For instance, it seems likely that some theists need God to exist 
to experience their lives as worthwhile. After all, many have been led to 
despair by the loss of their religious belief. It is plausible that those who 
have such existential needs will be more inclined to view certain widely 
accepted facts – the regularity of natural laws, say – as evidence for God’s 
existence. Others lack such existential needs, however, and are thus more 
likely to discount such facts as evidence for theism, or else will be inclined 
to give much less evidential weight to them. In this case, differences in 
existential need result in very different views about a certain aspect of 
reality. 
 There are no doubt other debates in which existential needs play 
a significant role. Some likely candidates include debates about free will, 
personal identity, and consciousness. But my present claim is local to the 
Mind-Independence debate. I hold that existential needs help to entrench 
the stalemate; we can explain persistent differences in intuition about the 
cases that divide defenders and critics of Mind-Independence by looking 
at differences in existential need. Some of us may need mind-independent 
moral truths in order to experience their moral choices as non-arbitrary, 
for example, whereas others get by with something more metaphysically 
modest, like idealised desires. This difference in existential need leads us 
to diverge in what views we are prepared to tolerate or embrace at the 
substantive moral level. This in turn leads us to different views of moral 
reality.  
                                                             
11 Something like this notion of existential need plays a role in Nietzschean thought, but I 
prefer to locate it within a Jamesian framework. It would take me too far afield to explain 
why I prefer this way of setting things up, but it has to do with the fact that I don’t wish to 
be driven down an ultimately perspectivalist or relativist route by a Nietzschean outlook. 
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The structure of the explanation is as follows: a stalemate arises 
when we argue about controversial cases, and it gets entrenched because 
the controversy makes room for our existential needs to more decisively 
determine our ultimate view of moral reality. Some are led to defend to 
views like Robust Realism, for it is committed to Mind-Independence. But 
others get pushed down a different path. This is not a matter of vicious 
wishful thinking, on either side. Instead, virtuous inquirers are led to take 
a certain view because of how they are disposed to count and weigh the 
available data. Their existential needs mediate their interpretation of the 
evidence. So, against what might be taken from an uncharitable reading 
of James, it’s not that we just opt to believe a view because it fits with how 
we want the universe to be. It’s not that some believe Mind-Independence 
because they wish it were true, even though others disbelieve it because 
they wish differently. Rather, it’s that an individual’s careful and critical 
inquiry provides them with apparent evidence for a certain view of moral 
reality, for this assessment is influenced by temperament and existential 
need. 
Note too that the claim is not that any given argument is rendered 
invalid or unsound by virtue of the fact that its author was influenced by 
existential need. That would be an ad hominem charge, and my claims are 
more subtle. I am suggesting that differences in existential need help to 
explain why we have persistently differing intuitions about controversial 
cases involving ICEs. By appealing to differences in existential need, we 
can enrich our view of why some arguments are not dialectically effective. 
Because we differ in temperament, we get a persistent clash of intuition 
and an entrenched stalemate. There’s no ad hominem here, for the claim 
concerns the capacity of arguments to convince, not their soundness or 
validity. 
 But one might be suspicious of the very idea of an existential need. 
I can imagine philosophers denying that they are led or misled by such 
needs. I can also imagine some denying that they have such needs. This is 
unsurprising. As I’ve said, the dispositions that constitute temperament 
often remain unconscious. With existential needs, this is especially likely 
if these needs are implicitly taken to be satisfied. Just as you tend not 
strongly experience your need to drink if you’re not thirsty, you tend not 
to strongly experience your existential needs if you assume that reality 
has what it takes for your moral choices to count as non-arbitrary. It is 




 Anyway, humans are exactly the type of creature that one would 
expect to have existential needs.12 We engage in purposive activity; we 
pursue goals by making choices. If one judges that reality offers no basis 
for the value of these goals or the non-arbitrariness of these choices, one 
might experience it as a rather bleak place. This is likely to have been a 
source of Tolstoy’s period of despair, for example. We don’t all have as a 
dramatic a time as Tolstoy, of course. But we all have desires and aims, 
and we all wonder whether these matter in ‘The Grand Scheme of Things.’ 
That is, we can all ask whether reality offers a basis for seeing our goals 
and decisions as non-arbitrary. This is all it takes to have an existential 
need. 
 But how do people differ in their existential needs? One important 
factor, I suggest, relates to how one feels about the presence of necessity 
and contingency in ethical life. Some experience a deep and unavoidable 
link between the contingency of our attitudes and the arbitrariness of any 
(fundamental) moral norms that constitutively depend on such attitudes. 
Others, however, don’t experience any such link between contingency 
and arbitrariness. The way an individual feels about this putative link is 
thus tied up with what they need from reality to experience their moral 
life as worthwhile and their moral choices as non-arbitrary. Some need a 
necessary and thus mind-independent moral reality for their existential 
needs to be satisfied, whereas contingent desires and aims are enough for 
others. 
For instance, a recent interview with Derek Parfit describes him 
as thinking that, without objective moral truth, the world “would be a 
bleak place in which nothing mattered.” This thought “horrifies” Parfit, 
who goes on to say that in such a world we would have “no reasons to try 
to decide how to live. Such decisions would be arbitrary … We would act 
only on our instincts and desires, living as other animals live.” However, 
Parfit also recognises that many of his colleagues “not only do not believe 
in objective moral truth – they don’t even find its absence disturbing.” In 
short, Parfit seems troubled by the idea that moral truth is as contingent 
as many metaethicists suppose. His existential needs are unsatisfied by 
views that allow moral normativity to depend on contingent desires and 
aims.13 
                                                             
12 For relevant discussion, see Cooper (2002), Ratcliffe (2005) and Kidd (2013). 
13 The quotes from or about Parfit in this paragraph are from an interview conducted by 
MacFarquhar (2011). Similar thoughts are expressed and defended in Parfit (2011). 
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Other philosophers see things differently. James Lenman answers 
Parfit’s concerns directly:  
The … realism favoured by Parfit is one of a number of 
philosophical positions where it is very common for those 
who believe them not only to consider them intellectually 
compelling but to think it would be catastrophically awful 
were they wrong. But I don’t get it (2009: 37).  
Lenman doesn’t get why the contingency of our desires should make any 
reasons that derive from them arbitrary. One’s desires don’t matter from 
a ‘zoomed out’ standpoint, but this is not our standpoint.14 Street is also 
untroubled by the ‘ultimate’ contingency of reasons, comparing it to the 
contingency of love.15 She notes that there are many people with whom 
one could have fallen in love, and we can recognise this without it thereby 
undermining “one’s lifelong love and commitment to the person whom 
one did, as it so happened, actually meet … and build a happy life with” 
(2012: 57). Street sees moral contingency as equally untroubling. Indeed, 
one might even embrace these contingencies as liberating. They allow us 
to construct our own paths without the constraint of some independent 
authority. 
In short, there are people like Lenman and Street who have more 
relaxed existential needs than people like Parfit, and this relates to their 
feelings about contingency and arbitrariness. I don’t mean to single out 
these philosophers. People in general are temperamentally led to count 
and weigh the substantive normative evidence differently, and existential 
needs do explanatory work when we ask why this is the case. Moreover, 
it is not clear who must ‘veto’ their existential needs, for we’re dealing 
with controversial cases. Both sides are led to stalemate by temperament, 
but it is not clear who is being misled. We thus need further argument to 
see who should override their existential needs. And we must go beyond 
The Substantive Strategy to achieve this. More broadly, to move forward 
we must go beyond arguments in which temperament inevitably plays a 
role. Otherwise stalemate will re-emerge; we’ll only be moving the bump 
in the rug. In §6.5 to §6.7 I consider an increasingly influential style of 
argument, one that may seem to move the debate forward against Robust 
Realism. 
                                                             
14 Lenman (2009: 36-38). Cf. Hare (1972) and Tiberius (2012). 




6.5 The Debunking Strategy 
How, then, can we move forward and make progress in the debate about 
moral reality? By identifying styles of argument that enable us to avoid or 
overcome the problematic impact of temperament and existential need. 
Unfortunately, there is not space here to identify and assess every such 
style of argument. I will therefore focus on one that may seem especially 
promising, that has been highly influential in recent years, and that often 
comes up in critiques of Robust Realism. This is ‘The Debunking Strategy,’ 
and it is designed to threaten the commitment to Mind-Independence.16 
In this section, I outline the heart of this way of trying to move the debate 
forward. In the next two sections, I argue that it fails to either avoid or 
overcome temperament. Divisive temperamental factors play a role even 
within debunking arguments, and the stalemate re-emerges in a different 
way. 
The Debunking Strategy has been developed in various ways, but 
the basic idea is that we can undercut the intuitions that seem to support 
Mind-Independence by looking at their causal history. Recent versions of 
The Debunking Strategy have typically focused on the evolutionary origin 
of our moral attitudes, and this sort of evolutionary debunking argument 
will be my focus here.17 The idea is that, by explaining our moral views in 
evolutionary terms, we expose that it is a mistake to invoke something 
mind-independent to vindicate those views. If this evolutionary claim is 
correct, it will be a serious problem for Mind-Independence and Robust 
Realism.  
                                                             
16 A way of trying to move the debate forward in favour of Mind-Independence is to appeal 
to ‘companions in innocence’ from other normative domains (like the epistemic domain) 
in order vindicate mind-independent entities in the moral domain. For this strategy, see 
Hampton (1998), Stratton-Lake (2002: xxv-xxvi), Shafer-Landau (2003: 113), Cuneo 
(2007a), Bedke (2010), and Rowland (2013). For critiques, see Heathwood (2009), Cowie 
(2014b), and Ingram (MS). Another way of trying to move the debate forward in favour 
of Mind-Independence is to argue that the idealisation required to make mind-dependent 
theories come close to extensional adequacy cannot be motivated in a principled way. For 
this strategy, see Enoch (2005). For a response, see Sobel (2009). Other argumentative 
strategies are also available. For instance, we might look to experimental philosophy or 
linguistics to improve our view of the substantive moral data. I hope to explore various 
efforts to move the debate forward in future, to see if they succeed in avoiding or 
overcoming temperament. My suspicion is that they won’t, though I am a pessimist. 
17 For a non-evolutionary version of The Debunking Strategy, see Nietzsche (1887). For 
evolutionary versions, see Ruse (1986), Joyce (2006), Street (2006), and Kitcher (2011). 
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There are two core ideas that motivate The Debunking Strategy. 
The first is that we have our moral views because we in some way evolved 
to have them. The second is that appreciation of this evolutionary history 
makes trouble for Mind-Independence, by exposing how our moral views 
are sensitive to the evolutionary ‘aims’ of survival and reproduction, and 
not to a mind-independent moral reality.18 How can we develop these two 
basic thoughts into an interesting argument? Let’s start with the idea that 
evolution influenced our moral views. Debunkers allow that many things 
have had such an influence – culture, rational reflection, and so on – but 
they say that evolution was especially significant. To put it a little crudely, 
a disposition to judge that it is immoral to kill babies would be much more 
likely to promote the survival and reproduction of one’s genes than a 
disposition to judge that it is morally permissible to kill babies. The forces 
of evolution – natural selection, sexual selection, and so on – will thus 
have favoured those with the former disposition. So it’s no surprise that 
we judge killing babies immoral. Of course, evolution didn’t directly select 
all of our specific moral views. The thought is that it does so indirectly, by 
selecting broad evaluative tendencies that then affect our specific moral 
views. 
The first premise in a debunking argument is thus something like 
the following: 
(1) Our substantive moral views are influenced significantly 
by our evolutionary history. 
Note that (1) is an empirical claim. It looks plausible, but a strong reading 
of it isn’t easy to secure. Even detailed discussions come with caveats. For 
instance, Richard Joyce’s answer to the question of how our moral views 
evolved is “provisional and to a degree speculative, since the present 
evidence does not warrant answering the question in either a positive or 
a negative way with any confidence” (2006: 2). Similarly, Philip Kitcher 
says that reconstructing “the actual history of the ethical project, from its 
beginnings to the present, is plainly beyond the evidence available – and 
probably beyond the evidence anyone could ever hope to obtain” (2011: 
11). This will become more important later, as we consider how different 
ways of reading (1) can affect the viability of debunking arguments. But 
what matters now is that something like (1) is any such argument’s first 
premise. 
                                                             
18 Talk of evolutionary ‘aims’ is metaphorical, but useful for my purposes. 
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 The second step in the debunking argument can be summarised 
as follows: 
(2) So, we have no good reason to believe our substantive 
moral views to be mind-independently true. 
This is what many debunkers take to be the key lesson that we can draw 
from (1). To move us from (1) to (2), they observe that we must somehow 
explain the link between our moral views on the one hand and evolution 
on the other. If we take our moral views to reflect a mind-independent 
moral reality, we might explain this by saying that we evolved the ability 
to reliably ‘track’ this part of reality. Just as cheetahs were selected for 
speed, humans were selected to discern mind-independent normative 
truths. This is Parfit’s view.19 Street (2006) calls it ‘The Tracking Account,’ 
and argues that the explanation offered by this account is not as good as 
her own. According to what Street calls ‘The Adaptive Link Account’, we 
have the moral views we do because they helped to form adaptive links 
between our ancestors’ circumstances and advantageous responses to 
those circumstances. For instance, those who tended to experience caring 
for offspring as required tended to have more reproductive success as a 
result. 
Street argues that The Adaptive Link Account is simpler, clearer, 
and more illuminating than The Tracking Account. And this allows the 
move from (1) to (2) – we have no good reason to believe that our moral 
views reflect something mind-independent, because the best explanation 
of evolution’s influence on such views is one that makes no reference to 
such a reality.20 Debunkers might hope to undercut Mind-Independence 
from (1) and (2) alone, but that would be too quick. Katia Vavova (2014) 
points out that we’ll first need something like the following principle: 
(3) If you have no good reason to believe that p, then you 
cannot rationally maintain that p.21 
As we’ll see later on, this principle leads to problems for debunkers. But 
what matters for now is that it helps get them to the conclusion that they 
want. 
                                                             
19 For details, see Parfit (2011 v.2: §119). 
20 Of course, it may still be that a mind-dependent view of moral truth can be given.  
21 This is different to Vavova’s phrasing, but not in a way that matters. This principle is 
endorsed by Street (2015). For related points, see Vavova (2015). 
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 Let’s bring these points together to clarify how this influential 
version of The Debunking Strategy is used against Mind-Independence: 
(1) Our substantive moral views are influenced significantly 
by our evolutionary history. 
(2) So, we have no good reason to believe our substantive 
moral views to be mind-independently true. 
(3) If one has no good reason to believe that p, then one 
cannot rationally maintain that p. 
(4) So, we cannot rationally maintain that our substantive 
moral views are mind-independently true. 
‘One cannot rationally maintain that p’ is more modest than ‘not-p’, so (4) 
doesn’t deny Mind-Independence. This modesty is needed as, clearly, one 
cannot infer not-p from the fact that one has no good reason to believe 
that p. Still, the conclusion makes a strong claim. It is a serious problem 
for Mind-Independence, for it doesn’t rely on divisive moral views. In fact, 
temperament doesn’t seem to play any role here, for the argument centres 
on empirical claims about how we evolved, not on any substantive moral 
intuition. 
 
6.6 Good Reason 
This debunking argument may not rely on substantive moral intuitions, 
but it does rely on a substantive epistemic intuition. This is because it 
relies on (3), which makes a substantive epistemic claim about when one 
can rationally maintain a belief. So we must ask whether (3) is intuitively 
correct.  
 One might well doubt this, for (3) is not the only game in town. To 
see this, consider the contrast the following two principles: 
(3) If one has no good reason to believe that p, then one 
cannot rationally maintain that p. 
(3*) If one has good reason to believe that not-p, then one 
cannot rationally maintain that p. 
Vavova (2014: 85) notes that (3) and (3*) look similar, but are crucially 
distinct. (3) treats beliefs as guilty until proven innocent. It doesn’t allow 
you to rationally maintain that p until you have a good reason for thinking 
it true. (3*) treats beliefs as innocent until proven guilty. It allows that p 




Which of these epistemic norms is intuitively more compelling? 
Vavova argues that (3) is intuitively problematic, for it risks proving too 
much. To see this, consider first that debunkers must see ‘good reason’ as 
referring to a reason that is independent of our substantive normative 
views. They have to say this to avoid responses like those offered by Erik 
Wielenberg (2010), David Enoch (2010b), and Knut O. Skarsaune (2011) 
who try to explain the non-accidental correlation of adaptive moral views 
and the mind-independent moral facts by relying on substantive moral 
claims.  
For instance, Enoch uses the claim that ‘survival is good’ to show 
how correlations may arise. If survival is mind-independently good, then 
moral views that evolved to ‘aim’ at survival will at least roughly match 
the mind-independent moral facts. By showing how the ‘aim’ of survival 
led to moral belief M, we thus support rather than debunk M: survival is 
mind-independently good, M helps survival, so – all else being equal – M 
is mind-independently good. Debunkers respond by saying that this begs 
the question; our reason to maintain that morality’s mind-independence 
is not debunked cannot itself be or rest on any mind-independent moral 
view, for it is precisely such views that are in question. So, in short, a 
‘good’ reason to think this has to be independent of everything that is in 
question. 
 But if this is the case, then (3) proves too much.22 Vavova argues 
that, if we make this independence claim, we have no good reason to think 
that sensory perception leads us to true beliefs: 
[If] we set aside all that is in question, we must set aside all 
beliefs gained by perception. This includes all scientific 
beliefs, like the belief that evolutionary theory is true. 
Without those, we cannot evaluate the rationality of beliefs 
formed by perception. We can test the reliability of a 
particular sense modality by granting the reliability of 
others ... But if we cannot rely on our senses, we have 
nothing with which to evaluate reliability. We have set aside 
too much (2014: 82-83). 
The result is that our justifications will run out, and our beliefs will rest 
on nothing. Operating with (3) thus means that The Debunking Strategy 
collapses into general scepticism. This is a result that debunkers wish to 
avoid. 
                                                             
22 Cf. Shafer-Landau (2012: 12-13). 
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There are two ways for them to go at this point. The first is to stick 
with something much like (3), whilst introducing a principled revision so 
that it stays local to the moral domain and avoids a more general sceptical 
challenge. The second is to replace (3) with (3*), and revise the rest of the 
argument accordingly. I don’t think that either move works, for in the end 
both fail to avoid or overcome temperament. But let’s consider them in 
turn.  
 
6.7 The Temperament in Debunking 
How might debunkers seek to revise (3) so that it stays local to the moral 
domain? The most principled revision is likely to be the following: 
(3-sui-generis) If one has no good reason to believe that p, 
where p commits us to a sui generis property, 
then one cannot rationally maintain that p. 
The idea is that we must be wary of accepting sui generis properties. After 
all, such properties are unique and thus discontinuous with other aspects 
of reality. They create a less simple and unified picture, and can thus seem 
awkward additions to an ontology. So maybe we should treat beliefs that 
commit us to them as guilty until proven innocent. Of course, most beliefs 
don’t commit us to sui generis properties. But if moral beliefs do, as many 
have thought, then (3-sui-generis) allows a revised debunking argument 
to go through without its overgeneralising. This revised argument could 
make problems for our moral beliefs whilst leaving all of our other beliefs 
intact.23 
 My worry about this idea is that there is room for temperamental 
division about (3-sui-generis). To see this, note that it is motivated by the 
appeal of simplicity and unity. The idea is that we should be suspicious of 
properties that are discontinuous with the rest of reality, for they create 
a more complex and disunified view. But we differ in the extent to which 
we share this suspicion. We differ in how attractive we find simplicity and 
unity, and in how we weigh these against a need to save the appearances. 
And this is a matter of temperament. Some are temperamentally inclined 
to save all of the appearances, even if it entails a more complex and less 
unified view of reality. Others, however, are willing to save most and not 
all of the appearances, if it will mean a simpler and more unified view of 
reality. 
                                                             
23 Note that a revised argument will need an additional premise stating that moral beliefs 
do in fact commit us to sui generis moral properties. 
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(3-sui-generis) might well seem an attractive epistemic norm to 
those who are temperamentally inclined to accept a simpler theory that 
fails to capture some of the appearances, but it will be far less attractive 
to those who are temperamentally inclined to accept the more complex 
theory that can deliver all the appearances. So, if a revised version of the 
debunking argument were to rely on this principle, it still wouldn’t move 
the debate forward. A stalemate would re-emerge at a different level, for 
some will be inclined to reject (3-sui-generis) and others will be inclined 
to accept it, and this divergence in substantive epistemic intuition is liable 
to become entrenched because it is linked to temperamental differences. 
So, this is not the best way for a debunker to go. I can’t think of a similarly 
principled revision to (3) that will do better, so let’s consider the second 
move.  
The second move is to reject (3) and its variants altogether, and 
to move instead to (3*). If we make this move, we will also need to change 
the second premise in the debunking argument. The revised argument 
would go as follows: 
(1) Our substantive moral views are influenced significantly 
by our evolutionary history. 
(2*) So, we have good reason to believe that our substantive 
moral views are not mind-independently true. 
(3*) If one has good reason to believe that not-p, then one 
cannot rationally maintain that p. 
(4) So, we cannot rationally maintain that our substantive 
moral views are mind-independently true. 
This argument probably provides the most promising way to develop The 
Debunking Strategy. But it is also problematic, for now the debunker has 
to do something rather tricky. Specifically, they have to show that we 
have good reason to doubt that our moral views are mind-independently 
true.  
This is not easy. A move from (1) to (2*) is hard to pull off, for (2*) 
is much stronger than (2). To deliver (2*) we need a strong reading of (1). 
We need to demonstrate that, directly or indirectly, evolutionary forces 
had by far the most significant impact on our moral views, for modest 
readings of (1) – according to which evolutionary forces are an influence, 
but not the only and not the biggest – won’t permit the move to (2*). The 




Consider a modest reading of (1). William FitzPatrick argues that, 
whilst evolution gave us capacities to reason in various fields, applying 
these to specific and sophisticated matters is something that happens in 
“cultural contexts, through relevant forms of training within traditions of 
inquiry into the subject matter in question” (2015: 887). Our cognitive 
capacities might thus non-accidentally track truths in some domain, even 
if the materials for their development evolved.24 And this is in fact how 
various areas of inquiry work: knowledge of complex mathematical and 
metaphysical facts requires training in a cultural context, even if the raw 
materials required for reasoning about mathematical and metaphysical 
questions came from evolutionary forces. A similar claim can be made for 
ethics. On this modest approach, you can agree with (1) without thinking 
that it implies (2*). For on this view, evolution has an impact insofar as it 
provided us with the materials needed for moral or normative reasoning, 
but moral and normative views develop within culture, and it is here that 
our capacity to reason is trained to discern mind-independent facts in this 
area of inquiry. So, a modest view of (1) is evidently not going to entail 
(2*). 
We can now ask whether the modest view of (1) is obviously less 
convincing than the ambitious view. Recall that the ambitious view tells 
us that, directly or indirectly, evolution had by far the biggest impact on 
our normative views. This is a strong empirical claim, and it will be hard 
to get the evidence that would be required to vindicate it. As we’ve seen, 
even Joyce and Kitcher observe that the relevant evolutionary claims are 
speculative. The strong view of (1) has yet to be secured, so it is a gamble 
to rely on it to deliver (2*). To be clear, I’m not saying that the strong view 
is false, and I’m not saying that the modest view suggested by FitzPatrick 
is true. I’m just saying that the fact of the matter is not now clear. And it 
may never become clear, given that (as Kitcher says) we’ll probably never 
discover the empirical evidence that will be required to confidently and 
accurately reconstruct the actual history of our substantive normative 
views. 
                                                             
24 We must take care. There’s evidence that norm-thought is not a cultural application of 
highly general rational capacities, but is itself evolved (Sripada and Stich 2006). I accept 
this, but it doesn’t conflict with my point. Even if evolution gave us capacities for specific 
domains, these are developed within cultures, and are applied in more subtle ways than 
they will have been by our ancestors. They are also applied in concert with other rational 
capacities, often in (semi-)public debates. This gives an empirically kosher view of (1) that 
is more modest even than The Adaptive Link Account. Thanks to Alex Duval for discussion. 
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So, we have at least two live options when it comes to interpreting 
the first premise in the debunking argument. One of these permits a move 
to (2*), but the other doesn’t. It may be that time will tell in the debunker’s 
favour, or it may be that time will tell in favour of Mind-Independence. In 
the meantime, we can plausibly suppose that what divides defenders and 
critics of The Debunking Strategy are temperament and existential need. 
Given that the fact of the matter is not at present clear-cut, there is space 
for temperamental factors to play a bigger role in shaping our ultimate 
views of this question. Whilst some are temperamentally inclined to think 
that the evidence favours the more ambitious interpretation of (1), others 
are temperamentally inclined to think that it favours the more modest 
interpretation. We are again divided by our temperaments and existential 
needs. 
Of course, even though we may never get the empirical evidence 
required to decide between the two readings of (1), it is also possible that 
we will. It would thus be premature to claim that The Debunking Strategy 
cannot succeed in moving things forward. Still, what we’ve seen in this 
section is that it has yet to move things forward, and that it might never 
do so. So we can at least say that a belief in Mind-Independence has yet to 
be undercut by The Debunking Strategy. The stalemate just re-emerges 
at another level, and we should be open to the possibility that it won’t go 
away. 
 
6.8 The Limits of Metaethics 
There are other ways of trying to move the debate forward. In §2.8 I said 
that Robust Realism should be defended primarily by (non-substantive) 
metaphysical argument. Maybe a scrupulously metaphysical approach, 
centring on the development and comparison of ways moral reality might 
be, can avoid divisive temperamental factors. I hope so, but even here I’m 
not sure. A metaphysical approach seems more promising than the moral 
approach, but I suspect that it will still be hard to overcome temperament 
and move forward. I don’t suggest that it will be impossible. Now that we 
have an idea of what holds us back, we are in a far better position to see 
how we can move forward. Yet we have just seen reason to be pessimistic 
about one of the most influential attempts to do this, so it is worth asking 
what we should do if all efforts fail. Not because we are prematurely 
concluding that progress is unachievable, but because it may bring some 




 Suppose, then, that there is no way out of the stalemate. Can we 
continue making arguments, even though we know that they won’t be 
dialectically effective for those who differ in temperament? What would 
metaethical discourse be like if we stopped the attempt to convince one 
another of what we take to be the truth about moral reality? Would there 
still be life in our debates? Can we carry on with more limited ambitions? 
I think so. For one thing, even if we cannot convince opponents of what 
we take to be the truth, we can do other stuff. I noted in §6.2, for example, 
that difficult cases can be used to preach to the choir, and can expose and 
elucidate a theory’s commitments. These activities are interesting and 
philosophically important, even if they rarely involve changing anyone’s 
view. 
 The more challenging question is whether it can be intellectually 
acceptable to believe a theory when you know that at least some of your 
epistemic peers persistently disagree with you about it. Some think that, 
in such circumstances, the rational thing to do is to suspend judgement.25 
Perhaps this is sometimes the case – for instance, when there is a good 
chance that further investigation will clear things up – but it is has less 
attraction in this situation. We’re assuming that various attempts to move 
metaethical debate forward have failed, and that we have seen how they 
fail to avoid or overcome the influence of temperament. If we suspend 
judgement, we’ll probably never be entitled to have any metaethical view 
at all. And that seems unattractive, given that – as we’ve seen – theories 
of moral reality can often important to the satisfaction of our existential 
needs. 
A good way to go is to allow that there are circumstances in which 
it is intellectually acceptable to believe some view, even when one’s belief 
is ultimately due more to temperament than argument. There isn’t space 
to develop this possibility in detail here, for it will inevitably raise various 
interesting and difficult epistemological questions. Nevertheless, an idea 
that I find attractive involves emphasising the importance of humility in 
intellectual life. If we are appropriately guided by the virtue of intellectual 
humility, there is plausibly scope for an agent to believe the account of 
normative reasons to which they are temperamentally inclined. This is so 
even if they are unable to give a dialectically effective argument for their 
view.  
                                                             
25 Sidgwick (1907: 341), Kelly (2006), Elga (2007), McGrath (2008), and Crisp (2011). 
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The notion of humility that matters here is one on which it is 
opposed to hubris on the one hand and a lack of self-confidence on the 
other.26 Roughly, humility is the virtue that regulates confidence. As an 
epistemic virtue, it helps epistemic agents to avoid serious excesses and 
deficiencies of confidence in epistemic activities like forming beliefs and 
making arguments.27 Individuals with the virtue of humility understand 
the strengths and limitations of their own cognitive capacities, and those 
of humanity in general. They form beliefs with an appropriate degree of 
confidence, and argue with a recognition of what argument can and can’t 
achieve.  
It is worth emphasising that, on this view, being humble – that is, 
having the virtue of humility – is not a matter of lacking confidence. In 
fact, humble people can be very confident about the truth of a proposition 
and the effectiveness of an argument for it – when it is clear that p, they 
will be very confident that p. Not excessively confident, of course, but not 
deficient in confidence either. They’ll strike a suitable balance. However, 
when the matter is less clear-cut, humble people might form a belief with 
a lower level of confidence, or they might choose to suspend judgement if 
that will help. It depends on the situation, but we’re discussing a situation 
in which the truth is not just unclear. In addition to being unclear, it is also 
the case that our efforts to find the truth are unavoidably influenced by 
temperament and existential need. What is the humble agent to do in this 
situation? 
When temperament’s impact is unavoidable, so that suspending 
judgement is pointless, this shouldn’t stop humble people from forming 
beliefs. Especially when the issue is so important that abandoning inquiry 
into it would adversely affect their lives. When an issue has great practical 
significance, humble inquirers needn’t ignore it or stay neutral. They can 
engage in inquiry about it, and form beliefs about its subject-matter. But 
their beliefs will be held with appropriate levels of confidence. This might 
be quite low, given the effect that temperament is likely to be having on 
their formation of that belief. Indeed, it might be such a low degree of 
confidence that it doesn’t extend far beyond the belief that this is a way 
things might be. But the belief is one that they are permitted, humbly, to 
form.  
                                                             
26 Humility may oppose various vices, including hubris, vanity, and pretentiousness. For 
more on this, see Roberts and Wood (2006: Ch. 9). 
27 For detailed discussion, see Kidd (forthcoming).   
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In the specific case at issue, we are therefore permitted to argue 
about moral reality, and to form beliefs about the relation between moral 
properties and our attitudes. This is so even if such beliefs are often due 
more to temperament than argument, and even if there is little or no hope 
of overcoming temperament. But we must cultivate humility, so that we 
grasp the level of confidence that is appropriate for these beliefs about 
moral reality. This means that, when people come to different views of 
moral reality, they can rationally maintain their views as long as they are 
appropriately humble about them.28 I suppose that some people might be 
disappointed by the modesty of this approach to metaethical inquiry. 
Others will no doubt see it as reassuringly self-aware. Personally, I tend 




It is too soon to say whether we will eventually overcome the stalemate 
that exists in much of contemporary metaethics. But to do so we will have 
to come up with argumentative strategies that can avoid or overcome the 
influence of temperament. Although the stalemate arises because we tend 
to argue about hard cases – cases about which reasonable and thoughtful 
can persistently disagree – it becomes entrenched because temperament 
and existential need step in and influence our view of moral reality. I have 
given reasons to be pessimistic about a prominent style of argument that 
might seem to move the debate forward at the expense of Robust Realism 
and Mind-Independence. I don’t yet know whether, in the future, we will 
find other ways of arguing that help us to make progress. But if we can’t, 





                                                             
28 One might worry that humble beliefs won’t fully satisfy existential needs. This might be 
right – they won’t do as much as beliefs that we hold confidently. But we’re not entitled to 
high levels of confidence in the situation at issue. And, even if diminishing confidence will 
augment existential dissatisfaction, it won’t do this nearly as much as the abandonment 
of inquiry or the suspension of judgement. Moreover, some existential dissatisfaction may 
be just what is called for in the dialectical situation under consideration. Thanks to Neil 





I am a Robust Realist, and I hope that I am humble about it. I try to be, at 
any rate. Being morally and intellectually virtuous is a lot easier said than 
done.1  
 Humility is especially needed in my case, for there are important 
issues that I have set aside. My primary aim has been to provide Robust 
Realism with a compelling metaphysics. I thus paid little attention to the 
epistemic, semantic, and psychological commitments that are associated 
with this view. There is a reason for this. I said at the start that Robust 
Realism is an essentially metaphysical view. The non-metaphysical claims 
that are associated with it are important and interesting, but they are not 
definitive of Robust Realism. Even so, providing a robustly realistic view 
of moral knowledge, language, and psychology is not something that can 
be set aside forever. I’ll leave this as a task to be undertaken in the future. 
Until it’s completed I must make a special effort to be humble about moral 
reality. 
 So there’s some stuff that I haven’t yet done, and it is stuff that I’ll 
have to do in the future. But there’s also a fair bit that I have done. I have 
argued that it is possible to read claims about moral reality in a robustly 
metaphysical sense. Whilst a substantive moral reading is available, it is 
not the only available reading. I have also argued that the commitment to 
irreducible moral properties is not undermined by the supervenience of 
moral properties on descriptive properties, at least not if we claim that 
there are necessary moral truths. I developed a model of necessary moral 
truths as norms that have had contingent limiting factors stripped away, 
and I have argued that the categoricity of moral norms makes it plausible 
to see moral reality as existing beyond the purview of natural and social 
science. 
 The metaphysical views that I have developed for Robust Realists 
have some motivation, and should be taken seriously. But to say that they 
should be taken seriously is not to say that they are true. I haven’t tried 
to show that Robust Realism is actually true, and I don’t know if we’ll ever 
find a dialectically effective argument for it given the pervasive impact of 
temperament. Maybe we’ll discover such an argument one day. Maybe we 
won’t. 
                                                             
1 Back in §2.6, I pointed out that philosophy PhD programmes are not production lines for 
moral saints. Well, they’re not production lines for epistemic saints either. 
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 This suggests even more work that must be done in the future. We 
need to identify further ways of arguing about moral reality, and we need 
to assess whether they succeed in avoiding or overcoming temperament. 
I tend to be pessimistic about these things. I’m not certain, but I strongly 
suspect that avoiding or overcoming temperament will be so difficult that 
it is unlikely to be achieved by human epistemic agents. And even if we 
do succeed in avoiding or overcoming temperament, it’s not as if this will 
ensure that the nature of moral reality will immediately become clear to 
us.  
 That doesn’t mean we should stop thinking about moral reality, 
of course. I’d be delighted to see arguments that can move things forward, 
and that therefore prove my current pessimism to have been ill-founded. 
Of course, even if we do succeed in moving the debate forward, we’ll still 
have to be humble in our metaethical beliefs. After all, humility is just the 
virtue that regulates confidence. It ensures that we are not excessively or 
deficiently confident in epistemic affairs, and it’s possible that the humble 
metaethicists of the future will be permitted to believe things about moral 
reality with a great deal more confidence than the humble metaethicists 
of the present. To settle this issue, we’ll just have to carry on talking about 
moral reality. We’ll have to seek new ways of arguing, in order to evaluate 
their ability to avoid or overcome temperament. We’ll have to make our 
current theories more refined, in order to put our views on a more secure 
footing. And we’ll have to identify new types of theory, in order to assess 
whether any of them have greater success than those that are currently 
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